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Abstract
Financial innovation is the subject of this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to build up
the first comprehensive theoretical framework able to analyze the causes, nature and
process of financial innovation, in other words the first holistic and integrated approach to
the phenomenon of financial innovation.
Initially, we review a significant part of the available literature on innovation. Then
we discuss the financial innovation-related literature, and incorporate some features from
the general innovation literature. We introduce an analytical framework and model that
accounts for the process of financial innovation. The novelty of the model is that it takes
into account the integral process of financial innovation and for the first time combines
elements from both standard and financial-innovation theory. Initially we present a set of
factors that cause financial innovative activity. Furthermore, we highlight the fact that very
often, more than one cause contributes to the initiation of innovative activity.
In contrast with the existing literature, Silber (1975), Kane (1981), Miler (1986)
and Tufano (1989), we elaborate further on the phenomenon of financial innovation by
taking into account the factors that shape the innovative firm, mostly internal to the
financial institution and very often related with the innovation-originated concepts. Then,
we classify financial innovation according to five criteria, two of them commonly found in
the innovation literature, one novel and the other two derived from the BIS (1986)
classification. Finally, we present seven criteria that a financial innovation fulfils in order
to be successful and "survive".
A further contribution of our model is its dynamic approach. We highlight this
dynamic process, by citing examples of financial innovations that were created in order to
address the shortcomings of existing innovations. In order to provide the supporting
evidence for the above model, we discuss in great detail four clusters of financial
innovation: special bank liabilties, derivative products, securitization and plastic cards.
During our research we encountered many financial innovations that took place in
different places and times and under different circumstances. Our model provided us a
unique analytical framework able to analyze each and every financial innovation in relation
to its causes of emergence, factors that shaped the innovative output, classify in a detailed
way this output and understand the reasons that enabled the survival of this innovation. Our
analytical framework is not a single dimensional linear model but a dynamic, multi-level
framework subject to evolution, able to provide a holistic, integrated and ageless approach.
III
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................1
PART I
1 THEORIES OF INNOVATION AND FINANCIAL INNOVATION
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................................9
1.1 THEORIES OF INNOV ATION................................................................................................................9
1.1.1 HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INNOVATION................................... 9
1.1.1.1 Smith, Marx and Schumpeter...................................................................................................... 9
1.1.1.2 Schumpeter and Darwin ............................................................................................................13
1.1.1.3 Market based theories: the 'supply-push' and the 'demand-pull' approaches........................ 16
1.1.1.4 The evolutionary economics approach to innovation ...............................................................18
1.1.2 THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE EMERGENCE AND DIFFUSION OF INNOV A TION.... .............. ............ 22
1.1.2.1 Market characteristics and innovation...................................................................................... 221.1.2.1.1 Finn size and innovation 25
1.1.2.1.2 Market structure, innovation and uncertainty 30
1.1.2.2 Sectoral differences.................................................................................................................... 34
1.1.2.3 Sources of innovative diversity .................................................................................................. 36
1.1.2.4 Diffusion and profitabilty of innovation ..................................................................................39
1.1.3 SUMMARy...........................................................................................................................................45
1.2 THEORIES OF FINANCIAL INNOV ATION.....................................................................................47
1.2.1 THE PIONEERING THEORIES OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION ............................. .............................. ............47
1.2.1.1 Silber's theory of financial burden.. ............. ............. .................. ....... ....................................... 48
1.2.1.2 Kane's theory of regulatory dialectic ........................................................................................50
1.2.2 ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION ................................................................................51
1.2.3 TYPES AND CLASSIFICATION OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION ..................................................................... 62
1.2.4 BENEFITS AND PROBLEMS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION ......... ....................................... ............. ............ 65
1.3 CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................................................74
2 THE MODEL OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................81
2.1 FACTORS CAUSING FINANCIAL INNOVATIVE ACTIVITY.......................................................82
2.2 THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS IN THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ............................................85 .
2.3 TYPES OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION ..............................................................................................88
2.4 THE FEATURES OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION'S SELECTION.................................................91
2.5 HOW DOES THE MODEL WORK? ....................................................................................................94
2.6 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................................96
IV
PART 11
3 SPECIAL LIABILITIES OF BANKS
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................99
3.1 UNITED STATES ....................................................................................................................................99
3.1.1 A BRIEF MONETARY HISTORY OF THE US.................................................. .........................................99
3.1.2 NEGOTIABLE ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL - NOW ACCOUNTS............................................................. .102
3.1.3 INNOVATIONS LAUNCHED AFTR NOW ACCOUNTS .......................................................... .................108
3.1.4 MONEY MARKET DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS - MMD ACCOUNTS AND SUPER NOW ACCOUNTS.............. ..112
3.2 UNITED KINGDOM.............................................................................................................................116
3.2.1 A BRIEF MONETARY HISTORY OF THE U.K .......................................................................................117
3.2.2 THE PARTICULAR BEHAVIOUR OF BRITISH BANKING LIABILITES........................................................ 121
3.3 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................125
4 DERIVATIVES
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................131
4.1 THE EMERGENCE OF DERIVATIVES PRODUCTS..................................................................... 132
4.1.1 CAUSES FOR THE EMERGENCE OF DERIVATIVES....................................................... ..........................132
4.1.2 ROLE OF REGULATION ............. ........................................................................... ....... ........................134
4.1.3 FUNCTIONS OF OTC AND CLEARING HOUSES.....................................................................................136
4.2 FORWARDS...........................................................................................................................................138
4.2.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF FORWARDS .....................................................................................................138
4.2.2 INCOME AND EXPOSURE FROM FORWARDS ........................................................................................140
4.3 FUTURES ...............................................................................................................................................141
4.3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OFFuTURES.........................................................................................................141
4.3.2 INCOME AND EXPOSURE FROM FUTURES ...........................................................................................142
4.4 SWAPS....................................................................................................................................................143
4.4.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF SWAPS .............................................................. ..............................................143
4.4.2 INCOME AND EXPOSURES OF SWAPS ..................................................................................................145
4.5 OPTIONS................................................................................................................................................148
4.5.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF OPTIONS........................................................................................................ .148
4.5.2 INCOME AND EXPOSURE FROM OPTIONS ...........................................................................................149
4.6 SECOND GENERATION OR ADVANCED DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS...................................... 151
4.6.1 SWAPTIONS........................................................................................................................................152
4.6.2 CREDIT DERIVATIVES............................................ .............................................................................153
4.7 RISK MANAGEMENT AND BANKS.................................................................................................155
4.7.1 PROBLEMATIC PRICING........................................ ..............................................................................155
4.7.2 PROLIFERATION OF DERIVATIVES AND REDUCTION OF RISK ...............................................................157
4.7.3 THE EMERGENCE OFV ALUE AT RISK (VAR) MODEL AND FUTURE TREND .........................................160
4.8 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................................162
v
5 SECURITIZATION
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................169
5.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS................................... 170
5.1.1 DEFINITION OF SECURITIZATION ........................................................................................................170
5.1.2 THE STORY OF SECURITIZATION ..... .......................... ........ ...................... ....... ................... ....... ..... ...... 171
5.1.3 FURTHER REASONS THAT FACILITATED THE EXPANSION OF SECURITZATION .....................................173
5.1.3.1 The syndicate story...................................................................................................................173
5.1.3.2 The similar path of Off Balance Sheet finance and securitization ........................................174
5.1.4 STRUCTURE OF SECURITIZATION .......................................................................................................175
5.1.4.1 Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)................................................................................................176
5.1.4.2 Credit Enhancement ................................................................................................................178
5.2 ASSET BACKED PRODUCTS ............................................................................................................180
5.2. i THE HISTORY OF PAss-THROUGH ............. ......... ............................. ..................... ....................... ..... ..180
5.2.2 THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION AND OTHER PASS-THROUGH
SECURITIES.................................................................................................................... ............................. 182
5.2.3 PAY-THROUGH SECURITIES................................................................................................................183
5.2.4 OTHER TYPES OF ASSET BACKED SECURITES.....................................................................................186
5.3 THE UK EXPERIENCE........................................................................................................................190
5.4 SECURITIZATION AND BANKS.......................................................................................................193
5.4.1 TYPES OF RISK THAT BANKS FACE ...... ............... ............. ................. .......................... ...... .......... ........ 194
5.4.2 BENEFITS OF SECURITIZATION. ..........................................................................................................196
5.4.3 PROBLEMS EMERGING FROM SECURITZATION ...................................................................................201
5.4.4 WHY BANKS SHOULD UNDERTAKE SECURITIZATION ..........................................................................205
5.5 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................206
6 PLASTIC CARDS
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................213
6.1 HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT CARDS ........................................................................214
6.1.1 TRAVEL AND ENTERTAINMENT CARDS ..............................................................................................214
6.1.2 BANK CREDIT CARDS......... .......... ...................... ................... ...... .......... ......... ..... ............. ............. ..... 2 i 6
6.1.2.1 Bank credit cards in the United States...................................................................................... 2 16
6.1.2.2 Bank cards in the United Kingdom...........................................................................................218
6.1.2.3 The main features of credit cards .............................................................................................219
6.1.3 PROPRIETARY AND AFFINITY CARDS .................................................................................................222
6.2. OTHER PLASTIC CARDS...................................................................................................................224
6.2.1 DEBIT CARDS .... ......... ......................... ............. ..................................... ......... ....... ............... ... ..... ...... 225
6.2.2 SMART CARDS ...................................................................................................................................228
6.3 REASONS AFFECTING THE PROLIFERATION OF PLASTIC CARDS....................................230
6.3.1 TECHNOLOGICAL REASONS....... .... ................. .... ....... ............. .... ........ ....... ............ .......... ... ..... ...........230
6.3.1.1 Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) and Point Of Sales (POS) .....................................................231
6.3.1.2 Automated Teller Machines (ATM)...........................................................................................233
6.3.2 BANKS PROFITABILITY AND DEVELOPMENTS .....................................................................................235
6.3.3.1 The US developments................................................................................................................236
6.3.3.2 UK developments......................................................................................................................241
6.4 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................244
Vi
7. CONCLUSION
7.1 THE MODEL .........................................................................................................................................249
7.1.1 THE CAUSES OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION ......................... ....... ...................... ................... ....... ...... ..... 250
7.1.2 FACTORS SHAPING FINANCIAL INNOVATIVE ACTIVITy.... .................. ......... .......... ....................... ........253
7.1.3 TYPES OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION..................................................................................................... 255
7.104 SUCCESSFUL FEATURES OF INNOVATIONS.......... ............. ..................................... .............................. 259
7.2 THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF THE MODEL ...................................................................................261
7.3 FURTHER RESEARCH .......................................................................................................................263
Appendices (A)..................................................................................................................265
Table of appendices (A)...................................................................................................266
Tables (T)..........................................................................................................................276
List of tables.................................................~i.......................................~i.............................294
Bibliography .....................................................................................................................295
Vii
ABC
ABS
ATM
ATS
BIS
CA
CAR
CARD
CCBN
CC
CCC
CD
CMA
CML
CMO
DIDC
DIDMCA:
EFT
EFTPOS
FDIC
Fed'
FHLMC
FNMA
FRA
FRN
GMC
GNMA
ICA
IMF
MBS
MINI
MMC
MMD
MMDA
MMMD
MMMF
NBFI
NBI
NOW
OBS
OTC
PC
PLC
Abbreviations
Assets Backed Certificate
Asset Backed Security
Automated Teller Machine
Automatic Transfer Service
Bank of International Settlements
Capital Adequacy
Certificate of Automobile Receivables
Certificate for Amortizing Revolving Debt
Credit Card Backed Notes
Cash Concentration
Competition and Credit Control
Certificate of Deposit
Cash Management Account
Centralized Mortgage Lenders
Collaterized Mortgage Obligation
Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
Electronic Fund Transfer
Electronic Fund Transfer Point Of Sale
Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation
Federal Reserve Board
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Federal National Mortgage Association
Forward Rate Agreement
Floating Rate Notes
Guaranteed Mortgage Certificate
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae)
Interbank Card Association
International Monetary Fund
Mortgage Backed Security
Mortgage Intermediary Note Issue
Money Market Certificates
Money Market Deposit
Money Market Deposit Account
Money Market Mutual Deposit
Money Market Mutual Fund
Non Banking Financial Intermediary
National BankAmericard service Incorporated
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal
Off Balance Sheet
Over The Counter
Participation Certificate
Product Life Cycle
Viii
POS
POW
PSL
R&D
RP
S&L
SEC
SPY
SSC
TIE
VaR
Point Of Sales
Payment Order of Withdrawal
Public Sector Liquidity
Research and Development
Repurchase Agreement, (Repos)
Savings and Loans
Securities and Exchange Commission
Special Purpose Vehicle
Small Savers Certificates
Travel and Entertainment
Value at Risk
IX
Introduction
Introduction
".....the Necessity offorming abstract Ideas, and universal Theorems, arises perhaps from
the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or
Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeness of the human
Capacity above our Imagination. "
T. Hutcheson , 1988
Introduction
Introduction
This research is about financial innovation in the banking sector of the US and the
UK over the last thirty years. The purpose of this study is, to discuss the phenomenon of
financial innovation, and build up a comprehensive theoretical framework by which to
analyze the causes, nature and process of financial innovation, using examples from the US
and the UK. We have also to add that we are going to discuss the phenomenon of financial
innovation from the micro economic perspective i.e. from the banking financial institutions'
point of view. Before discussing financial innovation we have to briefly discuss certain
major innovation-related issues.
It is certain that, innovation is extremely important for the capitalist system
regardless of whether someone is pre-occupied with its evolution (Smith 1776) or its
destruction (Marx 1848). Unquestionably, the first economist who paid particular attention
to innovation's role in the economic system was Schumpeter (1912). In addition prominent
evolutionary economists declared that innovation and selection characterize the dynamic
interpretation of the economy; explaining that innovation destroys the existing
organizational routines and creates new ones (Nelson and Winter 1974).
From another angle, the financial sector day after day becomes of paramount
importance for the economic development and growth of the world. Financial innovation is
crucial for any development in the financial sector (Gardener 1988). Consequently,
financial innovation is considered to be the 'engine' (Merton 1992) of the economy.
Financial innovation is a reflection and a cause for the structural changes observed since
the 1980s (Llewellyn 1992).
Introduction
The history of economic thought on financial innovation is not as deep-rooted as
standard innovation theory. The current literature on financial innovation is shaped by the
approaches of the pioneers Silber (1975) and Kane (1981). Both of them are extremely
useful, but the former is very general and the latter is considered very narrow. Other
economists such as Van Horne (1985), Miler (1986), Llewellyn (1992), and Merton
(1992), concentrated their effort on the potential causes of financial innovation. Other
researchers paid particular attention to classification, such as the BIS (1986) report,
Walmsley (1988) or Tuffano (1990). But all of them failed to provide a more integrated
and holistic approach that discusses the phenomenon of financial innovation. The only
comprehensive effort was the BIS (1986) report that discussed, in considerable depth, both
causes and types. But primarily, it failed to address significant areas of financial innovation
such as the financial institution and successful features of financial innovation and
secondly, further developments took place since its publication which showed it to be
inadequate.
To be more precise, none of the above contributions managed to address the
phenomenon of financial innovation under a wider spectrum, able to provide a
comprehensive analytical framework, and a modeL. The fragmented nature of their
approaches did not offer an integrated insight taking into account causes, financial
institutions, types and successful features of financial innovations. They were also
extremely reluctant to adopt concepts emanating from standard innovation theory.
Furthermore, they did not provide numerous and in-depth examples in order to support
their approaches. Finally, all authors apart from Kane (1981) and Merton (1992) omitted
the dynamic perspective of the phenomenon of financial innovation. Besides, Kane (1981)
discussed only a particular case of dynamic response, attributed to external reasons (re-
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regulation) and Merton (1992) proposed only, a one-way, dynamic approach justifying the
emergence, standardization and further development of a particular financial innovation.
Hence there is significant scope for research, in order to create a model and
construct an analytical framework that wil provide a holistic, integrated insight into the
financial innovative process. Such an analytical framework would be better equipped to
explain the innovative process than a narrow and self-limited - due to its fundamental
assumptions - formal modeL. In a fundamentally uncertain world, involving endless
multilevel equilibria (Nelson and Winter 1974), an analytical framework capturing multiple
causality and dynamics is very usefuL. This model and framework requires also
considerable supportive evidence from existing financial innovations. We made an attempt
to create this model and offer. the appropriate analytical framework, backed up by the
relevant supportive evidence.
In order to create this model of financial innovation we follow a particular
methodology. We wil initially review the standard innovation theory literature, in order to
extract an initial model of economic evolution and some concepts related to innovative
activity applicable to all sectors and industries. Then, we wil review the existing literature
on financial innovation in order to create a new wide set of causes, integrate novel factors
that shape the innovative process - for the first time - inside the financial institution,
provide an adequate process of the emergence of innovations, a detailed and adequate
descriptive and novel classification, and finally a novel set of successful features of
financial innovations. We also take into account the dynamic perspective of this model and
finally support it with adequate evidence from the financial sector. In order to provide the
supportive evidence, we have to make a comprehensive presentation and synthesis, from
the numerous financial innovations, into a coherent group and follow their development.
This synthesis is in itself a further contribution.
3
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Our model of financial innovation wil provide us a unique analytical framework
that wil enable us to assess the potential causes of innovative activity, formulate a set of
factors that shape this activity, classify accurately and detailed the innovative output and
look for a set of criteria in order to have the emergence of a successful financial innovation.
Our approach is not restricted to a particular set of innovations or financial system and it is
not static, single dimensional or deterministic. It provides a multi-level, dynamic model,
open to further evolution, applicable to any financial innovation in any financial system.
During our research, we had to make some choices, initially in relation to time and
place. We decided to discuss the two most advanced financial systems of similar
characteristics, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK); this would allow us
to identify different innovative processes arising from similar but not identical systems. We
decided to cover a period of thirty years in order, primarily, to have a significant amount of
supportive evidence and secondly because of the fact that, since the 1960's, significant
innovations have taken place, such as securitization, NOW accounts, the massive adoption
of plastic cards by banks and later financial derivatives. We had to make some choices in
relation to the innovations that we decided to investigate; we investigated two
predominately retail or commercial banking products such as special deposits liabilities and
plastic cards and two more corporate or investment banking products, such as derivatives
and securitization.
Our choices do not imply that other products such as loans or equity-related
products were unimportant or of a trivial nature. We had to take some decisions, given the
limitation of time and resources. The above four product clusters were chosen because they
represent a significant part of banks' activities and exhibit very interesting innovative
trajectories. These features were not abundant in the other two types of products: equity
related financial products (BIS, 1986) and loans, which did not show the same innovative
4
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activity as the already-mentioned products. We are going to investigate the phenomenon of
financial innovation from a microeconomic perspective. We adopted an appropriate
classification: external, internal and mixed causes to the financial institution. This is to be
distinguished from the potential distinction between exogenous and endogenous causes of
financial innovation, which apply rather to the context of macroeconomics and growth
theories. Furthermore, as we are going to mention in the last chapter, there is scope for
further research on these products in the future.
In order initially to build up the model and the analytical framework of financial
innovation, and then the supportive evidence, we are going to structure our research in two
parts.
The first part is divided into two chapters and provides the literature review, the
model and the analytical framework of the financial innovation process. Initially, we are
going to discuss the available literature on both standard and financial innovation theory.
We are going to discuss briefly the role of evolution in innovation theory and Darwin-
inspired evolutionary economics and we shall refer to factors affecting innovative effort
and pay particular attention to R&D, sectoral differences and aspects that influence the
profitability of innovation. Then we shall review the main theories of financial innovation
and classification of the innovative output as well as the potential benefits and
shortcomings of financial innovative activity
In the second chapter we are going to present our model and analytical framework.
It is divided into four stages, causes, the financial institution, classification and successful
features. We are going to include also a dynamic element in order to endow it with an
evolutionary and dynamic perspective.
The second part is divided into four chapters and provides a comprehensive
synthesis of four cluster of financial innovation and the supportive evidence for our modeL.
5
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The third chapter discusses the emergence of special bank liabilties in the US an the UK
such as NOW and Super NOW accounts, MMDA, MMMF, ATS, and in the UK CDs and
interest-bearing accounts.
In the following chapter, we analyze the emergence and proliferation of financial
derivatives such as forwards and futures contracts, swap agreements, financial options,
swaptions, credit derivatives and Var models.
The fifth chapter discusses the securitization phenomenon in the US and the UK,
and particularly SPY, credit enhancement, Ginnie Mae, PCs, CMO's, and other asset
backed securities, and in the UK, MINI, HOMES.
The final chapter of the second part analyses the emergence of plastic cards in the
US and the UK. The most common examples are credit cards, debit cards, smart cards,
EFT/POS and ATMs.
During our conclusion, we are going to recapitulate all the supportive evidence, in
the light of the analytical framework which had been developed in chapter 2. This allows
us to reassess the capacity of the resulting model to provide a significant insight and
capture the dynamic nature of financial innovation. At the end of this chapter, we are going
to propose areas of potential future research.
In this introduction, in summary, we have discussed the theme of our research,
starting from the shortcomings of existing academic work, and the scope for our endeavor.
We also elaborated on the structure of our research; We proceed now, in the first chapter,
to review the existing literature on theories of innovation and financial innovation.
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1 Theories of Innovation and Financial Innovation
Introduction
During this chapter we shall discuss innovation and financial innovation related literature.
The first part of this chapter is related to theories of innovation. We are going to investigate
the different perspectives II relation to whether invention, technical change and
innovations are considered as endogenous or exogenous to the economic system. By
discussing its endogeneity, we wil be able to understand later the factors that affect its
emergence.
Then we shall enrich our insight by applying some analogies between economic
and innovative activity, and the theory of evolution. These analogies highlight the
evolutionary nature of the economy via innovative activity and the selection process that
takes place among firms. This economic evolution differs from the natural one since it is
not random; it follows a path and has a predetermined target: profitability. This profitability
is not the neo-classical predetermined one; it is a much more complex concept. It is
associated with the notion of survival in a continuously evolving economic context, where
innovative activity is the only way to succeed.
Then we shall discuss the two main approaches of the theory of innovation: supply-
push and demand-pulL. The former is going to be enriched by the evolutionary economics
approach in order to provide a more dynamic interpretation of the phenomenon of
innovation. This interpretation requires also a discussion of the importance of firm size and
market structure for the innovative effort. This discussion provides us with a plethora of
concepts and theories; in order to adopt a more structured approach we shall introduce the
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concept of sectoral differences and cumulativeness of the innovation. Finally we shall
investigate some concepts related with the profitability and diffusion of innovation in order
to better understand the factors that shape the innovative effort of a successful innovation.
The second part of this chapter is devoted to the financial innovation theories.
Initially we shall discuss the first two theories that discussed the phenomenon of financial
innovation and proposed a set of causes. Then we shall review other more recent but
equally important contributions on causes of financial innovation. Sometimes researchers
repeat already advanced causes but we wil create a synthesis of underlying causes that
could initiate the financial innovation. This review wil provide us with a set of thirteen
causes that could be subdivided into three categories that we shall use in our modeL. The
next area that we shall discuss is the types and classifications of financial innovations in
the literature. Some of these types are very general and some of these classifications are
very narrow. But we are going to alter some of them and use others in order to find the
most appropriate ones for our modeL. Finally, we shall discuss the benefits and problems
that could be created from financial innovation. We are going to use the benefits as features
that wil make a financial innovation successful, while problems could be a cause for
further financial innovations.
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Part I Theories of Innovation and Financial Innovation
Chapter one
'If I had been taught in my youth all the truths of which I have since sought
demonstrations... I would never have acquired the habit and ability that I believe
I possess, always to find truths in proportion to the effort I made to find them... '
Rene Descartes (1526)
Part! Theories of Innovation and Financial Innovation
1.1 Theories of innovation
During the first part of this chapter, we are going to discuss the innovation related theories.
We are going to review their historic development and highlight the factors that could
influence the innovative activity.
1.1.1 History of economic thought, technological change and innovation
The first section is devoted to discussing innovation's place in the history of
economic thought; when it was first mentioned and whether it was perceived as exogenous
or endogenous to economic variables. After a brief reference to Smith, Marx and Hicks we
develop mainly Schumpeter's work and his paramount contribution, and Galbraith's
complementary views. We add the analogy between innovative activity and Darwin's
theory of evolution. Then we are going to discuss the 'supply-push' and 'demand-pull'
theories of innovation. We conclude with the evolutionary approach to theory advanced
initially by Nelson and Winter;
1.1.1.1 Smith, Marx and Schumpeter
The currently generally accepted point that innovation is the main source of
enterpreneurial dynamism was not always an unanimous point. This is mainly because
innovation is related with the famous 'black box' i.e. the enterprise, and it was not one of
the most popular themes of classical economists such as Hume, Ricardo, Malthus or Mil
(Humanidis 1995). But two very prominent classical economists, Adam Smith (1776) and
Karl Marx (1848), were the first to pay particular attention to the complicated relationship
between scientific progress, market conditions, diminishing returns and innovative activity.
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Smith was the first to attribute two important elements to technical advance in order
to connect it with economic activity: the required financial investment and the potential
advantage and commercial gains that it could provide. By observing the industrial
revolution and the significance of the division of labour in the process of improvement of
production, he realised that the main improvements were originated by individuals seeking
truth for its own sake. This makes it difficult for us to categorise these improvements and
advances as endogenous or exogenous to the economic system, but at least he gave them a
prominent place in his writings. He distinguished three types of invention and innovations:
labour-emanated, specialised and technician-emanated and speculative or the combination
of different components or technologies, (See appendix (A-1.1) which sumarizes the
classification for a range of key thoughts.) This contrasts with Malthus and Ricardo, who
considered the advancement in technology as exogenous to the economic system (Kamien
and Schwartz 1982).
The first to perceive innovative activity as entirely endogenous was Marx, who
discusses technological change from a different angle. He is the first to further analogise
with biology and describe the economy as a changing organism where technological
advance occurred from within the organism. The owners of the means of production did not
merely initiate, but mostly reacted to, and took advantage of the technological change
(Kamien and Schwartz 1982). Consequently, Marx considered innovation as part of the
normal operational strategy of existing enterprises (Oakley 1985) and not as Schumpeter,
who treated the innovator as an 'outsider'; capitalist enterprises were perceived by Marx as
inherently innovative.
It is easy to understand why classical economists did not give much thought to the
particular character of progress in the emergence of innovations. Technical advance
frequently depended on the right person being in the right place at the right time. While
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Galvani was dissecting frogs, he realised the electrical properties of metals, the basis of
batteries. Watt's development of the steam engine began with his attempt to repair an
earlier engine of Newcomen, and Bassemer's steel-making process preceded its scientific
foundation. It was not until 1876 that competition among manufacturers of dyes compelled
Farbenfabriken Vorm, Friedrich Bayer & Co of Elberfeld in Westphalia to hire professional
chemists and establish the first industrial research laboratory. This example was followed
by Eastman Kodak (1893), General Electric (1900) and AT&T (1925). As Freeman (1982)
stressed, the corpus of knowledge (macromolecule and physical chemistry, nuclear physics
and electronics) could never have emerged from casual observation, craft skils or from
trial and error in existing production systems as was the case with many earlier
technologies.
Later, Hicks in his 'Theory of Wages' (1932), makes a serious effort to bring some
insight to the occurrence of technological advance. He divided it into two components:
autonomous and induced. The second takes the form of the substantial amount of technical
advance that was induced by producers attempting to reduce their need for expensive
factors of productions. It is obvious that producers have a significant active role in
determining their technology, hence we have a clear sign of at least partial endogeneity.
Unquestionably the economist whose name is associated irrevocably with
innovation is Joseph Alois Schumpeter. He accepted ideas outside the Austrian School and
particularly from Walras. He placed high hopes in mathematics and empirical research. He
tried to explain the development of the capitalist market system as a complicated
integration of historical facts and philosophical-sociological considerations. He perceived
the role of innovations as the development that breaks the stationary economy and
generates an equilibrium position on a higher leveL.
11
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In more detail in 1912 in his 'Theory of economic development', he recognises
economic development as a process which originates from within the system; hence the
driving forces are inherent to the system. He focused on the microeconomic fundamentals
in order to define these forces and identified innovation as a source of change. He defined
innovation as the success of new combinations covering five cases: new products, new
production processes, access to new markets, exploitation of new sources of raw
materials and implementation of new organisational structures (see appendix (A-1.1)).
He also stresses that the role of the entrepreneur is characterised by imagination,
creativity and striving for power over others. His motivation is to break the circular flow of
income and to pursue even temporary profits and quasi-rents 
I through the introduction of
innovation. These developments destroy the old way, in other words the entrepreneur is
deeply involved in this 'creative destruction', in striking contrast with the static-oriented
manager whose activity is in conformity with the circular flow. The evolution of the
capitalistic market is based on this destruction (Schumpeter 1942).2
He advocated that competition through innovation has the attribute that it is not
restrained by the firm's acknowledged rivals. Uncertainty is fundamental and he believed
that monopoly power and large size could reduce it. He predicted the gradual decline of the
role of the entrepreneur and the emergence of large, management-driven enterprises3 and
that innovation was going to take place in huge research laboratories functioning in a
controlled, routinized and impersonal manner.
This point was also supported by Galbraith, one of the leading 'institutionalists'
who perceived the institutional structure of the US as an interconnection of ideology,
politics and economics. A key factor is large corporations which free themselves from
market constraints. In relation to innovation, he declared that the era of cheap invention
was over (Schumpeter 1952). Hence the remaining costly inventions required significant
12
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resources and technological expertise. Consequently they could only be undertaken with
resources of the magnitude commanded mainly by large firms. He also adhered to the
Schumpeterian concept of competition through innovation as the more efficient type of
innovation since it is very difficult to tacitly restrain and control it.
To summarise, during this subsection, we have discussed the emergence and
perception of innovation in economic thought and its place in the economic system. Smith
stressed the importance of technology via specialisation and division of labour. Marx
stressed its importance for the evolution of the capitalist system, and its endogenous nature.
Hicks discussed the endogenous part of technological advance. Finally, Schumpeter
highlighted its importance for economic change and agreed with Galbraith in their
prediction that large firms are better fitted to undertake it. In the following section we wil
propose an analogy between Schumpeter's economic theory and Darwin's evolutionary
theory.
1.1.1.2 Schumpeter and Darwin
During this section we are going to discuss the potential application of Darwin's
evolutionary theory (more fully explained in appendix (A-1.3J) to Schumpeterian
economics. It is possible to derive some very interesting analogies and a model to explain
the capitalist system and particularly its change and evolution, by the 'creative destruction'
of the system (see Hodgson, 1995 and Kelm, 1996).
Darwin proposed that the evolution of all species follows a concrete trajectory.
Initially there is information storage by which relatively stable characteristics are preserved
over time, then there is an endogenous change by which new variations are constantly
randomly generated and finally the selective retention by which the frequency of some
variations relative to others is increased. The final selection is based on the fittest variation
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that could live long enough in order to pass its adaptive variation to its offspring. The
above universally applicable trajectory led him to propose the cumulative causation
theory.4
If we remove the particular biological content, we derive a model and a theory that
could explain the process of endogenous change and identify the fundamental mechanisms
of information storage, endogenous change and selective retention.
The Information storage takes place in business routines.s Like genes, they contain
information about individual habits and organisational behaviour. They yield an inherent
inflexibility and predictability, but also routines facilitate the daily tasks and reduce the
need for limited cognitive capabilities even if they could often act as approximate
temporarily rational optimisation.
The second stage of Darwin's theory is the endogenous change. By conceiving of
innovation as the mechanism of endogenous change we could then analogise further with
biology where this change is driven by mutation and recombination.6 We can find
similarities with the process of industrial mutation which incessantly changes the economic
structure from within. Schumpeter's broad concept of innovation comprised all instances of
'doing things differently' and 'any change in the channels of economic routine.....arising
from within the system' (Kelm 1996, p12). Innovation is a 'sui generis' task whose
difficulty consists of the resistance and uncertainties inherent in doing what has not been
done before. This 'genuine uncertainty' which consists in the 'unlistability of all possible
outcomes resulting from a course of action' (ibid).
But despite the uncertainty, these innovations are not random in the same way as
biological ones. We could identify many elements such as conscious rationality, intuition,
perceptiveness, wil and leadership embodied in entrepreneurship which provide a guided
variation based on the existence of adaptive standards. These standards are the expected
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profits through low costs and differentiation. Both require at least some equilibrating
tendencies - a major Schumpeterian concept - in relation to the existing price (Kelm 1996).
Finally the third stage of Darwin's evolution, natural selection is associated with the
selective retention expressed under the profit seeking goal i.e. the generated variations are
not random since they are guided by the above-mentioned adaptive standards. Natural
selection is the differential survival and reproduction and could not be judged as moral,
immoral or providential; it is a pure observation or empirical fact. The existence of an
active agent gives birth to the selective retention mechanism that exists taking into account
the possibility of imitation and even further learning opportunities. This interaction
between innovation and later imitation has the character of a cumulative learning process.
The transmission process is biased by the adaptive standards i.e. profits plus the element of
chance.
Schumpeter's competition concept of differential survival of firms could constitute
an analogy with the Darwinian concept of selective retention. The absence of a central
conscious agent accounts for lack of foresight and the appearance of significant scope and
strong incentives for innovation and learning. An innovation could seriously threaten firms
with destruction but at least some of them escape by adapting themselves to the new
environment in a process of biased transmission. We have also to add that these new
opportunities could be considered as positive externalities for existing firms.
To summarise this interpretation of Schumpeter based on Darwin, innovation could
be perceived as a guided variation of routines carried out by entrepreneurs, adaptation to
innovation by biased transmission to other firms and finally elimination of firms incapable
of adaptation by natural selection (Kelm 1996). It is essential to explain that Schumpeter
avoided using Darwin's terminology extensively for the main reason that the period in
which he formulated his theory of economic change was characterised as the triumph of
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positivism; the theory of evolution stil lacked some definite proof (Britannic a 1995). It is
an indisputable fact that Darwin offered a universal framework for evolutionary theories
and elaborated further the point of cumulative causation. In the following section we shall
see more recent theories of innovation.
1.1.1.3 Market based theories: the 'supply-push' and the 'demand-pull' approaches
It was after the second world war that innovation began to appear occasionally in
economic journals and academic papers, mainly from US-based economists where the
theory of innovation drew attention to the market framework. The focus had moved from
its role in the economic system to whether firms are able to determine and improve their
innovativeness. Some authors discussed supply-push theories but the majority of the early
post-war research focused on demand factors that could influence the innovativeness of a
firm.
The 'supply-push' or 'technology-push' theories was initially advanced by Nelson
(1959) and Philips (1966). This approach is partially associated also with the evolutionary
approach (see section 1.1.4 below). The two main points are the advantage that large firms
with large research facilities have and the importance of progress in the scientific base for
the emergence of innovations. Two of the best examples were the invention of laser and
nuclear power which led to numerous commercial, applications unthinkable before. The
technology-push approach could be summarised in the point that the growth of the
scientific basis leads to more competition in industry, but often scientific base and
competitiveness are interdependent.
The main feature of the 'demand-pull' approach is that innovation is initiated from
the marketing or production side of the firm, requiring a response from the research
personneL. The synthesis of cortisone, transistors and celluloid in the chemical sector are
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important examples of the above theory (Schwartz and Kamien 1982). This theory implies
also that large firms with large marketing and research facilities have a comparative
advantage.
Smookler (1966) studied the 'demand-pull' in contrast with the 'technology-push'
theories. He analysed the pressure on innovative activity (or the opportunist behaviour; see
Kamien &Schwartz 1982) and the patenting behaviour of large firms. He proposed the
concept that the effectiveness of any innovation depends on two main factors: the number
of people that use it (size and structure of the market) and their capacity to improve it.
Rosenberg (1979) also adhered himself to this approach and expanded further, as we shall
discuss in the next paragraph. Smookler's innovation is a two sided or coupling activity:
like the two blades of a pair of scissors (Freeman 1982). It requires on the one hand the
recognition of the potential needs and markets and on the other hand the technology and
the result of research.
Other economists have also stressed initially the demand side in opposition to the
scientists 'science push' theories by stating that 'necessity is the mother of invention'.
Rosenberg (1979) cited as a very ilustrative example the chemical sector's efforts in the
1970's to reduce costs, which increased significantly after the oil crisis in 1973. He claimed
that innovators should know the market as Marconi knew the area of wireless
communication and IBM knew the area of personal computers. He used the opposite
examples for EMI in the computer business and AEI, the British firm in radar where
excellent research did not match actual needs.
One of the strongest arguments for the 'demand pull' adherents came from the
SAPPHO project. It tried to propose some general principles by comparing 100 pairs of
innovations in the UK from 1945-1976: one successful innovation and one failure in each
pair,? They identified three main categories: firstly factors in common to every attempt to
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innovate, secondly factors that vary, but not systematically, related to failure and thirdly
measures that discriminated success and failure. They also proposed that specialised rather
than general contacts are important, and that the size of project team is important. Only the
third question is close related with our research and the only clear answer for this was the
degree of 'user-need' understood (Freeman i 982).
The more recent research, investigating innovative activity has focused in a lesser
degree on the science or technological factor, and primarily on the demand factors that
could initiate innovative activity. Freeman (1982) added that the apparently random,
accidental and arbitrary character of the innovative process arises from the extreme
complexity of the interfaces between advancing science, technology and market. Therefore,
firms which monitor the advance in science and technology are better positioned, firms in
close contact with customers could recognise potential markets, and a good management
team is able to link these two flows of information.
During this section, we have highlighted the importance of both suppliers and
potential customers in the innovative process. In the following section, we wil discuss the
evolutionary approach which is trying to integrate more than one aspect of this market-
oriented analysis with the Schumpeterian approach, by sometimes borrowing biological
analogies, and gives us the first idea about the diverse factors that we wil discuss in the
second part.
1.1.1.4 The evolutionary economics approach to innovation
It was mainly after the oil crisis where innovation-related areas, such as inventions,
pattern and diffusion of innovation, began to be one of the most contemporary issues of
economics around the world. A significant part of this 'popularity' was due to the so called
'neo-Schumpeterian' economists, members of the evolutionary economic schooL. They
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challenged many of the fundamental assumptions of the neo-classical approach, such as
profit maximisation and the predictability of economic agents' decisions. We strongly
believe that, their approach could provide a significantly more integrated and holistic
insight and interpretation of the economic system and its components such as innovation.
This section could also be perceived as an introduction to evolutionary economic thought.
It is impossible to discuss the evolutionary approach and omit Thorstein Veblen. He
was one of the most radical thinkers, stressing the important role of giant corporations and
institutions (Veblen 1904). He advocated that humans naturally always tend to improve
their methods of meeting their generic needs by innovating as a result of 'idle curiosity,.8
He also proposed that a theory of innovation has to answer two main questions: is it more
serviceable and is it consistent with the existing distinction ?
Two of the first evolutionary economists were Nelson and Winter (1974) who
focused their research primarily at the firm leveL. They challenged the neo-classical
orthodoxy in proposing the evolutionary interpretation of economic phenomena, by
stressing the Schumpeterian evolutionary approach to understanding capitalism. They
argued that the real competitive environment is characterised by struggle and motion. This
is a dynamic environment where the main forces that enable the evolution and growth of
the economy are innovation and selection. The continuous interaction between the single
firm and its environment is the main component of their evolutionary approach.
This evolutionary approach explains the firm's behaviour as governed by a set of
observable decision rules that are in direct relationship with the environment and are not by
definition related to maximisation. They are not irrevocable but they are characterised by
short-term stability. An important part of these decisions is related to problem-solving and
search procedures. They interact with their environment and their competitors and one
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element of paramount importance for the survival of the firm is the analysis of the selection
procedure.
This approach creates an immediate place for innovation: it is a change of existing
rules and is governed by the observable profit-seeking and problem-solving behaviour of
firms. They observe a remarkable diversity among sectors (something we shall discuss in
1.2.1.2) and the extent that a firm decides to search and innovate depends considerably on
the institutional and environmental conditions of the particular sector and period. In other
words there is a continuous interaction between a firm and its surroundings.
Nelson and Winter (1982) proposed that these routines could be considered as
'organisational memories' and have durable functional characteristics. Every time profits
are below a satisfactory level, management alter these routines. By borrowing biological
terminology, in accordance with the previous section, genes (routines) are subject to
mutations through time. This approach does not conceive the 'variations' as random and
promotes a more Lamarckian interpretation.
Winter (1986) proposed that heavy empirical evidence highlights the importance of
experience and praises adaptive behaviour as the most close approach to real world-
decisions. In order to express the uniqueness of every period and irreversibility of every
decision, Winter did not hesitate to cite the Heracleitean point that it is not possible to step
twice in the same river.9 It is certain that this description of the economic system promotes
the notion of the endogeneity of the innovative process.
In addition, Hodgson (1995a) in accordance with Witts (1991), opposed the
classical mechanistic model where actions are treated as programmed and reactive and
changes are imposed from outside. He also supports the uniqueness of each individual
situation in direct contrast with other economists such as Koestler (1964) who have
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underlined the role of metaphor in creativity. Witt perceived metaphors as useful and a
juxtaposition of two different ideas acting as a cross-fertilsation.
In relation to the predictabilty of 'rational' operating agents, Hodgson (l995a)
observed that these non-linear dynamics could justify the introduction of chaos theory,
which proposes to treat the world always as indeterministic and unpredictable. Novelty is
considered as spontaneous and free, very often associated with innovation. But this
approach raises some key issues: it does not matter if economic agents act in a random or
determinate way, or there is path dependency i.e. history matters is the rule. He believes
that bifurcation and 'butterfly effects' suggest and reinforce irreversibility. Any
amplification of small fluctuations is able to provide endless novelty, can exhibit higher-
order properties. It is obvious that this approach challenges the reductionist theory that a
system could be broken down into parts and each part studied separetely. The association
of innovative activity with this irreversibility is clear.
At this point, Heertje (1988) went much further, arguing that new chaos theory,
complicated equation and non-linear dynamic systems could introduce maths to
Schumpeter's theory and position his theory as a mainstream one. 10
Nelson, Winter, Dosi and Witt proposed as an alternative the strong interaction
between society and the individual i.e. an organicist non-mathematical formalist
approach. i i They argued against the validity of the main neo-classical assumptions that
economic agents are always predictable, profit maximising agents. Innovation and selection
characterise their dynamic interpretation of the economy. Innovation destroys the existing
organisational routines and creates new ones. Unpredictability is also supported by the
existence of endless multilevel temporal equilibria in the system.
From 1980 onwards, a plethora of articles appeared and we wil have the
opportunity to discuss their contribution and findings during the following sections of this
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chapter. It is imperative to mention from the beginning that the adherents of the
evolutionary theory (Winter, Freeman, Dosi, Nelson, Soete) did not - up to this point -
manage to offer any new theory in order to explain the empirical evidence and adequately
replace the neo-classical theory.
1.1.2 The factors that influence the emergence and diffusion of
innovation.
After discussing the place of innovation in the history of economic thought, its
importance for the survival of the firm and its role in the evolution of the economic system,
we will now discuss the factors that influence the emergence of innovative activity and its
proliferation and diffusion. We will not be concerned with macroeconomic aspects like
national systems that promote innovation, or their impact on GDP growth. We wil discuss
initially the relationship between market characteristics and the emergence of innovation,
then we wil discuss patterns and differences observed among sectors, then later the
financial aspects that could influence innovation and finally the factors that determine the
success of an innovation in other words the diffusion and its profitability.
1.1.2.1 Market characteristics and innovation
We wil address two different issues: the relationship between firm size and
innovation, and the relationship between market structure and the propensity to innovate. It
is obvious that these areas are interrelated as firm size is closely related to market structure.
But in order to enhance the structure of our analysis we have to apply this distinction. Both
approaches concentrated their discussion and contributions on the importance and impact
of Research and Development activities on innovative output. This literature is
22
Part I Theories of Innovation and Financial Innovation
summarised in appendix (A-1.2), outlining contributions II the area of firm size and
innovation.
1.1.2.1.1 Firm size and innovation
The relationship between the propensity to innovate and the size of the firm is
probably the most frequently-discussed area of the innovation-related literature. As we will
discuss later, the outcome of all these discussions is inconclusive. It is essential to mention
that the vast majority of articles and papers include in their final part an industrial-policy
recommendation. Since this is not the focus area of our research, we are not going to
discuss it at all. Initially we are going to review the literature that defends the
Schumpeterian point that large firms are better positioned than small ones and later the
opposite approach. In both approaches Research and Development investment (thereafter
R&D) is of crucial importance and both accept their close association with innovative
output despite some objections mostly related to their limitations as a measure of
innovati veness.
As we have already mentioned the first to argue in favour of large firms as major
innovative institutions were Schumpeter and later Galbraith. Schumpeter highlighted the
importance of big, established firms that are able to exploit their economies of scale during
the innovative, and later production, process. Galbraith, observing the structure of current
capitalist societies and the cost of innovation, advanced the point that only large
corporations wil be able to undertake innovative activity.
One of the first efforts to determine whether the size of firms determines the degree
of innovation was Hambert (1963). He investigated 27 innovations that took place in the
US during the period 1946-1955. The main proposition is that new inventions are usually
high risk activities and the bureaucratic structure of large firms is not compatible with these
activities. But in relation to commercialised innovations, large firms were responsible for a
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higher percentage than smaller firms. He made a connection between R&D and innovative
activity and pointed out that investment in R&D is associated with the large profits that
characterise the monopoly or oligopoly market structures. An additional point was that big
size is also a reason for better external finance opportunities. But he stressed that small
firms historically count for major new developments (Wiliamson 1976).
Later Scherer (1965) investigated the relationship in the US between innovation and
firm size taking into account technological opportunities and the possibility to apply the
innovation over a greater output, also mentioned by Smookler (1966). Initially he did not
find any significant difference between large and medium sized firms' expenditures, but
later in the late 1960s and 1970s he adopted a slightly different - pro Schumpeterian -
approach.I2 He went even further by mentioning the importance of the cost spreading
principle since the higher the output the lower the cost per unit for R&D. He highlighted
the point that the ratio of research over productivity of R&D is biased against large firms
because the investment is spread over large outputs. He supported the argument that large
firms are originators of the main bulk of innovations in the US and he sustained his point in
later publications (Love 1997).
Kamien and Schwartz (1982) introduced the idea that a critical point exists between
R&D expenditures and innovative activity. Up to this critical point, which varies from
industry to industry, R&D is positively associated with innovative output (granting of
patents). After this threshold is reached a negative relationship was observed. As Cohen
and Klepper (1994) added that research and development expenditures are proportional to
size, but patents are usually registered or obtained by large firms.
The importance of firm size in the innovative process is also highlighted in a survey
carried out in the European Union in 1992, showing that more than 80% of large firms had
reported innovative activities, in direct contrast with less than 30% of small firms. 
13
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One of the first empirically based challenges to the importance of large firms in
innovative activity is attributed to Freeman. Freeman (1982) makes the point, based on his
historical review and his contemporary SAPPHO project; the blanket Schumpeterian
hypothesis (re-enforced by Galbraith, 1969) of 'bigness wins' could not be sustained. He
refers to the international SPRUI4 survey and Kleinman's (1975) research in the US in
order to highlight the contribution of small and medium size to innovation output,
disproportionate to their size. But he underlines the limitations of the R&D measurements
by systematically omitting the contribution of managers, engineers and other staff taking
place incidentally to their main work. He also highlights the cumulative nature of
innovation and admits the importance of big corporations in particular sectors. 
IS
The importance of small firms is further highlighted by Rowthwell (1986). Her
point is that small and medium firms enhance national rates of technological innovation. 
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She uses Townsends (1981) UK-based research to demonstrate the important contribution
of small firms to innovative activity, especially in sectors such as mining and textile
machinery, electronic capital goods and scientific instruments. She argues that we have to
take into consideration entry and R&D costs as well as the age and type of the industry. She
advances the point that in certain industries the structure of a small firm is better fit to
undertake research projects. But she accepts the existence of 'dynamic complementaries'
that could exist between large and small firms (as in electronics and semi-conductors). I7
Acs and Audretsch (1988) investigated the origins of innovative output in the US
using a wider sample than Scherer (1965). They based their research on data on innovation
until 1982.18 They found that R&D are positively related with patents and that innovations
are positively related with R&D but at a decreasing rate. 
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A very recent and thorough investigation of the existing literature has been made by
Symeonidi (1996) on behalf of the OECD. He discusses three main topics: the links
25
Part I Theories of Innovation and Financial Innovation
between innovation and firm size, the arguments in favour of high concentration and large
firms, and three issues related to the endogeneity of innovation.
He discusses the first issue by referring to empirical studies which totally dismiss
Schumpeter's point of view (Scherer 1965) or others that more or less accepted it (Soete
1979). He mentions that only recent studies (such as Cohen-Levin 1989) control their
econometric measurements for industry effect. He finalises his review by proposing that the
large majority of small firms do not spend a significant amount on formal R&D research
and consequently their share of patents or innovations over their formal expenditures are
higher than the large firms one (due to the low denominator). He underlines also the
existence of a certain threshold firm size where the R&D expenditure rises approximately
proportionately with the firm size - always taking into account the different sectors,
countries and moment in time. He concludes that the evidence is inconclusive.
His second topic is related to the Schumpeterian hypothesis that innovative activity
is favoured by high concentration and large firm size due to high costs. He argues that high
cost is not an absolute and unbeatable factor which prevents small firms from innovating.
Simply we expect innovative firms to be large if the cost of R&D is high when we consider
firm size and market structure as endogenous. He argues that evidence appears to exist that
small firms' financial constraints act as barriers to innovation in some industries,
highlighting simultaneously the importance of joint ventures on R&D projects. But he
indirectly adopts Cohen and Klepper's (1994) point that indivisibilities in R&D costs could
exist and that finally economies of scale and scope could possibly govern the production of
innovation.2o On the other hand, he challenges the Schumpeterian hypothesis that
appropriabilty has a positive effect on R&D incentives by explaining the paramount
importance of inter-industry variations.21
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His third topic is recent empirical studies referring to the complications that
endogeneity on both market structure and innovative activity could cause. He approaches
the question of the first mover's possible advantages by underlining the importance of the
nature of technology. The particular characteristics of every technological paradigm such
as its degree of learning by doing (Foster 1986) or its organisational inertia (Swan and Gil
1993) determine the outcome of the question. The question of how and what the dominant
design adoption wil cause has no straight-forward answer. He distinguishes two
approaches based on time, country and industry: innovation could precede (J ovanovic and
MacDonald 1994) or follow (Klepper Graddy 1993) industry shake-outs.
Closely related to the impact of R&D's, Love and Roper (1997) took into account
data from 300 UK manufacturing companies and introduced two other parameters that
could contribute to innovative activity. These parameters are technology tramfer and
networking effects.22 By investigating their data they propose that R&D, technology
transfer and networking could be either substitute or complementary inputs for the
innovative activity of the firm.
They refer to Audretsch's (1995) point that significant innovation could be
incremental and just an alternative application of existing technology. The importance of
incremental innovation for the improvement of efficiency over time, was also discussed in
1996 by Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt (1996). In a similar question Richardson (1996), makes
the distinction that routine innovations23 are treated as endogenous where radical
innovations could be regarded as exogenous. But he admits that the distinction is not
always possible.
During the same year Wood (1997) highlighted further the importance of Small and
Medium Enterprises (SME) in the innovative process of the UK24 and the association
between R&D and innovation. He also observed that innovative activity is enhanced by the
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existence of R&D and the existence of technically skiled staff using external (Government
and University) generated information.
In summary, after discussing the argument in favour of large firms such as the cost
of innovation, the importance of large R&D programs and the benefits from economies of
scale, we elaborated more on the importance of small firms, the limitations of R&D or the
patent system, and the existence of other R&D factors crucial for the innovative activity.
The discussion is inconclusive since there are significant arguments and supportive
evidence in both approaches. Consequently, we need more information in order to enrich
our understanding of innovative activity. In the following section we shall discuss the
relationship between market structure, innovative activity and uncertainty.
1.1.2.1.2 Market structure, innovation and uncertainty
At this part of our review, we shall discuss the different arguments advanced in
relation to the connection between competitive and non-competitive market structures and
innovative activity. During this section we are not going to encounter the plethora of
empirical researches that we had in the previous section. The prevailing approach is that
competition is a positive aspect despite the potential problem of duplication. The
duplication aspect favours the existence of concentrated markets and large firms. Finally,
we are going to discuss also the concept of uncertainty and how it is possible to reduce it
by innovation.
The importance of competition for innovation is discussed by Geroski (1988).15 He
began his analysis by distinguishing static and dynamic efficiency.16 The competitive
environment boosts the effect of innovativeness on the static efficiency but it is very
controversial to apply this statement to dynamic efficiency, especially if economies of scale
exist on R&D costs.
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He continues by explaining that monopoly can exercise a direct and an indirect
effect on innovation activity. The indirect effect is always believed to be positive, i.e.
monopoly boosts expected post-innovation returns and so increases innovativeness. But the
direct effect may be negative, i.e. monopolists respond more slowly than competitive firms
to a given level of expected post-innovation returns. Here again the final result is not
possible to be pre-determined and have universal application. It depends on the industry's
particular structure. Factors that we have to take into account are: the barriers to entry that
new firms face, the nature of innovations complementary to existing ones,
complementarities among research and marketing. His findings suggest that an increase in
competition and in innovative activity are mutually reinforcing. His final argument enables
him to be very critical of the Schumpeterian approach and he denies the existence of a
trade-off between monopoly power and dynamic efficiency.
In a later paper, Geroski (1995) discusses the relationship between corporate
performance and innovation generation. He uses 440 British firms covering a period from
1972 until 1982. He introduces the variables of growth, accounting profitability and stock
market returns as measure of individual firms' success. He found little evidence for the
existence of spilloveri7 and the main advantages from the production of innovations are
indirect for user industries. His main conclusion was that innovative activity is higher in
competitive markets.
A more evolutionary and holistic view of the importance of competition for the
technological perspective is also discussed by Dosi28 and Orsenigo (1988). They discuss
the relationship between industrial structure and technological innovation. They initially
refer to similarities between biology and innovation by comparing innovations with
mutations which, unlike the biological analogies, involve strategic behaviour. These
mutations transform the existing industrial structure.
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This transformation depends on the evolutionary environment. The main
characteristics of the environment are: the existing taxonomy i.e. the particular structure of
the industry (Pavitt 1984), their technological asymmetries, their variety of production
combinations and technological varieties (Metcalfe 1986). The final outcome depends on
the different behavioural approaches of the individual sector and the balance between the
two evolutionary processes; the learning and innovation process (mutation) and the
competition and selection process (natural selection). The evolutionary process could
present diverse dynamics and be path and behaviour dependent i.e. past actions could
determine the direction and the final outcome of innovative activity. He finally advocated
that competitive structures enhance the emergence of innovations.
An additional aspect of competition is extensively discussed in Sabido (1995). He
adopts a combination of the Loury (1979) and Sah and Stiglitz (1987)29 models, in order to
test firm behaviour when it is possible to undertake more. than one project aiming at the
same innovation. He states that a competitive firm could increase its number of projects
with the aim of bringing forward the expected date of innovation; he highlights that the role
of timing is cruciaL. When timing matters, competitive market structure does have a
positive impact on the pace of innovation even if firms are allowed to undertake several
projects.
The relationship between R&D and innovation output is already investigated by
many researchers. Economists advocating the importance of large firms or highly
concentrated markets highlight the importance of R&D for the innovative activity. R&D
and potential duplication are favouring this approach.
The main research that favours large firms and concentration was made by Cohen
and Klepper (1996). They investigated the propensity to perform R & D and they referred
to prior published papers that indicated that large firms do not undertake higher R&D
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expenditure. At this point they introduced a new parameter, cost spreading, and focused
particularly on the business unit leveL. This new approach could support the general
argument that large firms indeed have an advantage in spending on R&D and they refer to
four main results emanating from their data: the likelihood of performing R&D rises with
firm size, R&D and firm size are closely and positively related within firms, R&D rises
proportionately with firm size in most industries and the number of patents or innovation
per R&D expenditure declines with firm size.
They proposed that market structure is also very important since an oligopolistic
market tends to reduce the duplication problem in research and indirectly promote
previously unprofitable and more risky projects which wil increase the industry's rate of
technological change. Adding that, the observed diversity of R&D capabilities in the real
world enables small firms to coexist with large ones and they are able to survive if they
possess distinctive research skils and even to exceed large firms' productivity of R&D.
A similar problem from the point of view of reduced competition was discussed by
Poyago-Theotoky (1996). She uses a mixed duopoly model and limited appropriability of
research results. She proposes that, due to the free-rider problem, privately-owned firms
tend to underinvest in R&D, where public firms invest more than the private ones and
overinvest in Nash equilibrium situations.
A concluding point could be related to the causality question as to whether market
structure leads to innovation or the opposite. Symeonidis (1996). He refers to Shrerer
(1967) who found a weak relationship between concentration and patents. This relationship
was enhanced when others, like Kamien and Schwartz (1982), introduced research
intensity as an explanatory variable. But even this weak relationship fluctuated
considerably from country to country and from sector to sector. He concluded that there
was little evidence of a relationship between R&D research and concentration. There is
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even less evidence of a positive relationship between innovative output and market
structure and finally that industry's particular technological opportunities explain better the
above mentioned intesectoral and country variances.
After discussing market structure we could discuss some aspects applicable to all
market structures. A very detailed analysis on factors like information, science, technology
and uncertainty that we have to take into account in investigating market structure and
innovation is included in Dasgupta and Stoneman (1987). Initially they discuss the notion
of information. They make clear that its acquisition does not eliminate uncertainty but it is
conceived as a signal which allows us to update the probabilities of various possible
events. It is considered as a non-homogeneous commodity. They explain the priority rule
that governs any scientific research. This rule encourages the effort and the achievement i.e.
'winner takes all' by promoting the public disclosure of new findings. This approach makes
firms undertake risky investment in order to capture the unique prize.
They also refer to Arrow's (1962) themes of appropriability30 of innovation's
benefits and lack of experience in order to assess the market value of the project. They
suggest that information input could be perceived as a fixed cost of production and as a
factor that affects the choice of investment projects and allocation of research funds. In
competitive market structures they observed an adverse phenomenon of under-investment
and a duplication of research effort. They also agree with Arrow on the point that
economies of scale exist for low levels of information since they perceive it as a fixed cost
and competition is not intensive at all.
The information for the project's uncertainty is further discussed by Kort (1996)
where he discusses the firm's irreversible decision to undertake a self-financed research
project and the level of uncertainty involved. He introduces the self-finance parameter by
adopting the Kamien and Schwartz (1982) view, i.e. risky projects are expensive to finance
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and self- financing firms show an abundant reluctance to disclose information. 
3 1
Consequently significant duplication could take place.
The crucial factor about which market system is better, is related to the existence of
spillovers i.e. one firm's research activity could have a positive impact on another firm's
innovative activity and consequently an adverse effect on R&D activities. It was advanced
by Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) that co-operation via Research Joint Ventures (RJV)
could enable the firm to internalise these externalities by cost reduction advantages for high
values of the spilover parameter and for non-collusive product markets. We are obliged to
distinguish between information (perfect substitute) spilovers and technological (less
perfect substitute) spilovers.
The reduction of the uncertainty factor and Research Joint Ventures (RJV) are also
discussed by Goel (1994). He analyses the concept of joint research and uncertainty under a
duopoly regime in order to avoid wasteful duplication, since he believes that any research
involves lack of information about competitors' resources and timing. This paper was also
influenced by the emergence of legislation favouring Research Joint Ventures.32 He
concluded that, under a co-operative regime, the rapidity of innovation could cause
'crowding out' effects or a potential increase in the first partner's share wil lead to a
parallel shift of the second one (see also Fraja and Silpo, 1996).
To summarise, during this section, we discussed the importance of market structure
for the emergence of innovation. Competitive structures tend to favour innovative activity
but the duplication problem blurs the total dominance of that view. Uncertainty is
fundamental for all market structures but especially for competitive ones, and the existence
of spilovers and RJV could possibly reduce it. In the following section we turn to
discussing sectoral differences in innovative activity.
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1.1.2.2 Sectoral differences
The debate over whether large or small firms innovate more or whether R&D
expenditures are related with innovativeness could be significantly more clear if we
introduce the fact that there are other differences between firms. One of the most
commonly cited concepts in the discussion of innovative activity is the variability observed
between the different sectors of an economic system. This variability enables researchers to
divide them into categories and highlight the role of cumulativeness in the innovative
activity.
A very analytical review, covering 2000 significant innovations in the UK from
1945 until 1979 is made by Pavitt (1984). This paper made a significant contribution to the
classification of inter-sectoral characteristics of innovations which was later adopted and
extended by many other researchers (Do si 1988, Geroski 1988, Freeman 1990). He mainly
discussed the nature of these differences and adhered to the partially endogenous and
cumulative perception of innovation.
He agrees with Nelson (1981) and Rosenberg (1976) that the neo-classical theory in
relation to innovation has two important limitations: it considers as exogenous the
production of technology and innovation and it does not reflect the considerable
complexity of the nature of innovation. He uses the above mentioned data to try to build a
body of both empirical and theoretical knowledge that could offer some insights into the
nature of innovation and sectoral differences.
Initially he discussed the nature of inputs that enable the emergence of innovation.
He identifies three types of input either coming from the same firm (intra-firm), from
another firm or emanating from public infrastructure. He encountered some difficulties in
measuring and allocating the relevant information because the notion of pooling and
communicating of information is very vague and difficult to evaluate.
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He then discussed the characteristics of the innovative firm. Again the different
sectoral particularities affect the relative importance of innovation used inside the sector
callng it process innovation and outside, or product, innovation (see appendix (A-I. 1) on
the classification of innovations). Where some sectors mainly use the first category
(manufacturing) others devote their resources to the latter (chemical, electronic, electrical
and instrument engineering).
After this stage he proceeds to his widely-accepted taxonomy of firms; it is based
on the assumption that the characteristics of an innovative firm, due to the cumulative
nature of innovation, are determined by its past i.e. its principal activities. His criteria could
be summarised as: the sources of technology, user's needs and the means of appropriating
benefits. Based on these criteria he distinguishes three main categories: supplier-
dominated, production-intensive33 and science-based34 firms.
We are particular interested on the supplier-dominated firms which can be found
mainly in areas such as manufacturing, agriculture, house-building and professional,
financial and commercial services. They are small and their in-house R&D and
engineering capabilities are weak. The presence of the financial sector in this category wil
influence the place of R&D in the framework to be developed in the next chapter.
He argues that the relative importance of product innovation in a sector is positively
associated with R&D and patent intensity and negatively associated with proxy measures
of the scale and complexity of its process technology such as the capital-labour ratio. His
taxonomy could also enable us to better understand diversification both in terms of R&D
and technology and explanations of firm size and industrial structure depending on the type
of sector.
Pavitt (1980) had already proposed that institutional innovations in education and
training systems could explain some observed national discrepancies in productivity via
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accumulated know-how, skils and innovative capabilities. He concludes his article by
explaining that this taxonomy should be used bearing in mind the variety of possible
interpretations and avoiding any generalisation, again because of the variety of
characteristics.35
The existence of sectoral patterns among firms provides us with a significant
clarification of competing approaches which we have already considered. This variability
enables us to divide firms into three different types and for each type, R&D has a different
significance. Undoubtedly this approach highlights further the importance of
cumulativeness and enables us to further endogenise innovative, and partially scientific,
activity and progress. In the following section, we wil discuss further the sources of this
diversity in innovative activity.
1.1.2.3 Sources of innovative diversity
The source of the already observed inter-sector and inter-firm diversities of
innovative activity could be explained by the cumulative nature of innovations as we have
already mentioned and other particular characteristics such as appropriability, flexibility or
even location.
Dosi's (1988) is one of the most important contributions on the sources and effects
of innovation. He studies the allocation of research resources and the distribution of
innovations among sectors and countries. He explores the factors that determine innovative
activity and the particularities of every sector and their impact on the propensity to
innovate. He is also interested in the relationship between innovation and industrial
structure.
He analyses some data from 1960 to 1983 on R&D expenditures in the US in
different sectors. He finds that 10% is devoted to pure research, 25% to applied research
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and the rest 65% to development. The main part of pure research is financed as expected by
the Federal government and other non-profit institutions and only 20% by private firms. It
is remarkable that government finances also almost half of applied research and
development costs. The main problem with published figures on R&D costs is that they do
not capture the 'learning by using' improvements embodied in people and organisations.
He defines innovation as mainly a problem-solving procedure. This solution
involves a discovery or creation element. This element includes a general knowledge bases
and information drawn from experience and the specific unmodified capabilities of the
innovator. He underlines the fact that the innovations that consist of a technological
trajectory are strongly selective, finalised on precise directions and cumulative in the
acquisition of problem-solving. It has been observed that 'innovative avenues' (Sahal
i 985) provide the main historical pattern of the main technological change.
Dosi disagrees with Arrow (1962), in his persistence on the importance of scientific
base, and gives a preponderance to the in-house accumulated knowledge of the firm in
contrast with the general 'stock' of knowledge and argues that technological search is a
cumulative phenomenon supported also by Teece (1986). An important contribution on the
relationship between science and innovation is also part of this paper. Dosi argues that
science is directly related to the emergence of the technological paradigm. Science36 is not
considered as completely exogenous and its link with innovation goes both ways (see also
Rosenberg, i 979, and section 1.2.1.2). Also exploring the incentives to innovate introduces
the notion of appropriabilty (see latter section 1.2.5) as the business and legal context that
increases or decreases the propensity to innovate. An additional element is the trade-off
between public and private aspects as externalities closely related to the innovative process.
All the above factors enable Dosi to adopt Pavitt s (1986) taxonomy and to identify some
I h . . 37sectora patterns t at persist over time.
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Then he discusses the intersectoral differences in innovative activity. Referring to
the crucial question of relationship between size and innovation, he makes three comments:
there appears to exist a roughly log-linear positive relationship between firm size and R&D
expenditure, the technological characteristics of each sector determine the distribution of
innovating firms, and even taking into account firm size, it is remarkable that there exists
an unexplained interfirm and intrasectoral variance in terms of R&D investment and
innovation output.
In order to explain these differences, he highlights that every technological
paradigm presents a trade-off between flexibility and economies of scale. Each firm's
position is also affected by the cumulative and tacit character, at the firm level, of past
innovations and its behavioural approach on other strategic issues such as for example its
policy to innovate or imitate. These differences are directly related to the asymmetries
observed among firms and explain the observed variance noted above, in terms of R&D
investment and innovation output among firms. If we add to these factors the particular
sectoral context consisting of the set of technological opportunities, the cumulativeness of
innovative capabilties and the appropriability conditions, we have a plausible explanation
for the empirically observed inter-sectoral asymmetries and the nature of each
technological paradigm.
A final point for the source of innovative activity from a different view was made
by Auderetsch and Feldman (1996). They discussed the relationship between location of
innovative firms and R&D spilovers in small business in the us.38 They investigated
whether there is a cluster of innovative activity.39 They propose that the key concept is the
importance of new economic knowledge for firms, resulting from R&D at the industrial or
university level as well as skiled labour. Industries using information related to new
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economic knowledge tend to be more spatially concentrated than others and spilovers
effects tend to be significant.
To summarise, during this section we introduced many factors, such as the
cumulative nature of innovation, technological characteristics or appropriability, that
could explain the variability among different firms and sectors. In the following section, we
wil discuss the diffusion and profitability of innovations in order to understand the
additional factors that shape innovative effort.
1.1.2.4 Diffusion and profitabilty of innovation
During this part of our review we wil discuss the factors that affect the acceptance
and diffusion of an innovation. Then we wil discuss briefly the factors that determine the
profitability of an innovation. These concepts could provide us with significant insight
about the factors that shape the innovative effort of a firm. Before these two main areas, we
are going to discuss very briefly the relationship between internal organisation and
innovative activity.
The first economist who referred extensively to this area was Arrow (1971) when
he highlighted the importance of organisational innovation. He mentioned that truly
among man's innovations, the use of organisation to accomplish his ends is among both his
greatest and his earliest. Usual organisational innovations are refinements in cost
accounting, work scheduling, personnel and collective bargaining procedures. The initial
response of rival firms and financial analysts is to ignore it, partially because
reorganisation40 is a common reaction by firms that are experiencing adversity.
Before discussing any source related with the diffusion of innovation, we have to
take into account Rink and Swan's (1979), research on the relationship between R&D and
the final launch of a product. They found that 70 to 90 percent of projects wil never
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manage to pass to the next stage. Survivors from this stage wil enjoy a rate of success of
50 to 70 percent as marketable products. In other words less than 15 percent of projects
succeed in reaching the market. Later in 1996 more optimistic researchers calculated that,
depending on the industry, the percentage of successful ideas reaching the market place
ranged from 5% to 70% and proposing an accepting standard of 38%.41
Now, we are going to discuss the diffusion of new technology. Freeman (1988)
provides a considerable literature review on diffusion and discusses its effects and its
importance for long waves. He begins his article by underlining the importance of diffusion
of innovation for all schools of economic thought but surprisingly it was not the topic of
many researches. He makes the point that in many cases it is more important in order to
make rapid technical progress to apply new technology efficiently than to invent it. He
refers also to Ray's (1984) research where he discovered that the UK was among the first
nations to introduce a process innovation but often the last to diffuse it through the
potential adopters.
Freeman distinguishes four main types of innovation: the incremental which occurs
more or less continuously and just enhances the production function42; radical innovation,
which are discontinuous events showing a sigmoid pattern; the new technology systems
which are 'clusters' of interrelated innovations43 and changes in the techno-economic
system which cause fundamental transformations (see appendix (A- 1.1) for a comparison
with other classifications of other innovations). He also refers to the main argument that a
new technological paradigm should exercise a downward pressure on cost and increase
productivity.44
He remind us that the initial theory about diffusion of innovation came in the 1950s
with Oriliches (1957) who described its typical pattern as an S-shaped curve, introducing
the classification of 'pioneers', 'early adopters', 'late adopters' and 'laggards' in relation to
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the timing of the innovation's adoption. They frequently used the same terminology for the
beginning and spread of innovation as for an epidemic disease. We are going to see that
this approach was challenged later by Soete (1986). During the 1960's Mansfield (1961)
gave a considerable boost to the diffusion topic by introducing into the decision making
process the concepts of profitability, scale of investment and communication among early
and later adopters. Mansfield's approach was later criticised by many researchers such as
Stoneman (1976) and Gold (1981) on his ex-ante calculation of potential profitability
omitting other non-economic aspects of adoption such as managerial attitudes.
Others such as Mahajan and Paterson (1985) used a statistical model in order to
explore more the shape of the diffusion curve, paying particular attention to the inflection
point and summitry. Before Mahajan and Paters on the majority of mathematical
approaches were very simplistic, such as for example the binary form of innovation (i.e.
adopt or reject it), innovations were assumed to be independent, the size and boundary of
potential adopter was finite. Mahajan and Paterson (1985) started to incorporate possible
interactions among the above factors.
Soete (1986) devotes a section to inter-firm diffusion of innovation. He mentions
that the mathematical theory on epidemics could explain the 'retardation hypothesis'.
Firms' decision whether to adopt or reject an innovation is determined by uncertainty and
lack of information. Both of them are reduced by observing early adopters. The diffusion
curve has a logistic S-shape which is quite similar to the Schumpeterian (1939) industrial
growth pattern of sectors. Freeman (1982) explained that this similarity is explained by the
observed 'clusters' of innovations that could shape the industry's and economy's growth.
The S-shape could also be explained by Rostow's (1978) theory of stages of
growth: take-off, rapid growth, standardisation and decline similar to the 'product life
cycle'. But the simple epidemic and mechanistic approach is not adequate to explain the
41
Part I Theories of Innovation and Financial Innovation
diffusion of innovation. Metcalfe offers his own model which takes time into account, and
remedies the static nature of, Rostow's theory (which does not take into consideration
parallel changes in the environment). He also make allowances for incremental innovations
and explains 'retardation' on the basis of the existing investment commitments due to
previously adopted innovation (Soete 1986).
In 1998 one of the first researches on technology diffusion in the UK happened to
refer to the financial sector.45 Gourlay (1998) approached his analysis by highlighting the
importance of research spilovers especially in the information technology areas.46 He is
critical of the 'epidemic' description of innovation diffusion by introducing such aspects as
compatibility, interrelatedness, co-development and network effects.47 He conceives
Automated Teller Machines (ATM) as both a process and product innovation48. He
proposed a set of findings: institution size, profitability and demand deposit growth played
a positive role in the diffusion of ATMs from their introduction in 1972. Banks that had
already adopted other novelties were displaying higher learning-by-doing effects. No
relation was found in support of the labour-saving theories. Finally, adopters' expectations
and pricing were positively related to the earlier adoption of ATMs.
A further insight on the process of seeking and diffusing innovations could be
provided by the literature on network externalities. Network externality is when the 'utility
that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents
consuming the good' (Katz and Shapiro,1985). These externalities could be the result of a
direct49, or indirect nature50 or due to the existence of post-purchases services.5I Katz and
Shapiro (1985) proposed that these externalities lead to demand-side economies of scale
where the expectations of consumers are a significant factor for the quantity and price of
the product sold. Whether a firm prefers to offer compatible products depends on its size. 
52
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Positive network externalities are closely related with the already noted concept of
spilovers.
Another significant author, Economides (1991), adopted the same approach.53
Later, Economides (1995), proposed that the holder of a novel technology could enhance
profitability if he shares it with other competitors by charging a fee or even a subsidy in the
case where very strong externalities were observed. Innovators' profits could increase when
the network effects are stronger than their reduction due to competition54 since very often
the innovator's ability to achieve the necessary output for the creation of these externalities
is limited. We could add that consumers' expectations shape their demand curve and the
existence of competitors could shift the consumer demand curve upwards, consequently
increasing the equilibrium price and quantity (Economides 1996). In relation to financial
matters, credit cards, financial exchange networks and the stock market are the typical
examples of network externalities (see further chapter 6).
Profitability is closely related to appropriability of the innovation. The concept of
appropriability is discussed in depth in Hippel's (1981) article. He discusses the empirical
observation that, in some industries, product users are the squrce of innovation where in
others the manufacturers are, from the angle of who wil appropriate the benefit.
He uses the notion of functional relationship (Peck 1962) as expressing the firm
that wil appropriate the benefit from the innovation. He introduces the notion of
innovators' potential benefit from non-embodied and output-embodied knowledge. 
55 These
two notions yield a different benefit to the innovator, the first by the sale or licensing of the
knowledge and the latter from the incorporation of the knowledge in his productive
procedure.
The ability to appropriate benefit from the non-embodied knowledge is closed
associated with the existence of patents and trade-secret legislation. Patents could grant
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selective licenses, excluding all competitors, or license all applicants (the most common
form, based on Taylor and Silberston's 1968, findings). But patents are not always easy to
use as a mean of protection. Firstly, although the patentee has the right to exclude others
from using his invention, it does not give him the right to use it himself if such use would
infringe the patents of others. Secondly the patent system places the burden on the patentee
to detect an infringer. Thirdly the patent covers only the means and not the end as such. On
the other hand trade secrets can be revealed by reverse engineering or accidental disclosure
and again the innovator has to prove that the competitor has discovered the secret through
unfair or dishonest means.
The possibility to appropriate benefit from output-embodied knowledge is derived
by his ability to establish an industry-wide and firm-level quasi-monopoly with respect to
his innovation. The industry-wide quasi-monopoly is established by raising significant
entry barriers to potential competitors. This is something very difficult since innovations
are spread very quickly and all competitors could benefit from the new lower costs. The
firm-level quasi-monopoly is established by patents, trade secrets and the long response
time required in order to imitate the innovation. The last concept of response time is
determined by the length of the customer decision cycle, the learning curve of the
competitor and the size and indivisibility of the plant.
A third approach is recommended by Hippel (1982), where he discusses the
possibility for the would-be innovator to have different functional relationships. His point
was that during the time or even simultaneously, it is possible for the innovative firm to
hold diferent functional relationships (user, manufacturer), in order to capture the benefit
from the output-embodied innovation knowledge. The last approach is considered the most
fitted one in order to appropriate the benefit of the innovation in the many cases.
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A further contribution is included in Teece (1986) who discusses the profitability
dimension of an innovation. He refers to the different factors that determine who wil
receive substantial profits from the acceptance of an innovation: the innovator, the
followers or imitators, or firms that have related capabilities that the innovator needs.
Three main factors generally affect the answer to this question; the existing regimes of
appropriability which wil enable the innovator to appropriate or not the profits; the
characteristics of the dominant design paradigm which will be accepted as standard; the
complementary assets such as marketing, distribution or after-sales support or even new
complementary products such as software for computers. These assets could be
distinguished as generic, specialised and cospecialised assets. 
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To summarise, during this section we have discussed the reasons that influence the
shape of the diffusion of innovations such as research spillovers, duplications and
network externalities. We discussed also aspects that influence the profitability of
innovation and especially the appropriability of innovation's benefit.
1.1.3 Summary
Technological change, invention and innovation are not frequently encountered in
classical economic thought. Smith and Marx were the first ones to pay attention but it was
Schumpeter who gave these concepts the attention they deserved. He proposed a
remarkable set of types of innovations that cover every kind of innovative activity. The
economy is perceived as a changing organism. The enterpreneur is the agent of change by
initiating innovative activity. This activity is usually a new combination that prevails over
the old way, or a creative-destructive process where the system continuously generates new
routines, where only a few successful ones, manage to survive. Borrowing Darwinian
terminology these mutations are not random generated, but are biased transmitted towards
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a specific goal or adaptive standard while final selection is taking place. We have to adopt
a more integrated approach taking into account the particular characteristics of the sector.
We investigated what influences the innovative process. Initially we discussed firm
size and then market structure. The evidence is inconclusive. The importance attributed by
Schumpeter and Galbraith to large firms could be sustained only if we consider R&D as
indicative of innovative activity, or as an expensive cost and we introduce the cost-
spreading principle. But small firms do not engage in formal R&D and face financial
constraints, but are responsible for radical innovations. Probably competitive market
structures are beneficial for innovations, but they could create duplication and 'free-rider'
adversities for innovative activity. The significance of R&D for the innovative effort could
be better understood if we take into account that innovation has in most cases a cumulative
nature, and significant diversity was observed among sectors in relation to innovative
activity.
A significant factor that affects the innovative activity, is the available in house and
public information and their relationship. Other factors shaping the innovative effort are,
Research and Development, cumulativeness, routines, technology, research spilovers,
network externaliies and appropriabilty, should be considered as factors that influence
and shape the innovative activity of a firm.
What emerges from the literature on innovation is the complexity of the causal
powers behind innovation. The scope for different causal patterns between sectors has been
established. We turn now to consider the particular causes of innovation in the financial
sector.
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1.2 Theories of Financial Innovation
During this section, we shall discuss the theories of financial innovation, the classification
of financial innovations and problems and benefits emanating from financial innovative
activity. Hence we shall refer to many academic contributions related to financial
innovation which provide us a significant part of the information required to built our
model of financial innovation (2.1). A common feature of all these contributions is that
none of them provides us with an integrated and holistic view concerning the phenomenon
of financial innovation. Consequently, common limitations of the following contributions
are the lack of: a plethora of potential causes, insight of factors shaping the financial
innovation process, detailed classification of the innovative output, successful feature of
financial innovations and finally an evolutionary and dynamic model of the phenomenon.
A further significant limitation is the lack of any connection with standard innovation
theories and concepts. Initially, we are going to discuss the pioneering theories of financial
innovation.
1.2.1 The pioneering theories of financial innovation
In this section, we wil discuss the literature in financial innovation. Initially we
wil review the pioneering theories of financial innovation of Silber (1975) and Kane
(1981). They were the first to introduce to the academic terminology the notions of
constraints-induced innovations and the regulation dialectic phenomenon. These two
theories are mentioned in almost every article on the subject that we have encountered
during our research. For this reason we are going to devote the following sub-sections of
this chapter to them.
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1.2.1.1 Silber's theory of financial burden
Silber's (1975) basic hypothesis, emphasising the microeconomic framework of
financial innovation. It could be summarised in the phrase that firms face some financial
constraints and try to remove or lessen their burden. Silber uses the word firm for financial
institutions. These constraints could be self-imposed, market -imposed or government-
imposed. He believes that the 'raison d'etre' of every firm is to maximise its utility taking
into account existing constraints. He expressed an institution's behaviour as a simple linear
programming model of optimization where firms maximise utilty subject to a number of
internal and external constraints.57 Self-imposed constraints usually are the firm's liquidity
requirements and the specific allocation of their asset portfolio. Market-imposed
constraints affect the arsenal of tools that the firm uses and the market structure
(competitive or oligopoly, perfect or imperfect capital markets) in which they participate.
Silber defines the particular conditions that wil enable the emergence of a financial
innovation (dividing them into instruments and practices), such as the arrival or imposition
of an exogenous constraint. He discerns two kinds of constraint: a possible reduction of
firm's utility, hence a new tool is required to bring it back to its previous level of utility
('adversity innovation,)58 or the cost of adhering to an existing constraint, becomes
'abnormally' high ('success innovation,).59
He considers as the main historical causes of innovation by US banks as a response
to a reduction of their utility or adversity innovation: the interest rate ceiling, where banks
tried to endogenize exogenous items of their balance sheet (Certificate of Deposit,
Eurodollars and bank-related commercial paper); the decline in the markets for particular
assets (introduction of term loans from commercial banks during the 1930s); a declining
growth rate of sources of funds (new products in order to attract new funds) and an increase
of the risk of a particular asset or of all assets due to the economic environment (interest
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rate risk and the shift from the 'administered' interest rate in the 1960s to the floating
prime rate of the 197 Os).
On the other hand, examples of 'success innovations' are the extensive use of cost-
reducing information technology and elaborate new finance theories in the financial sector
and several new products designed to cope with the rising yield of assets in order to attract
new funds (see appendix (A-1.3), summarising Silber's contribution in comparison with
other contributions).
He proposes that the three possible ways a financial firm could innovate are: by
endogenizing an exogenous item of the balance sheet, introducing an existing financial
instrument from another country or industry into the firm's portfolio and thirdly as the
mixture of the above two ways, taking the form of a modification of an existing instrument.
Silber (1983), provides us with four different types of financial innovation. Initially
he repeats his microeconomic theory and approaches the welfare impact of financial
innovation. Then he presents a survey of financial innovations that took place from 1970
till 1982 and allocates them to four main categories: cash management, investment
contracts, market structures and institutional organisation. During his classification, he uses
his already mentioned constraints as the main exogenous reason(s)60 that had initiated these
financial innovations.
He concludes that his model could explain around 60% of all innovations that took
place during the period. He highlights the leading role of technology and legislation the
initiation process of innovations (see appendix (A-1.3)). He finally concludes that these
two main constraints have led to increased economic benefits via a reduction of costs, a
better allocation of risk, and circumvention of outdated regulation. The result has been an
increase in the economic welfare of the system.
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Silber's contribution thus focus in primarily on the concept of financial burden that
firms could face. This burden reduces the utility of the firm and consequently financial
institutions innovate. The importance of Silbers theory is that, by using the concept of
financial burden, he provides us with a wider spectrum of potential reasons contributing to
the innovating process. He offer us causes to innovate exogenous and endogenous to the
firm. His classification into adversity and success innovations as well as the four types of
innovations are of lesser importance for our research. We are going to discuss in the
following section the idea of a regulative dialectic.
1.2.1.2 Kane's theory of regulatory dialectic
A different perspective is expressed by Kane (1981) who argues that the most
prominent and significant factor which initiates the financial innovation process is
regulation. Kane (1997) had already introduced the concept of regulatory dialectic. This
concept describes the cyclical relationship between regulation and firms. He conceives the
political process of regulation and the economics of regulatee avoidance as opposite forces
where both try to maximise their utility subject to the constraints imposed by the other
party. It is a typical Hegelian6I endless interaction of regulation, regulatory avoidance or
alternatively called 'loophole mining' and re-regulation.
He uses his model to explain most of the evolution that took place in the US during
the 1960s and 1970s. The main force is the regulative dialectic between the federal banking
regulation and the exogenous market forces such as technological change, changing
banking environment and increasing uncertainty about future financial developments.62 He
approaches innovation as an arbitrage instrument trying to take advantage of regulation
lags. Innovation takes the form of product substitution in order to circumvent regulation -
50
Part I Theories of Innovation and Financial Innovation
sometimes by just rearranging contracts and by just simply moving along different financial
systems.
He defines regulation's burden as a form of taxation imposed on banks. Banks'
main concern during the 1970s was to avoid it.63 In order to attract customers despite the
regulative burden, they used a mixture of means initially covering non-monetary benefits to
indirect monetary benefits and at the end mainly monetary advantages. But on the other
hand regulators developed their own defences and adopted new approaches resulting in the
emergence, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, of a re-regulative action.64
Kane (l988a, 1 988b) analysed his theory in more depth, where he explained in
details his association and acceptance of the Hegelian concept of thesis (regulation),
antithesis (loophole mining), synthesis (re-regulation), using examples from the US
banking environment of the period 1960-1985. A final point is that the final synthesis is
going to be a new thesis and the process could go on infinitely.
Kane's contribution is essential for the better understanding of the existence of a
dialectic between financial institutions and exogenous factors. This permanent evolution
under the process of thesis, antithesis, synthesis provides us with a connection with the
evolutionary approaches that we discussed in the previous chapter. His persistence with
regulation as the main exogenous factor is justifiable on the grounds of his research
material and does not shadow his contribution. In the following section we wil discuss
three other important contributions in relation to the types and additional causes of
financial innovation.
1.2.2 Additional causes of financial innovation
In this section, we wil examine other major approaches which had a considerable
contribution and provided us with additional insight into the causes of financial innovation.
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These causes are predominately external to the financial institution but some of them are
internal ones too. External causes are related to volatility, regulation, as well as
government intervention, transaction costs, disintermediation, competition and
institutional requirements. The internal causes are associated with cost structure and
institutional preferences. This literature is summarised in appendix (A-I.3), which
compares different explanations for financial innovation and appendix (A-lA) presenting
BIS influenced contributions.
One of the first researchers to provide a more detailed analysis of the causes of
financial innovation, apart from the general financial burden and regulation was van Horne
(1985). His main contributions were the plethora of causes of financial innovation and the
introduction of dual causation65. These potential causes were: volatility in inflation and
interest rates, regulatory changes, tax changes, technological advances, changes in the
level of economic activity and new academic work on efficiency and inefficiencies. He uses
a partial list of innovations from the period 1978-1984 and distinguishes between product
and process financial innovation. He argues that the main cause of product innovation is
the volatility observed in interest and inflation rates, and for process innovations the main
cause is technological advance.
A further contribution highlighting the above causes and introducing three
additional causes was made by Miler (1986). Miler investigates the concept of the 'most
successful innovation'. He describes as revolutionary the last twenty years' innovative
developments. He mentions the time-series identification/definition of innovation as the
unforseeable (surprise) part of aggregate economic data. But he does not conceive the
generation of an innovative activity as a random or pure-luck phenomenon, as he admits
that many instruments existed before their massive proliferation. He also considers taxation
(the motive for the most successful innovations) and regulation (Kane's 'regulatory
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dialectic') as the main reasons but also, to a lesser degree, the increase in academic
qualifications of the managers of business institutions. He also observes that in the US
financial system, the government has itself introduced and even backed some financial
innovations.66
He cites four examples of innovation where, even if the initial reasons have ceased
to exist, they continue to grow in a substantial degree.67 He then provides the answer to his
initial question: financial futures are the most successful financial innovation and their
'sand in the oyster' was the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates. His choice is supported by the facts of: their volume, their contribution infillng the
spectrum, reduction of transaction costs and initiation of other innovations adding, that the
possibility of cash settlement was a further step that contributed to their immense success.
His major contribution consists of the success and future of financial
innovation. In order to provide an answer, he analyses the particular reasons that triggered
innovative activity twenty years ago. He does not accept regulation and tax as sufficient
reasons since they always existed. He advances the argument that it was a coincidence of
economic and technological developments and remarkably old and costly regulation,
summarising that innovative activity was like a 'snake bursting through its old skin'. For
these reasons he believes that it is possible to slow down the rate of innovation, but that
progress wil continue since there are stil financial areas such as real estate and financial
markets competition that are not so developed or offer only a few financial products.
The existence of imperfections, the reduction of transactions costs and the positive
developments for the functioning of the market are advanced by Levich (1987). His paper
focused mainly on the impact of financial innovation at the global leveL. He argues that
market imperfections cause financial innovation and he divides them into: policy-related
(or man-made) and behavioural (natural) barriers. These imperfections encourage the
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segmentation of the capital market, the 'Law of One Price' does not apply and these profit
opportunities act as an incentive to innovate. He divides the reasons that encourage
innovation into demand side and supply side. In the former category belong the volatility of
asset prices, exchange and inflation rates, the change of international wealth patterns and
the globalisation of industrial markets and the new financial model applied by the
specialists. The latter group consists of advances in telecommunications and computer
technology, increased competition and regulatory pressure.
Gardener (1988) discussed financial innovation in the UK, and introduced the
concept of temporary monopolies. In his paper, he refers briefly to the sources and causes
of financial innovation in the UK and mainly discusses the impact of innovation on the
banking sector. He considers financial innovation as the 'engine' that stimulated changes in
the British banking environment as in the form of de-regulation, foreign banks' entry and
diversification of activities. He investigates the causes of innovation by referring to three
main theories: first Veblen's struggle between technological progress and institutional
resistance; then Kane's regulatory dialectic applied especially to the US; and thirdly the
BIS approach of demand and supply side theories. He highlights the role of technology as
part of every cited theory and adds the importance of profit opportunities and temporary
monopolies as main reasons for innovative. He pronounces financial innovation as the
'lifeblood' of the capitalistic financial system and very crucial for the risk-sharing function
of banks and the risk-taking capacity of the whole economy.
During the same year the causes of desintermidiation and globalisation were
advanced, by Artus and Boissieu (1988), who proposed a new integrated approach taking
into account the existing theories. They observed that the phenomenon of financial
innovation is not so uniform in all OECD countries. They identified five factors that are
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closely related to the emergence of financial innovation: financial deregulation,
marketization, disintermediation, securitization and globalisation.
Another significant approach was made by Walmsley (1988) who added and
highlighted the causes of competition and supply-induced innovations. His first
contribution is the table, covering the period 1957-1987, of the most significant financial
innovations. His second contribution is that, except for the typical distinction of product
and process innovations, he distinguishes two types of innovation: aggressive and
defensive ones.68 He also adopts the BIS taxonomy of innovation. He identifies three main
sources of innovation: intense competition among financial institutions, regulation and the
impact of technological advances and information technology applications. He refers also
to the example of supply induced innovations from governmental and semi-governmental
sources such as the SEC or the US treasury69. His final points are related to negative
aspects of financial innovations.
A further contribution was made by Ross (1989) by introducing the marketing
factor and institutional preferences, as a potential cause of financial innovation. In a
remarkably original article, he introduced factors such as marketing and institutional
arrangements. He concentrates his analysis on securities. He distinguishes two classes of
innovation: new securities and markets, and new dynamic strategies. He points out that
institutionalisation is the main feature of the financial system and distinguishes two kind of
institutions: the transparent and the opaque ones.70 It is also possible that institutions have
different preferences than individuals. Financial innovation could accommodate the needs
of particular institutions and occurred even in cases where the market is complete. He
explains the typical life cycle of a new product and highlights the role of high fixed
marketing costs. Marketing costs are associated with the design, sale and post-sale services,
as well as the training of potential users. These costs could facilitate the standardisation of
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the product and enable their amortisation from the innovative institution. He considers his
work as complementary to Miler's (1986) approach of taxation-regulation and Merton's
(1988) theory of transaction costs as being of considerable importance for innovative
activity in the sense that innovation occurred as a response to the constraints, and
marketing costs that could decisively shape the new institutional structure and future
innovations.7 I
Another probably simplistic approach, but iluminating in relation to its narrow
horizon was made by Flood (1992). His main contribution is the identification of two
aspects of imperfect markets.72 He tries to understand what makes innovation successful
and consequently to investigate the causes of financial innovations. He adopted as the
fittest way to measure the degree of success the trade volume of the instrument. He
compares a futures contract on bagged Canadian silver coins - introduced by !MM in 1973
- and market index mutual funds - introduced by Vanguard Group in 1976. Both were
redundant i.e. their price movements were closely tracked by the price movement of other
securities hence there were substitutes. But the transaction and liquidity cost made the
difference since capital markets are not perfect i.e. frictionless. The former instrument
ceased to exist in 1974 due to the lack of liquidity and increased costs while the latter one
had a tremendous success.73 Except for the elaborate presentation of these examples, Flood
also refers to Merton (1984) where he has ilustrated that innovative institutions
extensively use the trial and error approach when they launch a new product.
Arestis and Howells (1992), observing the high growth in the financial activity,
connected it with financial innovation. They proposed technological changes, deregulation
and competition as potential causes that boosted financial innovation activity. They also
introduced the concept of cost of intermediation74, as a complementary explanation, to the
growth of financial activity. Additionally, they highlighted the complex and partly circular
56
Part I Theories of Innovation and Financial Innovation
interaction among these factors and divided them, to 'exogenous' and endogenous' to the
financial system.75 Their main purpose was not to discuss the phenomenon of financial
innovation but to refer to its significance for the growth of financial activity and ultimately
to the problematic monetary policy in the UK in the 1980s.
A minor contribution related to a regulation feature is made by Mishkin (1992),
where he observes the considerable amount of new financial institutions and instruments
which had emerged during the last twenty years in the US. He identifies financial
innovation as the main cause of this change and adopts the simple analytical approach that
a change in the economic environment wil stimulate a search for innovation. He adopts
four causes of innovative activity, three of them already mentioned in the financial
innovation literature; first, changes occurred in market conditions such as interest rate
volatility and a drop in brokerage commission. Hence in order to avoid or reduce risk banks
offered Variable Rate Certificate of Deposits (1977), Adjustable Rate Mortgages (1975)
and Derivative products; secondly, the considerable advances in technology which
permitted the proliferation of credit cards and securitization; thirdly the effort to avoid
existing regulation such as reserve requirements and restrictions on interest rates banks
offered NOW, ATS accounts and Overnight RPs. Finally re-regulation occurred during the
same period as the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Depository Institutions Act of
1982 and acted as a cause of further innovative activity.
He concludes by analysing the future of financial innovation in relation to two
spectrums and variables: interest rates and inflation. If the former are going to show a
remarkable fall then some financial instruments such as options and futures are going to
disappear. If the latter declines then deposits are going to be increased.76 It is obvious that
Mishkin has adopted a more simplistic approach in relation to the future perspectives of
innovation.
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The same year, Miler (1992) advanced a further cause of financial innovation:
economic growth. He presents the main reasons that affected innovative activity, mainly in
the US, the last twenty years. His approach has a lot of similarities with his 1986 article. He
advances four main reasons: the move to floating exchange rates, the information and
computer technology developments, the world's economic growth and regulatory and de-
regulative action. He then addressed the question whether this wave of financial innovation
had a positive or negative effect on the economy and investors.
The demand for more complete markets and further aspects of imperfect markets
are discussed by Merton (1992, 1995). He initially defines the efficient allocation of
economic resources via financial intermediaries as the primary function of the financial
system. He considers financial innovation as the 'engine,n that causes the improvement of
the 'real' economy. He investigates the motives for financial innovation and, in accordance
with Silber and Kane, finds three main motives: a response to the demand for more
complete markets, a reduction of transaction costs and increased liquidity and a reduction
of 'agency' costs78. He finds all these three consistent with his view that financial
innovation improves economic efficiency. He believes that during periods of high volume
of financial innovation a 'spiral effect' takes place: a new product introduced for a niche
market becomes standardised and moves from intermediaries to the market. Their cost due
to size and competition decreases and new customised products emerge and improve the
completeness of the market. The system is dominated by large institutions and dynamic
trading demands further changes to infrastructure 79 in order to accommodate it.
A more balanced approach, highlighting the causes of innovation and especially the
importance of both initiators' and users' preferences, was advanced by Llewellyn (1992).
He adopted a different approach from Silber (1975) and Kane (1981) in order to study this
phenomenon and proposes the interconnection between the financial system and
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innovation. He believes that financial innovation observed during the 1980s should be
viewed as both a reflection and partly as a cause of structural change. He argues that the
financial system and financial innovation are interrelated and should be investigated in
conjunction i.e. in order to assess financial innovation systematically, we must assess its
influence on financial system efficiency. He is the only one to spend some time discussing
the difference between standard innovation and financial innovation.
He begins his analysis by highlighting the difference between innovation in industry
and the financial sector: first, research costs concerning financial innovations are low;
second there are not protective patents; thirdly it is affected and shaped by regulatory
forces; and finally, it is designed not only to meet the requirements of the customer but
reflects also suppliers' constraints. The nature of financial innovation has a dual
characteristic: it creates new instruments, techniques and markets and unbundles and
reassembles separate characteristics of existing financial instruments.
He increases considerably the list of potential causes due to the international
character of his research. He defines the seven main forces that initiate the financial
innovation process as: the increase of wealth, alterations in portfolio behaviour and
preferences of users or suppliers, changes in the market environment, policy (exogenous)
changes, spectrum filling and technology. He concludes his paper by discussing the impact
of financial innovation.
The restrictions of banks' balance sheets and the paramount importance of
disintermediation are highlighted by Davis (1993). In his brief paper he initially explains
the reasons behind financial intermediation8o and explains also the uniqueness and
importance of banks for the financial system. Then he discusses only two types of financial
innovation that took place during the 1980s in the retail banking sector: securitisation and
wholesale banking. The main reasons for the former are interest rate volatility, restrictions
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on bank's balance sheets and disintermediation which deprived retail banks of fund. The
latter was facilitated by the existing economies of scale and the expertise of banks in
screening and monitoring. He concludes by proposing that the characteristics of bank
intermediation enabled some of the recent developments in the banking sector.
The importance of demand and the cost structure of financial instruments was
advocated by Merton, Tufano and Mason (1995) who discuss the particular causes that
initiate the innovation of securities. The components of an innovation are marketing cost,
manufacturing costs and taxes and regulation related costS.8I Any actual change in one of
these components makes profitablè a previously uneconomic/unprofitable product.
Financial institutions are able to exploit economies of scale and scope. Hence innovative
activity is expected to be higher in these institutions.82 Apart from the cost structure,
changes in demand could initiate innovations. The current stage in the life cycle of firms
and macroeconomic shocks such as in the i 970s are the main factors which shape the
demand for financial instruments and innovations. They also point out that we have to take
into consideration many interrelations and interactions among cost structures and
demand.83 Finally they add that the evolutionary nature of innovation has proved the
importance of learning and experimentation as crucial components of successful innovative
instruments and institutions.
The importance of competition was further discussed by Ford and Mullineux
(1995), who consider two particular financial innovations: the payment of implicit interest
on cheque accounts84 and the Automated Telling Machines (ATMs) and Electronic Fund
Transfer (EFTs) (see latter chapter 6 below). The reasons behind these two innovations in
the UK, were competition between traditional banks and other financial institutions like
building societies85 and technological improvements like the magnetic strip.
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The interaction between supply and demand as well as cost structure are further
discussed by Blake (1996). He analyses both financial innovation and the process of
financial intermediation using econometrics. His approach is in accordance with Silber's
(1975) and Kane's (1981) supply-side-induced, and Miler's (1991) demand-induced
innovation. He proposes that external factors such as technological developments, the
business cycle and regulation affect the process and act as shadow prices. He believes that
changes in both the demand on (investors' tastes) and the supply (institutions' cost
structure) side could cause an innovative action. He proposed the concept that financial
instruments present both internal characteristics (Merton et aI, 1995) such as return, risk,
divisibility, liquidity, and external ones such as delivery system and institutional
strategies.86 Every change in this balance, is the reason behind any innovative action,
referring to the observation that whenever shadow prices (i.e. cost of compliance)
increases, innovations occur in large numbers.
During this section, we have discussed a plethora of reasons that could cause and
influence the innovative activity of financial institutions. Causes external to the firms such
as regulation, volatility, disintermidiation or government intervention, and internal to the
firm such as cost structures and institutional preferences. We can also observe some
causes that could be perceived as both internal and external such as liquidity
enhancement, transaction costs and institutional requirements. In order to refine a
framework of financial innovation, we need to consider how to classify the different types
of innovation encountered in this literature. The following section includes the most
important types and partial classifications of financial innovations and further contributions
based on this classification.
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1.2.3 Types and classification of financial innovation
During this section we shall discuss the types of financial innovation and advance further
particular classifications of the innovative activity that financial institutions undertake. We
are going to discuss extensively especially the BIS classification of financial instruments as
well as other contributions. The purpose of this section is to understand the possible ways
of classification of financial innovation. We believe that a common shortcoming of these
classifications is that they do not offer us a detailed account of the nature and
characteristics of an innovative output. This literature is summarised in appendix (A-1.5J,
presenting a table of types of financial classifications.
The first to mention a potential classification of financial innovations was Veblen.
He and his fellow travellers and adherents such as Lawsons (1990), and Carter (1989)i17,
strongly believe that the private entrepreneur is the source of innovation in his pursuit of
pecuniary gains. Financial innovation is divided into product and process. Product
innovation is a new form of financial instrument (Walmsley 1988). In Veblen's analysis the
main new products are related with the corporate finance sector, such as corporate
securities or stock shares - reflecting the goodwill of the firm - and preferred stocks which
transferred ownership of assets to their holders. These securities enabled in subsequent
years the reorganisation and coalition of new industrial corporations. Process innovation is
a broader conception of financial innovation, related to new practices and structures like
'rocket scientists' who develop new products or the SWIFT payment system.
Another classification was proposed by Silber (1975); after he proposed a
distinction similar to Veblen's, between instruments and practices88, he discussed adversity
and success innovation. An adversity innovation is defined as an innovation that emerges
in order to circumvent a barrier that is imposed on a financial institution. A success
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innovation is an innovation that emerges in the case that the burden of adhering to an
existing cost becomes high. It is obvious that both concepts are associated with Silber's
theory of financial constraint. Later in 1983, by observing the financial innovation activity
during the 1970s in the US, he proposed four particular types of innovation: cash
management, investment contracts, market structures and institutional arrangements.
Meanwhile in 1981, by reviewing banking products the same period as Silber, Kane
identified three types of financial innovation: non-monetary, indirect monetary and
monetary. All were the direct result of regulation-imposed restrictions on the payment and
interest rate applicable to different types of deposit in the US (see latter chapter 3 below).
Two new classifications were proposed by Niehans (1983) as well as a more deep
analysis of a particular structural financial innovation. He discussed the emergence of
multinational banking and its causal relationship with financial innovations. Multinational
banking could also be a financial innovation by itself. He divides all banking products and
services in three categories.89 He proposes two types of innovation: adaptive ones,
consisting of the development of new ways of bundling the basic services9o, and
technological ones related to the storage, retrieval and transmission of information.91 He
finally believes that international banking exists mainly for four reasons: different
regulation environments, economies of scale92, imperfections of the market for
information93 and potential diversification of political risk.
One the first and most accurate classifications of financial innovation after Silber
and Kane, was undertaken by the Bank of International Settements. This classification was
adopted by many researchers who provided further contributions in relation to the
innovative process such as a complementary classification or factors that influence the
emergence and the success of financial innovation.94
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The most organised attempt to discuss the phenomenon of financial innovation was
undertaken by the Bank for International Settements (BIS, 1986). The BIS was
preoccupied with the geometrical expansion of financial innovations during the 1970s and
1980s. In order to investigate them, they introduced a taxonomy of financial innovations
based on their intermediation function. They divided them into five main categories: risk
transferring (price/credit), liquidity-enhancing, credit-generating and equity-generating.
They implemented this taxonomy and presented a two-part table consisting of 'On' and
'Off' balance sheets instruments.
The BIS95 proposed that such powerful long-lasting forces as technological advance
and global financial integration support the innovative effort. Innovative actions are also
supported in the micro-environment (firm-institution) by the institutionalisation of
Research and Development activities. The latter resulted from the general acceptance that a
stochastic relationship exists, between output and amount of resources committed to the
process.96
Later Walmsley (1988) proposed a further classification. He identified two types of
financial innovation: defensive and aggressive ones. An aggressive one is an innovation
that is introduced in response to a perceived demand. A defensive innovation is any
innovation caused by changes in the environment and transaction costs. We are going to
elaborate more in the following chapter about further aspects based on this classification.
The same period Artus and Boissieu (1988) proposed four other types of financial
innovation: cash management procedures, new financial instruments associated with the
financial intermediation function, new instruments introduced to existing capital markets
and instruments introduced to new capital markets.97 They also draw a distinction between
innovations initiated in the public or private sector; the latter are unquestionably in the
majority.
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A related classification applicable to corporate banking activities, was proposed by
Vinal and Borge (1988). They observe innovative activity in the European corporate
banking sector. They divide corporate finance instruments into four categories: special debt
instruments, debt-equity hybrid instruments, special equity and risk covering instruments98
Finally Tuffano (1990) proposed six types of financial innovation, applicable
mostly to investment banking innovative activity. He divides his data into six main product
categories: mortgage-backed (3), asset backed (2), non-equity linked debt instruments (28),
equity-linked debt (8), preferred stocks (13) and equity products (4). For all these products
the six large investment banks account for 76.3 % of new underwriting.99
During this section, we have discussed the main classifications that have been
proposed for financial innovation. The initial classifications of process and product have
been expanded by defensive and offensive, adversity or success and on or off balance
sheet. In order to better define a finanCial innovation, we have also to separate its properties
such as the enhancement of liquidity, the generation of debt and the transfer of risk. In the
following section, we move on to consider the consequences of innovation. We shall
discuss the benefits and problems of financial innovation in order to be able to define the
successful features of a financial innovation and potential shortcomings.
1.2.4 Benefits and problems of financial innovation
During this section, we will discuss the potential benefits and problems for finanCial
institutions and the financial system emanating from the emergence and diffusion of the
financial innovation. We are going to encounter concepts such as first mover advantage,
better risk management and fund allocation as well as huge exposures, systematic risk
and inadequate information. The main reason that we discuss the problems that could
emerge is that they could act as potential causes for further innovative activity in a dialectic
65
Part I Theories of Innovation and Financial Innovation
and evolving environment that we shall investigate in the following section. In appendix
(A- 1.6), we summarise the benefits and problems of financial innovation.
The importance of financial innovation for efficient financial markets, the potential
temporary abnormal profits and needless regulative intervention was advocated by van
Horne (1985). He perceives as the most important contributions of financial innovation the
increase in markets' operational efficiency and the enhancement of markets' completeness.
He believes that innovation generally takes place when inefficiencies in the financial sector
offer opportunities for profit by exploiting temporary monopolies and charging high prices.
He defines as we have already mentioned, six main reasons that contributed to the
proliferation of financial innovation activities during the last twenty years.
He then discusses the notion of excesses that are taking place during the innovative
process and the cost (dislocation of human and physical capital) of these excesses. In more
detail, he observes that sometimes innovations - callng them balloons - that do not
contribute either to efficiency or to completeness could stay for a considerable time in the
markets before disappearing due mainly to excesses on the demand or supply side. ioo He
believes that the market always clears and he is opposed to the corrective intervention of a
regulatory agency. He concludes that the existence of uncertainty wil maintain innovative
activity and highlights the importance of new analytical tools in order to obtain better
insights in the financial environment.
The idea that regulation could be partially helpful and facilitate the innovation
through protection for the first mover is discussed by Anderson and Harris (1986), who
adopted an econometric approach. They analyse oligopolistic industry under a continuous-
time model where the imitative institution could be disadvantaged. In other words, the
features of this model are: small number of firms, first mover's advantage, competition is
taking place through product development, regulation causes time retardation and higher
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costs and it is approached as a two-player (institutions) game. Their findings could be
summarised as follows: leading institutions generate an informational externality and
competition could discourage innovative activity and encourage imitative behaviour.
Conventional patterns are not perceived as a remedy because a weak patent regime could
arbitrarily prevent innovations. Slight regulatory lags tend to encourage innovation and
allow the market to pronounce on the imitative or innovative nature of the product.
The existence of first-mover advantage in particular financial products and positive
complementarities are discussed by Corkish et al (1997). This very recent research analyses
the case of a successful innovation in the UK: the introduction of futures contract in
London in 1982 in the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) and the
reasons for their success. These were their correlation with the underlying market (where
the future contract was based) and volatility, as well as the existence of first mover
advantage due to the liquidity that it offered. An interesting finding was that the existence
of competitors in the form of securities or exchanges could act as complementary goods
and enhance further futures success.IOI
The importance of intangible assets such as know-how and reputation, and lower
potential cost, but the rejection of the existence of first mover advantages in investment
banking, is proposed by Tufano (1990). He investigates 58 innovations that were
undertaken by investment banks from 1974 to 1986. It is the first attempt to bring some
empirically-backed insights to how much it is worthwhile to innovate. He initially
highlights the observed diversity of development costs, ranging from $50,000 to $5
milion. 102 He adds that these potentially high costs are not the only consideration since we
have to take into account the intangible assets involved in any launch of a new product as
commitment and reputation. On the other hand patents are almost impossible to be granted.
He then addresses the question why a firm should innovate and how the innovative firm
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behaves. He rejects the usually advanced theory - especially for industrial innovation - that
the first mover exploits monopolies (van Horne 1985) and charges a higher price than later
entrants. He shows that they charge even lower prices but due to that, they manage to
capture a higher market share. The large captured market shares enable them to become
even larger. They do not capture the whole of the market because other non- economic
reasons intervene. 
103
Innovative investment banks can afford to charge lower prices and amortise their
initial outlay because they enjoy lower costsI04. But he was not able to prove the existence
of a 'spilover' effect in the banks' innovative activity. Instead he presents, as proof, the
explanations provided by managers about the way they exploit the intangible advantages of
their innovative actions in order to obtain a comparative advantage in relation to their
competitors.IOS Finally, strong links between underwriting and trading were observed and
bankers believe that innovating signals their abilities better than any advertising.
The risk enhancement element is advocated by Miler (1992). He accepts as the
main positive effect the enhancement of risk management. He highlights that innovation
was blamed for the increased stock market trade volume, the observed high volatility and
mainly for 1987 stock crash. He makes crystal clear that the empirical evidence does any
support any of these accusations.106 He concludes this issue by declaring that the only
complication worth mentioning is the hegemony of large institutions in the stock market.
At the end of the article he re-addresses (Miler 1986) the question of the future of financial
innovation and adds that the expected slow down is also supported by the fact that there are
not many new finance theories in academic circles. He predicted that it is more likely that
institutions and structures are going to change much more than instruments. These changes
wil be in more close contact with the cost of existing technology than the development of
new technology.
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The same risk enhancement aspect combined with positive developments in
liquidity, cost and profits are discussed by Allen and Gale (1994). They discuss the issue of
financial innovation by referring to the benefits of innovation and then citing briefly the
main theories of financial innovation. The main benefits deriving from financial innovation
are: the increase in risk-sharing opportunities, the avoidance of regulations and taxes, the
reduction of transaction costs and increased liquidity, the reduction of agency costs, the
capture of temporary profits and considerable changes in prices of financial products.
Then, they refer to the theories of Silber (1981), van Horne (1985), Miler (1986),
Walmsley (1988), Conrad (1989) and Merton (1990). A major contribution of this book is
inclusion of a brief history of financial innovation from ancient times until the 1980s.
According to Levich (1987), competition, integration and market reliance are the
positive aspects of innovative activity. The effect of innovation is allocated into three main
categories: related to financial markets, international financial relationships and
macroeconomics effects. The first category includes the reduction in transaction costs,
better risk transfer, increase liquidity, improved funding in opportunities for riskier credits
and greater competition. The second includes enhanced capital mobility, greater
integration and greater similarity across countries in cost-risk relationship. The final
category includes reduction in discretionary national monetary policy and greater impact of
monetary policy on exchange rates. His final comment is that the recent wave of financial
innovation has increased the reliance on the market mechanism and monetary intervention
could not use the traditional tools.
The aspect of efficiency and its improvement through financial innovation was
discussed by Llewellyn (1992). He assesses the impact of financial innovation by
enumerating the benefits related to the allocative and structural efficiency of the financial
system: The cost of intermediation has been reduced, it is easier to match portfolio
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preferences, funds are allocated in a most efficient way, it is easier to price and distribute
risks, it has expanded and changed available assets and liabilities portfolios, it has
increased the bulk of specialist services and it has increased the efficiency of the payment
system. Then he discusses the problematic issues of monetary control mentioned already by
Akhtar (1983): supervision and prudential policy (BIS, 1986), the lack of experience in
managing an new financial instrument (Mayer and Kneeshaw, 1988), the potential
exposure of this instrument (Kohen and Santomero, 1980) and the final question, whether
it is accurately priced or not (Mayer and Kneeshaw, 1988).
Finally, he does not share Vinals and Berges' (1988) scepticism in relation to the
potential benefits from innovation for the financial system. He concludes his article by
pointing out that the emergence of financial innovation is not random and its positive
impact could be assessed in relation to the increase in the efficiency of the financial system.
Profitability combined with the enhanced hedging abilties are discussed by Artus
and Boisseau (1988), who review Silber's (1975) and Kane's (1981) theories of constraints
and regulation theory adding the Desai and Low (1987) complementary approach of 'fillng
the gaps'. 107 Finally they mention the Porter and Simpson (1980) theory of thresholds and
reversibility.i08 The former defines a particular level such that when holding costs of an
instrument exceeds it, financial innovative activity is automatically initiated. The latter
emanates from observation of the considerably long-lasting nature of many financial
instruments.
The effects of financial innovations could be focused on four areas: macroeconomic
consequences, the banks' profitability and structure, the effectiveness of monetary policy
and as a better hedging instrument for risk and interest volatility. They conclude that
financial innovation is not responsible for financial crisis. They foresee many new financial
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products as an alternative to the reducing reliance and confidence of investors on
traditional financial instruments.
Finally the conditional reduction of uncertainty aside from enhanced risk
management is discussed by Bhatt (1986). He discusses the relationship between financial
innovation and reduction of uncertainty. Due to the uncertainty about any future event,
borrowers and lenders face different risks. Borrowers face the risk of the particular project,
and the lender faces two types of subjective risk about the project and about the willngness
of borrowers to repay. Financial innovation such as personal guarantees or short term
credit, and the specialisation of dealers in one type of asset, could reduce this subjective
risk without increasing the cost. But it requires trust and confidence in the system, a stable
environment and freedom from regulation, experimentation of financial innovations.
Since we mentioned above Vinal and Borge (1988), we have to discuss their
scepticism about the real improvements in financial market. They observe innovative
activity in the European corporate banking sector and discuss its impact on the 'real'
economy and in particular on investment. They admit that it is very difficult to approach
this question because relevant data are not available and there is not any conceptual
framework to use. They refer to the papers of Levich (1987), van Horne (1985) and the BIS
(1986) report. In order to define the reasons that contribute to innovation, they introduce
the notion of 'zero sum game' i.e. innovations that do not either lower cost or spread the
risk better and that are bound to disappear. They define their possible contribution in three
main areas: availabilty of new external sources of finance, cheaper sources of finance and
better financing of working capital and risk coverage. Then they discuss the impact of
innovation on firms across Europe. They found out that only a few financial instruments
reduce the cost of capital and their impact is negligible. Firms rely even more on internal
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finance and intermediate external finance than ten years ago. Finally accessibility to new
types of finance is not increased for the main bulk of firms.
A view related to the increased risk taking and exposure of financial institutions
was expressed from Walmsey (1988). He concentrates his attention on the potential risks of
these financial innovations. He observes the significant increase in trading volumes and
interconnections among the different institutions which result in a higher exposure. He
underlines the negative impact of innovation on monetary control of the economy and
emphasises the over-leveraging of, particularly, US firms. He also advances the argument
that high fixed costs - a direct result of advanced and complicated information technology -
could be justified and amortised only by large volumes of trade and is considerably
facilitated by significant high volatility. He finally adds that the new financial structure and
applied hedge theory are not capable of minimising significantly the systemic risk that
institutions face. 
109
The increased amount of transactions and complementary instruments used could
create further duplication problems and decrease the efficiency of instruments. Pesendorfer
(1995) develops an econometric model that, under certain assumptions, could explain
financial innovative activity. He adopts Merton's (1991) three motives for financial
innovation i.e. better allocation of risk, and reduction of transaction and agency costs. He
assumes a simple model where financial intermediaries issue financial instruments against
standard securities which act as collateraL. These financial instruments are less known and
more tailored to the particular needs of the customer (retail and institutional market) hence
there is not an established market. Institutions should pay marketing costs in order to sell in
the retail market since it is not as educated and specialised as the institutional one. At this
stage, he assumes proportional set-up and marketing costs per customer. His three
conclusive points are that: phenomena of 'redundant' securities could be observedIIo, an
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inefficient level of innovation occurred when there exist complementarities among
innovations; and depending on the pnce level, there are many equilibrium levels of
innovation. The latter also suggests the point that the smaller the marketing costs, the lower
the utility indeterminacy observed.
A further complication in the usage of advanced instruments is related to potential
limitations of the models used to price them. Conrad (1989), is the first to analyse a very
sensible and controversial phenomenon. She challenges the assumption that share price is
not affected by the introduction of the corresponding option, which is one of the
fundamental assumptions of the Black and Scholes derivatives pricing modeL. She uses
data, covering the period 1974-1980, on securities and their respective options prices. She
observes that there is a permanent increase in the price of the underlying security before the
introduction date - not the announcement - of the option. This permanent increase, around
2 percent, is probably related to anticipated purchases of the security by market-makers in
order to build inventory and hedge against future transactions in the option. This price
effect is also accompanied by a reduction of the security's volatility but has no effect on the
systematic risk of the security.
A further contribution on this issue was made by Detemple (1990) who deals with
the same financial instruments as Conrad (1989). He also challenges the redundant
element of Black and Scholes' derivatives pricing modeL. The incompleteness of the
market is related to the discontinuity of the connection between new information and
pricing adjustment, hence it is impossible to replicate with dynamic strategy all possible
pay-offs (Black and Scholes' fundamental assumption).
We conclude our discussion by presenting a more general argument, unquestionably
related to the large exposures that financial institutions take, combined with lack of
adequate controls or lack of information about the real nature of the instruments involved.
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Raines and Leathers (1992) provide a very iluminating approach to the impact of financial
innovation on financial markets. They underline the main characteristics of the 1980s as
massive speculation, the accumulation of debt, the crisis in banking/thrift institutions and
the numerous cases of price manipulation. They refer to Veblen's theory (1904) of
financial markets (The Theory of Business Enterprise). In his view financial markets
incorporate a dual tendency towards collusive stability and resurgent periods of financial
instability (see Carter 1989 and Lawsons 1990). He describes the financiers' behaviour as
trying to maximise pecuniary gains and favouring financial peace and stability. The latter is
in full accordance with the concept of collusive oligopoly - few large institutions
administered financial markets. But in the quest for high pecuniary profits, epidemic
financial instability is created through financial innovation and new waves of competition.
The last two phenomena could occur simultaneously (during the 1980s) or independently
(during the 1920s; only new waves of competition). After this instability new forms of
collusive agreement, backed by a new institutional framework, are established usually
when using the latest introduced financial innovations ( for example from 1880 until 1930).
During this section, we have discussed potential benefits and problems from
financial innovation. Benefits are associated with abnormal profit opportunities,
intangible assets, better risk management, or more complete markets. Potential problems
are the amount of risk undertaken, excesses, inadequate information and systematic risk.
In the following chapter, we shall propose a model of financial innovative activity,
incorporating elements from the current chapter.
1.3 Conclusion
During the discussion of the innovation related theories we adopted the
evolutionary perception of economic activities as a set of endless guided variations. These
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variations are based on the R&D activities and existing business routines. Factors that
shape these variations are the particular sector's cumulative characteristics, technological
public and in-house developments, research spilovers, network externalities,
appropriability and strategic objectives.
Then we discussed the pioneering theories of financial innovation of Silber (1975)
and Kane (1981). They provided us with the idea of the financial constraint that firms face
and the existence of a dialectic relationship between causes and institutional responses.
Then we elaborated more on the potential causes of financial innovation by reviewing
many related papers. We found many reasons that caused financial innovative activity over
the last thirty years. We wil incorporate these causes in our proposed modeL. Then we
discussed the types of financial innovation and potential classifications. We encountered
many different types but many of them were very narrow (Kane 1981) or very general
(Silber 1975, Niehans 1983). Most of the classifications we reviewed were perceived as
appropriate for particular types of financial innovation or instruments. We wil adopt two
of them (BIS 1986) and alter a third one (Walmsley 1988) as more suitable for om modeL.
Finally, we discussed the benefits and problems that financial innovation could cause. The
benefits enable us to understand the reasons or features that make a financial innovation
successfuL. The problems could act as further cause for financial innovative action.
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Endnotes of theories of innovation and financial innovation
10r economic rent i.e. the difference between price and prime-variable costs.
2 Schumpeter (1939) justifies the observed fluctuation of the capitalist system as the appearance of swarms or
bursts of entrepreneurs and innovations. He proposed four phases in each cycle: upswing, recession,
depression and recovery and three types of cycle: the Kitchin cycle (3 years) characterised by inventory
accumulation and de-accumulation, the Juglar (8-11 years) related to individual innovations and the
Kondratieff (50-60 years) related to major innovations.
3 In the same source, we could find a similarity in his perception for the future of large organisation with
Hicks (i 932).
4 Darwin (i 838), was influenced by the Scottish School beliefs that complex phenomena could arise as
unintended consequences of the actions of many individuals and particulary by Malthus' (1798) idea of 'the
struggle for existence'; the phenomenon of crowding and struggle and the process of continuous natural
selection. In contrast with the neo-classicals he accepts the existence of 'inferior parts' as a reason for
struggle and improvements. The existence of diversity is seen as playing a positive and energising part in the
system and essential to the vitality as a whole. He argued that 'evil is in the world to move us not to despair
but to activity'. Veblen agreed with Darwin in his point about cumulative causation i.e. a blind scheme in
which there is no trend, no final term, no consummation, an endless process without finality or goal.
Biologists accept the possibility of group selection and accordingly, the methodological individualism so
important for neo-classicals is rejected.
sFor evolutionary economists such as Nelson and Winter (1982) people act following routines. Because it is
often very difficult to act optimally (time-information), routines guarantee a satisfactory performance, not
necessary in a maximising one. A routine could also be an implicit contract. There are general routines (all
accounting departments in firms) and particular routines ('de la maison'). They could change for external or
internal reasons.6The factor of sexual reproduction does not correspond to any economic phenomenon, hence we cannot
derive any analogy.
7 Failure was defined as an unsuccessful attempt to make any profit.
8 Something that Schumpeter and other neo-schumpeterian did not accept.
9 Apart from uniqueness, another major disagreement lies on the super-optimazation, of the neo-classical
approach, due to unlimited and perfect information. The last two points even Lucas and Arrow (1986)
admitted when they described the seven steps of the Classic Defence argument. But they do not define and
explore the important phenomena that lie beyond these limits and investigate the nature and timing of the
adaptive process.10 We have to remind ourselves that even Leontief and Friedman stressed the possible limitations of
mathematical formalism and its potential damage to economics. Formalism does not allow for creativity,
change from within and interaction with the environment (Lawson 1994). But we could always bear in mind
that these type of mathematical simulations are still useful (Dosi 1993) because they enable researchers to
argue against neo-classical global profit maximisation and propose simple decision rule like mark-up pricing.i i As Winslow (1989) said the individuals are not given i.e. as the society cannot exist without individuals,
they do not exist prior to the social reality (Hodsgon 1995a).
12 He investigated the US market structure and found that the 500 largest firms are related to the main bulk of
innovative process (Acs 1988).
13 See Evangelista et al 1997 who refer to the Community Innovation Survey in 1992 collecting data from
42000 European firms.
14 The Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) participated in the survey that took place in the 1960s by
OECD. It Investigated the same categories as the SAPPHO and they found similar results except the
electronics sector.
is He advises firms to establish a minimum nominal yearly expenditure - depending on the sector - in order to
follow, at least a defensive strategy.
16 She pointed out that at the same time they create new jobs and yield regional economic regeneration.
17 Small firms could provide the radical innovations that large firms are able to expand in large scale
production.
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18 They claim that their data are significantly better than before due to the computatization of the US Patent
Office which provided them with data including patents, renewals and innovation from the US Small Business
Administration.19 The innovative activity is negatively related with concentration and unionization. Finally they sustain
Winter's (1984) point that small and large firms face different environments in relation to their innovative
activity.
20 He also found that the evidence related to the positive effect of diversification on firm's innovative projects
is inconclusive but makes an allowance for technologically related areas.
21 Hence he also considers it as an open question.
22 Their empirical results deviate from the typical Schumpeterian case: the Kamien and Schwartz (1982)
observation of the existence of a critical point in the association between R&D and innovation, Acs and
Audretch's (1988) theory that small firms are more innovative than large, and finally Geroski' s (1990) point
that in the UK there is little evidence of causation between actual monopoly power and innovative activity.
23 He believes that firms that do not undertake routine innovations could earn normal profits and stay in the
business.
24 He covered innovations emanating from 600 firms, during the period 1986-1995, except from 1991. He
divided all firms in six categories in accordance with the amount of employees.
25 The 'raison d'être' of this article was to explain the positive elements of the abolition of barriers among the
EU nations but I believe that its points enable us to have a more general view of the relationship between
competition and innovation.
26 Static efficiency is related to the exploitation of given technology where the dynamic is related to the
efforts to push further the technological frontiers.
27He also challenges any significant relation between productivity and innovation
28 We are going to discuss, Dosi's contribution in depth, in the section on 'Sources of innovative diversity'.
29 Sach and Stiglitz advanced the theory of non-tournament i.e. a model that assumes that firms undertake
several parallel projects aiming at the same innovation and having a cost-reducing impact at the process. (see
also Beath 1992).
30 Initially mentioned in the 'Demand pull theories of innovation.
31 He adds also that, Guerard Bean and Andrews' (1987) research proved the lack of statistical significance
existed between R&D and external funds.
32 The National Co-operative Research Act of 1984 which promoted the RJV in the U. S.
33 Production-intensive firms are related to the increasing division of labour and simplification of production
tasks. Their main representatives are food production, metal and manufacturing, shipbuilding and motor
vehicles. They devote a considerable part of R&D to process innovations and present high vertical-integration
characteristics The production of a significant part of their own process innovation characterises the
mechanical and engineering firms, but they mainly focus on the creation of product innovations destined for
other sectors.
34 The science-based firms are considered to be located in the chemical and electronic/electrical sectors. Their
R&D expenditures are very high and they usually produce the technological paradigm that defines the
technological trajectories.
35 It should be also tested further - covering all sectors - extended and modified in order to cover other areas.
36 Rosenberg (1982) argues that research is expensive hence the allocation of R&D investment has to follow a
certain direction. Usually these directions are determined by economic and technological factors i.e. they set
the 'agenda' for research. At this point he clarifies that technology is a codified set of experiences and
knowledge. The growth of technology is much more cumulative, and interactive with new scientific
knowledge.
37 He divided these sectors into four categories supplier dominated, specialised suppliers, scale-intensive and
science-based.
38 The data comprises 8000 commercial innovations introduced in 1982 in the US.
39 Allowing for the fact that industrial production in the US is indeed concentrated in less then ten states.
40 The importance of organizational structures for the innovative activity is extensively discussed in
Shri vastava and Souder (19870 paper. The paper includes a review of the relevant literature and three models
of organizational structures and their impact on the innovative activity: the stage, process and task dominant
models.
41 Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt (1996) highlighted the diversity of sectors and cases.
42 It is possible to identify them by observing the change in the coefficients of input-output matrix.
43 They could be related with more macro changes as the consumer policy changes for the purchases of
durable products in 1950' s in capitalist societies. .
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44 But from the 1960's the actual rate of productivity has declined. He argues that the main reason is the
structural crisis of adaptation of the techno-economic paradigm resulting in an uneven sectoral development.
It is imperative to explain that industries' massive production (Fordist style) and energy intensiveness, based
on the previous paradigm, have reached their limits on productivity gains, i.e. diminishing returns to further
technical advance along existing trajectories (Wolf's law). On the other hand the new paradigm, i.e.
information technology, is not yet affecting all the economy, hence its cost reduction advantages, have not
been fully exploited.
45 It covered the diffusion of Automated Telling Machines (ATMs) during the period 1972-1992. We are
going to discuss in depth the ATMs in the 'Plastic card' chapter (six).
46 Sakurai (i 996) and Papakonstantinou (1996) in accordance with the EU Green Paper on Innovation (1995)
and the Cabinet Office 'Realising our Potential' (1993) discussed the importance of research spilovers in the
innovative activity.
47 Discussed by many other authors as Ayres (1991), Stoneman (1994) or Saloner (1995).
48 Process due to the novelty of using the demand deposits and product because it expands the spectrum of
services provided with the 24 hours access.
49 The purchase of a telephone is a typical example.
50 The purchase of a hardware and the later creation of compatible software, is a typical example.
5! In the case that their availability and quality depend on the amount of sales.
52 Large firms prefer not to offer where small firms with analogous networks prefer to offer compatible
products. They also discuss whether or not side payments exist and whether their existence could influence
the joint adoption of a standard or the unilateral construction of an adapter- usually from a small firm.
53 He proposed a model based on intense competition, predicting higher profits when products are not
compatible.
54 Without being necessary that the innovator is a quantity leader
55 Benefit from output embodied knowledge is achieved through in house use of the innovation in order to
enhance its products. Benefit from non embodied knowledge is achieved through the sale of its non embodied
knowledge to third parties.
56 Generic is general purpose assets not tailored to the innovation, specialised assets are unilateral depended
between innovation and the complementary assets and co-specialised assets have a bilateral dependence, like
specialised repair facilities for a particular type of machines.
57 External constraints are government intervention and competitors. Internal constraints are the self imposed
liquidity ratio and other internal regulation that prevent the firm tìom reaching its own target.
58 The typical example is a regulation imposed in the bank by the monetary authority such as interest ceiling
on time deposits in D.S in the 1930s.
59 In this case a reduction in firm's utility is considered as 'abnormal' in accordance with historical data and
firms decide to act against this constraint. A typical example is an increase in a particular type of cost such as
personneL.
60 These are: int1ation including level of interest rates, general price level and tax effects, volatility of interest
rates, technology, legislative initiative, internationalization and other.
61 Hegel's dialectic could be summarised in the process of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. It is a dynamic
approach in contradiction to any permanent static equilibrium, if we take into account that the synthesis
becomes a fresh thesis and the process is perpetuated.62 A typical example is the US deposit institutions in the 1960s and 1970s. The exogenous factors are the
technological change and changing market environment which forced banks due to the uncertainty they faced,
to move quicker than regulation.63 A very detailed demonstration of the regulatory approach is included, (Kane 1981), summarising the
substitutes that banks created as a response to particular regulation.
64 Re-regulation took a considerable time for many reasons: firstly the burèaucratic regulative bodies require
substantial amounts of information before deciding to act, they had to take into account the impact of their
approach for the welfare of their regulatee, and very often any re-regulation is enforced and supervised by a
separate agency in a gradual way.
65 More than one causes could initiate the innovative activity.
66 In the particularly political sensitive area of housing, the government has pioneered innovations. We wil
discuss them in depth, in the 'Securitization' chapter.
67 The Eurodollar market due to US restrictions, the swaps due to British government exchange restrictions,
deep discount bonds by US corporations or zero bonds due to tax complications, financial futures due to the
exchange and interest rate volatility.
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68 Aggressive innovation is the introduction of a new product or process in response to a perceived demand. A
defensive innovation is a response to a change to internal or external factors.
69 The Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1970s pressed for development towards the centralisation
of the market making process and trading. The US Treasury in i 984, in order to manage the raising of huge
amounts of debt launched two new products: the twenty years bond with a 5 year call period without
withholding tax and the first zero coupon paper i.e. the Strip.
70 Mutual funds are considered as transparent where insurance companies and Saving and Loan are
considered as opaque. Pension funds are positioned in the middle. In opaque institutions the agency costs or
the monitoring, bonding and control costs, are the most severe.
71 He develops a model that highlights the importance of financial institutions in running the marketing
networks.
72 Imperfect is conceived in contrast within the perfect competition assumptions of no transaction costs and
liquid financial markets.
73 A possible explanation of the tremendous success could be the transaction cost associated with fixed
commissions and providing an incentive for pooling of transactions. An additional reason could be associated
with less costly monitoring.
74 They mentioned that a possible explanation could be associated with Goldsmith's (1969) approach of
'rotation' and 'offset' ratios. These ratios measure the degree of divergence and volatility between surplus
and deficit units.
75 Using as an example the connection between deregulation and technological development.
76 Due to the Fisher effect (equation which connects the inflation rate with interest rates) and this fall in
interest rates would lower the 'tax' on deposits imposed by reserve requirements and reduce banks interest on
wholesale and eurodollar market and focus more on deposit business.
77 It is the second time that we encounter the description of financial innovation as an 'engine'. The first
encounter was in Gardener's (1988) paper where he describes financial innovation as an engine of change in
the British banking system.
78 The cost of monitoring an investment.
79 The expansion to round-the-clock trading, combined with powerful information technology leads to tailored
products and very sophisticated hedging and risk strategies.80 Since banks can pool risk and diversify easier than individuals given the fixed cost of acquiring
information.
81 Marketing costs are incurred in order to identify and educate buyers and sellers, manufacturing costs are
related to creation and engineering of the financial products and other transactions associated with the
launching and running of these products.
82 The regulative implications also boost further the scope for cost reduction and products such as synthetic
CMO's and amortizing interest rate swaps were launched by banks.
83 Increased volatility and broadening of potential markets could provide further scope for innovation.
Furthermore, development related to the nature of potential investors could also enhance innovative activity.
84 It is the case that banks do not charge their depositors for writing cheques and the administration of their
account.
85 Particularly, after the Building Society Act in 1986. We shall discuss it in depth in the following chapter on
special banking liabilities.
86 As part of the standard function of a financial intermediary: the processing of information, the
transformation of maturities accompanied with the provision of liquidity and the transformation of risks.
87 The above three papers discussed Veblen's theory of financial instability. This theory is not related directly
with our research but indirectly through the institutionalist approach and the importance of large (financial)
institutions for the smooth functioning of the economy.88 An instrument innovation is associated with Veblen's product innovation and practice innovation is
associated with Veblen's process innovation. Except from these two, van Horne (1985), used the process,
product classification.
89 The first type consists of exchange of present money against future money, the second is bringing together
borrowers and lenders and the third one is the execution of payments.90 They are in principle reversible when the cause ceases to exist but, taking as example the Euromarkets
(inflation and interest rate ceiling), their disappearance takes much more time than their emergence.91 The main cause of these innovations is the reduction of transaction costs.
92 But the causal relationship is not clear.
93 Transmission of information is cheaper and easier within than between firms.
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94 Some of these reasons could be perceived as causes but since all these causes are already mentioned in the
previous chapter (section 1.1, we integrate them in this section primarily because these researchers accept the
BIS classification and then because they advanced attributes that financial innovation should include in order
to be successfuL.
95 The BIS is itself considered as a very ilustrative case of financial innovation (Summons 1993).
96 Reminding us the literature and discussion on the impact of Research and Development activities for the
innovative process in chapter one (section 1.1).
97 In accordance with Schumpeterian definitions of innovation (see appendix (A-LID.
98 Vinals and Borge's (1988) classification is the following:
*Special debt instruments *Debt-equity hybrid instruments
-Variable rate loans -Convertible bonds
-Floating rate bonds -Bonds with warrants
-Note issuance facilities -Prets participatifs
-Zero coupon and Junk bonds
-Leasing
* Special equity instruments
-Euro-equities
- Venture capital
*Risk-covering instruments
-Swaps
-Futures/forwards rate agreements
- Options
99 The quantity is measured by the market value at the time of the offer, the price is the underwriting spread
i.e. investors payment minus the issuers proceeds.
lOO An illustrative example is the explosion observed in between 1982 and 1984 of instruments capturing the
85% tax exemption of dividend income. In 1984 the Tax Act reduced considerably the demand for these
products.
101 Remind ourselves the existence of positive network externalities on the financial markets. In our case the
existence of other instruments or markets increases the demand for financial instruments for hedging purposes
and could also be explained by Merton's (1992) already mentioned spiral effect.
102 This investment included: payment for legal, accounting, regulatory and tax advice, time spent educating
issuers, traders and investors, computer systems for pricing and trading, capital and personnel commitments
to support market making, plus the annual average investment of one million dollars for product development.
103 These barriers could be long-standing client relationships, distinction among firms, clients' preference for
multiple underwriters and market makers.
104 Lower prices could still generate profits through lower cost and these innovators are called inframarginal
competitors.
105 They use their knowledge of the buyers to set up secondary trades and become the dominant market
makers. The active market making provides could then provide Iow cost information about the preference of
investors for future underwriting and market making.
106 He associates this criticism with the intransigence of the economic doctrine of Physiocracy. The two
developments wrong blamed, for the crash of 1987, are, the Index Futures for stock market volatility and
Index Products.
t07 This approach perceives a theoretical spectrum of all products based on liquidity and return. Each product
is positioned in this spectrum, the 'filing the gap' theory investigates the reduction of distance between this
points/products.
108 In accordance with this theory, there is no incentive to innovate unless the opportunity cost of holding
traditional financial products or employing existing financial technology exceeds a certain threshhold. This
threshhold is related to the maximum interest rate for the preceding period.
109 The buidt-up of large positions and the program trading practice act as factors of instability.
i 10 New combination could just be linear combinations of existing securities but still improving the utility of
economic agents.
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Chapter two
'Entropy: (Clausius 1865) It is a measure of disorder or randomness in a physical system.
It took its name form the Greek word' Tponr¡ , which means transformation. Based on
the second law of Thermodynamics, the entropy of the universe is constantly increasing.'
(Philosophy Encyclopaedia)
Part I The model of Financial Innovation
2 Model of Financial Innovation
Introduction
In the previous chapter we discussed the main theories of innovation and derived an
evolutionary and dynamic approach, combined with some important concepts such as
routines, in-house and public available technology, spilovers, appropriability, network
externalities and strategic objectives, as well as an evolutionary process justifying the
emergence innovative activity. We also discussed theories of financial innovation and
derived potential causes, classification, benefits and shortcomings of financial innovations.
During this chapter, we wil propose a model designed to ecapsulate the financial
innovation process and to provide an analytical framework that offers significant insight
into the process. This model combines elements from both sections of the previous chapter,
on theories of innovation and financial innovation. It consists of four stages before the
successful emergence of a financial innovation. Each stage offers additional information
and enhances further our understanding of the particular innovation. It both synthesises and
extends elements from the existing literature.
The first stage addresses the causes of financial innovation allocated into three
groups. The second stage is the factors that initiate and shape financial innovative activity
inside the financial institution. The third stage is the types and classifications of financial
innovations, necessary in order to describe accurately any financial innovation. Finally, we
discuss the features of selected or successful innovation in order to provide a holistic view
of the phenomenon. This holistic view is further enhanced by the dynamic and evolutionary
nature of our modeL. Shortcomings and limitations of existing innovations, could initiate
the financial innovative process.
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2.1 Factors causing financial innovative activity
During this section, we shall discuss the first stage of the model of financial innovation
process consisting of the causes of financial innovation. It is essential in order to create an
analytical framework to understand the causes that initiate the financial innovative effort.
The first stage of the model is the set of causes that could initiate innovative
activity. We divide these causes into two main categories, the external and the internal.
Between them there is a sub category of causes that could be both external and internaL.
Significant contributions of our model are: the plethora and diversity of potential causes for
innovation and the proposition that more than one causes could initiate financial innovative
activity. We are not going to include technological advance, a very often cited cause of
financial innovation, for reasons that we are going to explain in the following section.
Model of financial innovation
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The external causes of financial innovation are seven. The order does not indicate
the importance attributed to these causes. The first two are associated with volatility, of
interest rates and exchange rates. Interest rate volatility was proposed as a cause by van
Horne (1985), Minskin (1992) and Davies (1993). Exchange rate volatility was discussed
mostly by Miler (1992). Another cause that it is frequently cited is the increase of wealth
and economic growth. The most prominent supporters are BIS (1986), Miler (1992) and
Llewellyn (1992). We then identify regulation as the most cited cause of financial
innovative activity. Almost all the prominent researchers perceived regulation as a very
common cause of innovation: among others Silber (1983), Kane (1981), van Horne (1985),
the BIS report (1986), and Miler (1986/1992). Mishkin (1992) proposed and elaborated
also the concept of re-regulation which Kane first observed in his 'regulatory dialectic'.
Government initiatives - apart from regulative ones - is a further cause of financial
innovation. The most important advocates of this cause were Miler (1986) and Walmsley
(1988). The disintermidiation that characterised the financial systems at the end of the
1970s and mostly in the 1980s and 1990's was mentioned by many authors. Artus and
Boisseau (1988), Arestis and Howells (1992), Davies (1993), Ford and Molluneux (1995)
were the most important contributions on this cause. Finally, competition or the quest for a
competitive edge was very often directly or indirectly mentioned. The most direct adherents
of this cause were the BIS report, Walmsley (1988), Arestis and Howells (1992), Ford and
Molluneux (1995), where Llewellyn (1992) and Merton et al (1995) described it as changes
in the market environment demand requirements.
The following set of four causes could be perceived as internal or external
depending on the particular case of financial innovation. The first is, providing support to
existing innovations. One of the contributions of our model is the introduction of this new
cause. As we are going to discuss in the following chapters, financial institutions could
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initiate innovative activity in order to support existing innovations. Second is liquidity
enhancement advocated by Levich (1987), Flood (1992) and Merton (1992). Then
transactions costs were directly supported as a cause by Allen and Gale (1984), Miler
(1986), Flood (1992) and Merton (1992) and indirectly by Llewellyn (1992). Finally the
institutional requirements, which could be associated with regulation or competitive
pressures or the deliberate decisions of the institution was advocated mainly by Ross
(1989), Llewellyn (1992) and indirectly by Davies (1993) through restrictions on banks
balance sheets.
The third set of causes are considered as internal to the firm. There are two types of
internal causes: institutional preferences and the cost structure of financial institutions.
Institutional preferences were advocated mainly by the institutionalist Ross (1989) and
Llewellyn (1992). The cost structure was advocated by Merton et al (1995) and Blake
(1995).
During the first stage of our model, we have discussed three types of causes that are
able to initialise the innovative activity. All of them are considered as endogenous to the
financial system since we perceive the financial system as consisting of three elements:
providers of financial services, buyers of financial services and regulatory bodies. In other
words we adopt a functional relationship i.e we do not segment our approach only to
recognised banks or official designated banks, but we tend to cover a more wide financial
spectrum of analysis where banks operate. These three sub-categories are external, internal
and potentially both internal and external to the financial institution. As we shall discuss in
the coming chapters, it is possible that more than one cause is initiating the innovative
activity. In order to enrich further our insight on the phenomenon of financial innovation,
we are going to propose a set of factors that are internal to the financial institution and
shape the financial innovative activity.
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2.2 The innovative process in the financial institution
The second stage of our model analyses the factors that influence and shape financial
innovative activity inside the financial institution, in order to enhance our understanding
about financial innovations.
We are going to use many concepts from the theories of innovation, discussed in
the previous chapter. This "cross fertilisation" between concepts emanating from the
standard innovation theory and financial innovation is one of the contributions of our
modeL. During this section we are going to encounter concepts such as existing routines, in-
house and public knowledge, technology, creativity, appropriability, spilovers, network
externalities and strategic objectives.
The key concept is that the most commonly cited cause of financial innovation,
technological advance, is not treated as a potential cause but we incorporate it, inside the
financial institution. When we incorporate it, we do not perceive it as endogenous to the
institution. We propose that the level of technology available both internally and externally
is going to be taken into consideration during the design of the innovation. In other words,
technology could shape or facilitate the innovative process but it is not a single cause by
itself. The financial sector belongs to the supplier-dominated industries (Pavitt 1984). The
characteristics of this sector is small firms, with small in-house Research and Development
and engineering abilities.
The first concept is the existing routines of the financial institution. We adopt the
evolutionary approach that firms use internal routines (Hodgson 1995a, 1995b) in order to
function. These routines could facilitate the daily management of the institution. Any kind
of routine could act as a barrier towards any novelty. Learning and experimentation are
crucial for the innovative activity of institutions (Merton et al 1995). It is also connected
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with the expertise (Tuffano 1990) or know how (Davies 1993) that is crucial to financial
institutions. Part of these routines is the academic qualifications of the managers (Miler
1986). They are also part of the important economies of scale that large financial
institutions present and enhance further their innovative activity (Davies 1993, Merton et al
1995).
Then we discuss the concepts of in-house technology, knowledge and externally
available technology, the general stock of knowledge. The emergence of innovative activity
depends on two elements, the available in-house knowledge or technology and the general
stock of knowledge. The internal part is endogenous (Hicks) and aiming at cost reduction.
The technology available in a financial institution could be cumulative (Pavitt 1984). The
introduction of technological applications in order to reduce the cost was discussed by
many researchers and especially in cases where an institution's utility was reduced or in
cases where the cost of adhering to an existing burden surpassed a certain threshold (Silber
1975). The paramount role of technology is highlighted by many researchers such as Miler
(1986), Mishkin (1992), Ford and Molluneux (1995) only to mention a few. The public
stock of knowledge could be used in institutions' innovative process through R&D (Dosi
1988). The importance of new advanced academic work was supported by van Horne
(1985) and Levich (1987).
The third set of factors consists of research spilovers and creativity. The
institutionalisation of R&D activity is a fact observed by BIS (1986). Spilover could create
a problem of 'free rider' (Poyago- Theotoky 1996) and reduce competition (Kort 1996)
hence patents (Dasgupta and Stoneman 1987) and protective regulation could be
introduced in order to enhance innovative activity. Spil over is essential especially in
information technology applications (Kort 1996, Gourlay 1998). A further characteristic is
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creativity, as Smith first mentioned; the entrepreneur seeks his own truth Hodgson (1995)
refers to the difficulty of including it in a formal modeL.
Then, we discuss the concepts of appropriabilty and positive network externalities.
Appropriability should be taken into consideration since patents are weak or non-existent
(Tuffano 1990, Llewellyn 1992). But positive regulation could exist (Corkish et al 1997).
Financial institutions under conditions of weak patent protection or appropriabilty could
capture benefits by producing complementry goods (HippeI1981).
The appropriabilty of an innovation could be enhanced by network externalities as
discussed by Economides (1995) or positive complementarities as supported by Corkish et
al (1997). Positive network externalities could increase significantly the predisposition of
institutions to undertake innovative activity or adopt existing innovations.
Finally, we discuss the element of strategic objectives. The strategic objectives
could be associated with both demand (users) and supply (institutions) characteristics
(Llewellyn 1992 and Blake 1996) as well as their technological abilities (Smookler 1966)
that strategists take into account when formulating their plans. It is also essential that
innovators have a good understanding of their potential market (Rosenberg 1979).
During this section, we have discussed concepts and aspects that are to be taken
into account by the financial institution during the process of generating innovative output.
These aspects are related to internal characteristics, to available knowledge and aspects
surrounding the potential financial innovation such as spilovers, appropriability,
complementarities and positive network externalities. In order to provide a more enhanced
description of financial innovation, we are going to discuss in the third stage of our model
the potential classification of financial innovations.
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2.3 Types of financial innovation
The third stage provides an analytical classification of the types of financial innovation. It
is not possible to discuss the phenomenon of financial innovation without having a detailed
and enriching way to classify the innovative output.
We are going to divide them into five types and sub categories (see the model in
section 2.1). Our classification is based on different prior, altered and novel classifications.
The purpose is to provide a very detailed and accurate description or classification of any
financial innovation.
During the discussion on classification of financial innovation we encountered
many different allocations. In our model we do not use all of them and we are making some
alterations that could enable us to better classify them. We do not use the classification that
was proposed by Veblen (1896) and Niehans (1983) since it is too narrow. Silber's (1975)
classification is considered as covered by our own. We avoided Kane's (1981), Silber
(1981), Artus and Boisseau (1988), Vilas (1988) and Tuffano (1990) since their
classification are perceived as important only for particular types of financial instruments.
Finally Walmsley's (1988) categories are modified and expanded.
Before discussing the types and sub-categories of financial innovation we could
analogise with biological concepts. Financial innovative activity could be conceived as
similar to the innovative activity in industry (Hodgson 1995). Financial innovation is a
mutation of existing routines of doing a task or producing a financial instrument. These
routines could be applicable also in the relationship between the different properties of a
financial instrument i.e. risk, return and liquidity. These mutations are not random; they are
guided variations towards the goal of profitabilty. Hence it is a biased not a random
transmission.
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Our first classification of financial innovation distinguishes between radical and
incremental innovation. We do not propose a middle category as Freeman (1982) did, since
we believe that these two types are sufficient. A radical innovation is an innovation that
leads to a series or cluster of further innovations based on the initial archetype. An
incremental innovation is a financial innovation that adds a further characteristic to an
existing innovation. Incremental innovation could be endogenous to the financial firm
(Richardson 1996) and the result of learning-by-doing improvements (Audretesch 1995).
Product differentiation could be perceived as routine innovations (Knight 1967). The
majority of innovations are incremental (Audretesch 1995).
The second classification is similar to Schumpeter's types of innovative activity. It
is considered the most detailed and enables us to encompass all types of financial
innovation. A financial innovation could be a new product or instrument, a new process of
doing a task or providing a service, a new market in which financial instruments could be
sold, new materials or inputs and new organisational structures. This classification is
considered as the most appropriate because of the disintermediation and deregulation
process. The banking industry used new inputs in the design of their products, expanded to
new markets and created new organisational structures or departments and on the other
hand potential competitors emerged from other previously separated areas of the financial
system.
The third classification was inspired by Walmsley's (1988) classification of
aggressive and defensive financial innovations and Silber's adversity and success
innovations. But we are going to propose an alternative distinction between responsive and
exploratory financial innovations. Responsive innovations are considered to be any
innovation where the initial cause is associated with any burden that the financial
institution faces. The vast majority of existing financial innovations belong to this category.
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An exploratory innovation is considered any innovation that does not appear as a response
to a burden, but due to the willngness of the financial institution to acquire a competitive
edge, as firms do in other industries. This type of innovation is extremely rare but is going
to be significant in the future, because as disintermediation is taking place in the financial
sectors, many particular aspects of the sector based on the particular nature and existing
barriers wil cease to exist. Hence financial institutions wil have to behave like other non-
finance firms and use their own R&D - already observed by BIS (i 986) when it referred to
a trend of institutionalisation of R&D activities in financial institutions - in order to acquire
competitive advantages against existing and potential rivals. An innovation is by nature a
novelty, hence uncertain by its nature, and some critics could immediately disregard the
concept of 'exploratory' as a tautology. If we define the word innovation as 'make
changes', this could provide us a reason to elaborate more on the concept of 'exploratory'.
The key elements of exploration are inquiring and investigating and we apply the concept
of exploration, in the sense that there is not any specific reason to undertake it except for
the quest for market share and profits, like non-financial firms do.
The fourth classification is similar to the BIS (1986) report. We divide financial
instruments into off and on balance sheet. This classification is not directly applicable to all
of Schumpeter's five types of innovation. It is mainly related to financial instruments but
indirectly we could apply it to other types of innovation by elaborating further and
expanding the concept of the balance sheet. In other words whether the cost or return of
this innovation is included directly in the balance sheet, it is automatically off balance
sheet.
Finally the fifth classification is derived partially from the BIS classification of
financial instruments. It allocates them in accordance with their ability to enhance liquidity,
transfer risk whether in the form of price or credit risk, and to generate credit. We omit the
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fourth type i.e. generating equity because, as we mentioned, in the introduction, it is not in
the scope of our research. As we mentioned this classification is applicable mainly to
financial processes or instruments. Due to its narrow use, we are going to call it a sub-
category.
During this section we have discussed the five types and sub-categories that
describe better and more accurately the financial activity of a financial institution. We are
going to use them in order to define financial innovations more precisely. In order to
achieve that, we also had to alter some of the existing classifications and provide a new
type of classification. An additional aspect that enables us to better understand the financial
innovation phenomenon, concerns the features which lead to its success. We turn now to
fourth stage of our modeL.
2.4 The features of financial innovation's selection
During this section, we wil discuss the features that a financial innovation should have in
order to pass selection and emerge as a successful innovation (see model in section 2.5.1).
The difference between a variation that survives and an unsuccessful mutation is whether
the innovation has any of these features. Sometimes, a financial innovation could present
more than one of the features.
The first feature is spectrum filing. A financial innovation should fil the spectrum
of intermediation in order to be successfuL. The spectrum of intermediation is determined
by the relationship between risk, return and liquidity. Every financial instrument has these
three characteristics. Any new combination is an additional place on this spectrum. This
approach was supported by Miler (1986) and Llewellyn (1992).
The second feature is enhanced risk management. Better risk management could be
associated with the 'fillng the spectrum' approaches. This approach was discussed by
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Levich (1987), Vinal and Borges (1988) and Gardener (1988). It is also possible to
associate with a conditional reduction of uncertainty as advanced by Bhatt (1986).
The third feature is regulatory imperfections. A financial innovation could address
or target regulative imperfections in the form of regulation or taxation loopholes. The main
advocates of this theory were Kane (1981), Levich (1987) and Davis (1983).
The fourth feature is market imperfections. This approach is discussed by Levich
(1987) and Flood (1992). A financial innovation could target the imperfections of the
market in relation to liquidity and transaction costs.
The fifth element is related to intangible assets. A financial innovation could
provide the innovator institution with the expertise or the first-mover advantage, which can
be perceived as a positive externality. Tuffano (1990) proposed this element after
conducting a survey of investment banks.
The sixth feature is associated with temporary monopolies. Temporary monopolies
could be extremely profitable. The first author to discuss this issue was Gardener (1988).
These monopoly opportunities could be associated with the first-mover advantages that
were proposed by van Horn (1985) and Corkish et al (1997). This approach was also
encountered in Dasgupta and Stoneman (1987). In oligopolistic market structures, the
closest application of the concept of temporary monopolies could be materialised under the
dominant or barometric firm price leadership (Sloman 1998).
Finally, the cost reduction feature, is associated many times with existing
innovations and we are going to investigate its potential application as a successful feature.
It could also be associated with the general point that financial innovation reduced the cost
of intermediation (Arestis and Howells 1992) and (Llewellyn) or transactions costs (Allen
and Gale 1984).
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The process of financial innovation could be understood as an evolutionary process.
As we mentioned in the previous section, it is possible that some problems created by
financial innovations could be the cause for further innovations. These problems are
detailed in appendix (A-1.6J and are associated with the reduced accessibility of firms to
financial innovation due to their high cost (Vinal and Borges 1988), problematic monetary
control (Kane 1981, Mishkin 1992), limited information for pricing of advanced financial
products as financial options (Conrad 1989, Detemple 1990) and the large exposures to
systemic risk (Walmsley 1988, Raines 1990). Some of these in addition with other
unanticipated shortcomings of existing innovations, could act as directly or indirectly
causes for further. This dynamic approach is a further contribution of our analytical
framework.
To summarise, during this section we have discussed the features that a successful
financial innovation should include. These are related to the innovation's properties as
filing the spectrum and better risk management, imperfections either market or regulative
or due to tangible (temporary monopolies) and intangible assets. Sometimes it is
conceivable that an innovation has more than one of these features. Apart from this
structured presentation of potential successful features of financial innovation, a further
contribution of our model is going to be its dynamic dimension. We shall discuss, in the
following chapters the dynamic aspect that our model offers and the potential shortcomings
or unanticipated features of financial innovation which could be addressed through new
innovative activity. Before that, in the following section, we discuss in general terms how
to operationalize our model, and outline the significant contribution of our modeL.
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2.5 How does the model work?
During this section, we shall provide a generalized example in order to ilustrate how our
model can be applied further and make the case, that it is sufficiently comprehensive to
allow us to understand the causes, nature and development of further financial innovations.
The structured presentation of these factors is one of the most important contributions of
our conceptual framework.
A financial institution could face a "burden" related to an internal or external
reason. This "burden" could also be combined with other additional factors and jointly act
as a cause for the initiation of the innovative activity. This activity is going to be shaped
and influenced by some factors. The potential innovation can be based on existing routines
(usually the case of incremental innovations), taking advantage of publicly-available
technology and mostly the institution's technological capabilities, and could use theoretical
and academic knowledge. It can use previous research as a component as well as the
creative abilities of the specialized staff of the institution. The structuring of the innovation
wil try to maximize the appropriabilty of the potential benefits and could hopefully
present some positive network externalities. Finally strategic objectives such as institutions
plans or experience could also shape the design of the innovation. The output of the
innovative activity could lead to a radical or incremental innovation. This innovation could
be either a new financial instrument, process, market, material or organizational structure
and be classified as responsive to a particular "burden", or based on R&D developments, or
potential demand. It could also be "on" or "off' balance sheet and either enhance liquidity,
transfer risk or generate credit. This innovative effort could remind us of business
"variations" that target particular goals. Whether the innovation in question manages to
address these goals determines its success or failure. These goals are related with the filing
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of spectrum of intermediation, enhancement of risk management, takes advantage of
regulatory or market imperfections, confers intangible assets or temporary monopolies or
reduces costs. It is possible that unanticipated complications or shortcomings of this
innovation wil force financial institutions to further innovate in order to address them.
The importance of our model consists in providing, for the first time, a model
encapsulating the financial innovative activity which includes also dynamic elements that
could encompass and explain further innovative developments. Previous academic work by
Silber 1975, Kane 1981, van Horne 1985, BIS 1986, Llewellyn 1992 and Merton et al 1995
did not provide so many potential causes. It highlights the existence of dual causation for
the initiation of financial activity. Furthermore, it is the only model to provide so many
institution-related factors, as shaping innovative activity. A further novelty is the adoption
of concepts related to the standard innovation literature. It provides also a much more
detailed classification than the BIS report (1986), Walmsley (1988), Vilas (1988) or
Tuffano (1990) and propose a new definition of financial innovation. Finally it is the only
model that explains the features of a successful financial innovations and expand further
Kane's (1981) and Mishkin's (1992) regulatory dialectic into a more dynamic and
evolutionary approach. In order to support this model, we considered comprehensive
information on four clusters of financial innovations; that in itself is offered as a
contribution not included in previous academic work.
Our model could be extremely useful to any researcher involved in the financial
sector. Whatever the degree of evolution of the banking system (Chick 1989), our model
provides a significant insight into the financial innovative process and an holistic view of
the phenomenon. The initiation, emergence, shaping and survival of the financial
innovation is described by a coherent and structured way, combined with an evolutionary
and dynamic perspective. This insight was further enhanced by new definitions (factors
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shaping the innovation and types) and concepts (successful features and dynamic nature)
that enriched our modeL. It is extremely important in a financial world where uncertainty is
inherent in the system (Shackle 1967, Schmidt 1996), that analytical frameworks are
created, which capture multiple causation and the dynamics of phenomena as important as
the financial innovation for the financial system.
During this section, we have ilustrated how of our financial model might be
applied to any financial innovation and suggested ways in which it represents an advance
on existing literature.
2.6 Conclusion
During this chapter, we proposed a conceptual and descriptive model of the process of
financial innovation. Our model is discussed in four stages. The first stage presents a set of
thirteen factors that could cause financial innovative activity. These causes could be
external to the institution such as volatility of exchange and interest rates, economic
growth, regulation and government initiatives, disintermidiation and competitive edge.
They could also be both external and internal, such as supporting existing innovations,
liquidity enhancement, transaction costs and institutional requirements. Finally they could
be internal such as institutional preferences and cost structures. An additional novelty of
our model is that it is conceivable for a particular financial innovation to have more than
one cause.
Then, we discussed the different factors that shape the financial innovative process
inside financial institutions. These factors are existing routines, in-house and public
knowledge and technology. Financial innovation is also shaped by the existence of
spilovers, appropriabilty and other externalities as well as by the strategic objectives of
the institution. A significant contribution of our research is the adoption of these concepts
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related to the standard innovation theory and their incorporation in our model of financial
innovation.
The third stage of our model focuses on the types and classification of financial
innovative activity. We propose the distinction between radical and incremental
innovations and we adopt, slightly modified, Schumpeters's five types of innovation. Then
we could classify them as responsive or exploratory, on or off balance sheet. Finally we use
the BIS (1986) classification applicable to only two financial instruments and processes.
The contribution of this stage is that it provides a uniquely accurate and detailed way to
classify financial innovations, asa result of our selection, alterations and novel types of
classification. These financial innovations could be perceived as mutations or variations of
existing routines; not random, but targeting a particular goal, profits and consequently
considered as a biased transmission process.
The final stage discusses the features of a successful financial innovation. These
features are associated with the properties of the innovation, the potential intangible and
tangible (temporary monopoly) advantages and exploitation of imperfections, both
regulatory and market. The evolutionary dynamic of our model is supported by the
continuous interaction between causes and innovations and the possibilty of initiation of
further innovative activity from the shortcomings or unanticipated problems of existing
innovations. In the second part, we are going to discuss in detail four clusters of financial
innovation, in order to provide the supportive evidence to our model of financial
innovation. We are concerned to assess how far the model can in fact encapsulate and
ilustrate all aspects of a wide range of actual innovations.
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Chapter three
'An answer raises new questions'
Prolegomena, Any Future Metaphysics, E. Kant, 1781
Part II Special liabilities of banks
3 Special liabilities of banks
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we developed an analytical framework which we can use in order
explain the emergence of any financial innovation in the banking sector. In this chapter we
are going to discuss some financial innovations that banks in the US and in the UK created
in the liabilty side of their balance sheet, as the first of four applications of the modeL.
Initially, we wil refer briefly to monetary history and the background to this cluster
of innovations. Then we wil discuss the resulting financial innovations that took place in
the US. The first innovation to discuss wil be the Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW).
Then we wil discuss other financial innovations that took place in the wider financial
sector as a response to NOW accounts, such as MMMF, CMA, ATS and other innovations.
The following section wil refer to the legislative intervention that enabled the introduction
and proliferation of Money Market Deposit Accounts (MMDA) and Super NOW accounts.
and enabled banks to better compete with other financial institutions.
In the second part of this chapter, we wil discuss the monetary history of the UK
and banking liabilties that presented similar characteristics to those listed above for the
US. The innovative effort in the UK was not as intense as in the US. The main financial
innovations were the Certificate of Deposits and interest bearing sight accounts.
During this chapter we wil refer to the causes of these financial innovations,
explain factors that shaped their development, classify them and finally explain their
features that contributed to their success and thus investigate whether these financial
innovations could be explained by our modeL.
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3.1 United States
During the first subsection, firstly we wil review the money and banking history of the US.
It is essential to review this history because many reasons behind the initial financial
innovation are related to the US banking history, and particularly to regulative
interventions. Then we are going to discuss the first innovative deposit account, the
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW). The following section discusses other financial
innovations that took place after the NOW accounts. These products were intended to offer
similar services and offer challenging alternatives to their customers in order to increase
their returns and avoid the negative effects of high inflation. Then we review two other
important innovations: the Money Market Deposit Account (MMDA) and the Super NOW
account. The purpose of this discussion is to identify the causes and characteristics of this
particular innovative process in the US.
3.1.1 A Brief Monetary History of the US
During this section, we wil discuss briefly the money and banking history of the US since
it is imperative to have some of these developments in mind in a chronological order to
understand the financial innovations in question.
From the beginning of the US system, banks seeking to circulate notes required a
corporate charter either from the State or Federal authorities. The charters were
individually negotiated and had a duration of ten to twenty years. Notes from different
banks enjoyed different degrees of acceptance, reflected in the different discounts applied
in the 1800's. In 1838 New York was the first State to apply the free banking approach and
during the next two decades this approach was enforced in the form of brokers' publication
of discounts for thousands of banks. This market discipline was enhanced by technological
changes in the communication (railroad) and telecommunication (telegraph) areas.
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Discounts were based on more objective criteria and discounts for new entrants were
reduced. In 1864 the Congress applied a tax on the State issuance of notes causing a
reduction of State banks from 1500 to 250. State banks, in order to substitute for the loss in
notes, introduced demand deposits.
Later, the gold standard was adopted in 1900, and in 1913 the Federal Reserve
Board (hereafter the Fed) was created. i In 1927 in accordance with the McFadden Act,
State supervisors were responsible for supervising financial institutions and were able to
prevent interstate expansion. In 19332, after the Crash, in accordance with the Banking Act
(the Glass Steagall Act), commercial and investment banking were separated3 and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was created (FDIC). At this time a significant
innovation was the multifunction banks, which used to circumvent the Act, since banks
were considerably constrained through different legal forms.
Regulation Q, emanating from the same Act, prevented banks from offering interest
on current accounts and applied a Fed-originated ceiling for time deposits. The Bank
Holding Company Act in 1956 enabled the Fed to supervise any company owning more
than one bank.4 Regulation Q ceilings were raised in order to realign with market rates in
1962-1964, but during the period 1965-1969 market interest rates moved above the
Regulation Q ceiling.s The issuance of securities considerably influenced the monetary
aggregates through money creation and upward movements in interest rates (Sylla 1982). In
1969 the Bank Merger Act tried to reinforce the State supervisory controls since significant
efforts were (and continue to be) made in order to circumvent regulation by using holding
companies.
In the following years State regulation proved more flexible and responsive to
market realities than federal regulation, by allowing the launch of Negotiable Order of
Withdrawal (NOW) accounts in 1974, Money Market Mutual Deposits (MMMD) in 1982
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and super NOW accounts in 1983. In 1975 monetary policy targeted money growth rates as
a means to reduce inflation. The dual nature (State or Federal) of supervision allowed
banks the choice of regulation they preferred to be subject to. During the period 1965-1989
the assets and number of State banks increased (Sylla 1982)
In 1980 the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act enabled
the gradual abandonment of regulation Q, completed 1986. It also enabled banks to accept
NOW deposits from individuals and non-profit organisations. The novelty of the MCA was
that the Fed was applying reserve regulation according to the type of deposit6 and not to the
type of institution and they authorised for the first time thrift institutions such as Savings
and Loans as well as Credit Unions to diversify their assets.
Retailers located at the other end of the intermediation spectrum were offering
some infant financial products already from 1911. But at the end of the 1960s and during
the 1970s bank regulation offered them significant space to expand in the financial sector.7
In 1981, the financial activity of the ten largest non-financial firms equalled the top five
banks financial activities. After 1982 and the introduction by the banks of Money Market
Deposits (MMD) accounts the situation became more balanced (Graddy 1985).
But it was not only retailers that were entering the financial intermediation area.
Banks' customers i.e. commercial firms discovered alternative ways to raise finance, such
as the extensive use during the 1980s of the corporate paper and bond market.
In 1982 the Garn-St Germain Act8 allowed depository institutions to offer MMDA
and Super NOW accounts under certain conditions and authorised the acceptance of NOW
accounts from the Federal and local governments (Rasche 1987). Thrift institutions were
allowed to offer this type of accounts consequently to diversify their liabilities. During the
same year, the Fed accepted that, due to massive financial innovation, the relation between
money growth - especially M1 - and inflation is blurred and interest targeting is adopted.9
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In 1988 international risk-based capital requirements were adopted and in addition
to tighter regulatory standards caused the credit crunch in the 1990s.1O Increased reporting
requirements could increase the marginal costs of banksY During the 1980s the number of
banks fell from 14,435 to less than 12,000. Especially after 1985, the number of failed
banks as well as the number of mergers was considerably increased.12
In 1994 the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act permitted
interstate branching. By the end of 1990s, it was predicted that the banking system of the
US was going to be dominated by three types of institutions, megabanks, superregionals
and community banks. I3
This brief monetary history highlighted the importance of regulation,
disintermediation, and competition as key components of the US banking landscape. These
factors could act separately, combined or even as a part of a dynamic dialectic. We turn
now to discuss specific innovations which have proved part of this landscape, starting with
NOW accounts.
3.1.2 Negotiable Order of Withdrawal. NOW accounts
During this section we wil discuss the introduction and proliferation of Certificates of
Deposits and Negotiable Order of Withdrawal accounts in the US. These innovations and
especially the second, altered the banking accounts landscape of the Us.
Regulations that were restricting banking activity were reserve requirements and
restrictions on interest rates payable on deposits (Regulation Q).14 Banks initially in the
mid 1960s - were forced to find alternative sources of funds such as Eurodollars, i.e. dollar
borrowed by banks outside the US, or bank commercial paper issued by a bank's parent
holding company (Hitchins 1997). On the liabilities side Eurodollar markets also offered a
solution: banks in order to avoid Regulation DI5 attracted deposits in the form of
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Eurodollars (Graddy 1985). The famous 3-6-3 rule of the last 30 years, was seriously
challenged by these developments. 
16
During this period an important innovation took place II 1961: the Negotiable
Certificate of Deposits (CD) or large deposits that earned unregulated interest. This
innovation was caused by the desire of banks to circumvent regulation on interest rates. It
is a financial instrument, responsive to regulation, on the balance sheet and it could not be
classified as a radical one. Negotiable CDs were issued for minimum deposits of $100,000
for a period of one to six months with interest payment at the end of the maturity and
subject to lower reserve requirements than checking accounts. 17 This innovation primarily
took advantage of a regulatory imperfection and circumvented the interest rate ceiling
since they were not considered as demand deposits. The active secondary market existed
for CDs (since they were classified as time deposits) and was perceived as a further
innovation. This development significantly enhanced liquidity. The existence of a
secondary market, immediately provides the basis for positive network externalities. They
were mainly used by institutions as a substitute for commercial paper and banker's
acceptances. In other words they were shaped by the institution's preferences. A further
aspect of this instrument was the potential fillng of the intermediation spectrum.
Rising inflation and interest rates from the end of the 1960s to the 1980s further
increased the financial burden of regulation on the banks. The monetary authorities did not
allow banks to pay interest on checking accountsI8 and they set an upper limit for time
deposits. As inflation was rising the public was also demanding an inflation premium
embedded in the interest payments it was receiving for their deposits. Due to the regulation
of interest payments, banks had to offer a plethora of diverse non-pecuniary services to
their clients such as checks, safe deposit boxes or even radios or coffee machines (Kane
1981 ).19 Banks were also involved in non-price competition based on their branche
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network, longer office hours or merchandise premiums. It was argued by many researchers
that this type of competition does not promote efficiency and even that the cost of rising
deposits is higher than in the case of free competition.20 Meanwhile during that period
depositors were offered significantly higher yields from alternative placements in securities
or mutual funds2I or by joining a Savings and Loans institution (Sylla 1982).
Before 1970, Savings and Loans institutions were not allowed to offer demand
deposits. In order to circumvent these barriers22 they had to offer a product that technically
was not classified by the Fed as a demand deposit. In 1970 a mutual savings bank initially
in Massachusetts23 and later in 1972, in New Hampshire, offered its depositors the ability
to withdraw money by using a check.24 This financial instrument was called a Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal or NOW account. Technically they were savings accounts that
required 30 to 90 days notice before any withdrawaL. The institution was paying the legally
acceptable 5.25% and 15 cents was charged for each withdrawaL. In other words, it was a
radical-regulation induced financial instrument, on balance sheet, enhancing the liquidity
of depositors.
Initially the banking commssioner prohibited these accounts, but in 1972 a ruling
of the State's Supreme Court overruled the prohibition and interest paying NOW accounts
appeared in New England.2s This development put commercial banks in a disadvantageous
position since they were already forced by regulators to pay less interest on savings and
time accounts than thrift institutions (Kimball 1977).26 It is worth mentioning that initially
the larger mutual Savings banks introduced NOW accounts27 in a similar way to other
process or product innovations, having a significant advantage of better in-house
technology available (Basch 1982). Early adopters were also banks with high loan/deposit
ratios and increasing incomes.28 External or environmental conditions that probably
promoted the proliferation of NOW accounts were the degree of oligopoly and the location
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of headquarters.29 In other words big, aggressive and innovative savings banks probably
enjoying economies of scales and accommodating at the same time their own preferences
or requirements led the introduction process and their quest for large market share.
In October 1973 Congress allowed NOW accounts in mutual Savings banks,
commercial banks, S&Ls and co-operative banks in only two States - Massachusetts and
New Hampshire.3D In 1974, 236 institutions in Massachusetts and 41 in New Hampshire
were offering NOW accounts (Gibson 1975). We have to realise that NOW accounts were
not as novel a line of product for commercial banks, to the same extent as for Savings
banks. It was a product that had attributes of two existing products: demand and time
deposits. Many banks feared that NOW accounts were just going to be mainly a conversion
of existing lucrative demand deposits (Basch 1976).31 Many commercial banks did not
offer NOW accounts32, and preferred to offer more attractive checking accounts33 or
offered them under unattractive conditions in terms of minimum balances or service
charges (Basch 1983). It was observed that larger banks offered NOW accounts sooner, but
in less competitive markets commercial banks delayed in offering them. Faster growing
banks during the period attracted more NOW accounts - a higher ratio of NOW to total
deposits - than slower growing banks (Basch 1976). In other words, large banks and
competitive structures favoured the introduction of NOW accounts.
An analysis of the impact on commercial banks of these accounts in Massachusetts
and New Hampshire during the first years of their introduction was less significant than
one could have expected. During this period, they enjoyed temporary monopolies due to
the regulative barrier preventing other institutions from other States offering this type of
account. Initially it was estimated that banks' demand deposits were not eroded and their
after-tax earnings were reduced only by 2.5% and 5% during 1974 and 1975 respectively.34
A recent analysis calculated that the reduction was significantly higher, at 3.4% and 11.3%
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respectively (Kimball 1977). The reduction for the lowest-earning commercial banks was
even worse, at around 19% and 24.3%. It was observed that many small commercial banks
preferred not to offer or to delay considerably the introduction of NOW accounts due to
many reasons, one of them being the lack of appropriate information technology.35 This
caused a reduction in their profits of 8.6 % and 12% in 1974 and 1975. Commercial banks
lost 3% of their demand deposits in 1975, but comparing total deposits figures, they did not
lose in nominal deposits but their total deposit growth declined (Kimball 1977). But it was
believed that commercial banks that introduced NOW accounts defended their market
share more efficiently than other financial institutions. This fact provides us with a
potential appropriability of benefit aspect of these financial instruments.
Some complementary observations in relation to the amount of NOW accounts that
commercial banks had on their balance sheets, were associated with free drafts, causing
higher amounts and numbers of average balances. It was also observed that banks which
offered NOW accounts for a long period experienced lower average balances but a higher
number of accounts than banks that did not offer from the beginning this type of accounts
(Bash 1976). Four main pricing tools were used by financial institutions in relation with
NOW accounts: free drafts, interest rates applicable, transaction charges and minimum
balance requirements. The last was the least uniformly applied tool of commercial banks in
the 1970s (Simonson 1980).36 All of them could be perceived as routine or incremental
innovations, part of the diferentiation strategy of the bank.
In New York, in 1974, a similar type of product was offered, called Payment Order
of Withdrawal (POW), which did not pay interest.3? More than 400 out of the 485 mutual
savings banks in the US were located in New York. The acceptance by the regulatory
bodies of this innovation could change considerably not only the mutual savings presence
but the whole banking landscape in the US. After the 1973 Act, it was recommended to
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allow nationwide financial institutions to offer NOW accounts, but it was only in 1979 that
the State of New York authorised NOW accounts. The POW financial instrument is a
typical example of a non selected mutation due to unsuccessful features i.e. regulation
imperfections.
In 1980 the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act allowed
all banks to offer NOW accounts. But regulation was stil shaping features of these
products, the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee (DIDC) was regulating
interest rates (until 1986), and only households and not firms or institutions were allowed
to have NOW accounts.
Research that took place in 1982 by Morgan reported some preliminary results
based on the introduction of NOW accounts in four States.38 Despite and allowing for
differences amongst States, it is possible to observe some common tendencies. Large
commercial banks offered better terms (prices)39 than medium size banks. In case where
branching restrictions or reduced competition by thrifts was applied, terms were not as
good as in the opposite case. Finally, financial institutions, having in mind the experience
of Massachusetts and money market rates, offered conditionally free drafts. These findings
mainly support the better positioning of large banks and the existence of research spilovers
emanating from the past experience of similar innovations launched by other financial
institutions.
In the first two years of nation-wide introduction, the balances of NOW accounts
increased from $17.4 bilion in 1980 to $81.8 bilion in 1982 (see table (T-3.1) on the US
monetary aggregates of the period). In 1983 the DIDC authorised Super NOW accounts for
a minimum deposit of $2,500 which were not subject to any ceiling regulation. NOW
accounts are defined as other checkable deposits and constituted a component of M140
whose composition is also shown in table (T-3.1). As we could observe in the same table
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from 1989 they surpassed total demand deposits. The sum of NOW, Super NOW and credit
union Share Drafts were classified as other checkable accounts and they are subject to the
highest reserve requirement ratio.41
To summarise and in accordance with the terminology used in our model (2.1),
during this section, we have discussed the paramount importance of NOW accounts, as the
first of a cluster of financial innovations that we wil discuss in the following sections. We
identified causes related to regulation and institutional preferences. We encountered
familiar concepts such as positive network externalities, technology appropriability and
research spilovers and strategic objectives such as defending market share. We observed
incremental on-balance-sheet innovations, responsive and enhancing liquidity, and the
innovation's features, such as fillng the spectrum, and regulatory imperfection. When the
particular innovation failed to address these features (POW), it did not survive. We finally
observed also, a dy,namic response, when the DIMNC Act (1980), created a further
innovative action (Super NOW) that wil be discussed in the section (3.1.4). But in the next
sub-section, we shall discuss additional innovations that took place after the emergence of
NOW accounts.
3.1.3 Innovations launched after NOW accounts
During this section we wil discuss financial innovations that took place in the wider
financial and intermediation sector. These innovations are either instruments or processes
which were related to the initial introduction of NOW accounts.
Financial institutions nationwide, in order to offer as much services as possible and
at the same time incentives to their customers to stay loyal or even attract new customers,
launched many new products during the 1970s. Some of them mainly targeted households,
others targeted corporations.
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The first innovation that clearly targeted households was the Money Market Mutual
Funds (MMMF). In 1974 financial institutions other than banks or thrift institutions - not
targeted by the regulation - offered the opportunity to customers to have a liquid bank
account backed by shares and investments from a larger pool of funds and receive interest
payments on their deposits. The inital minimum deposit was $5,000 but was later reduced
to less than $1,000.42 The financial institution invested the money in short term marketable
securities.43 It was also possible to write checques for a minimum of $100. This financial
instrument was not a routine or incremental innovation for these financial institutions, and
required considerable in-house technological abilties. Taking into account the concept of
providing liquidity to existing and new markets, it is even possible to perceive it as an
exploratory innovation. This exploratory innovation was caused by market conditions, was
considered as both a product-(access to cash) and a process-(linking with mutual funds)
innovation targeting regulatory imperfections and filing the financial spectrum of
customers of these financial institutions.
The MMMFs became extremely popular during the late 1970s and mostly during
the 1980s 44 (see table (T-3.2), including a column ilustrating the proliferation of MMMF
accounts). The proliferation of MMMF during the 1980s, could be ilustrated if we
compare their total amount in 1980 and 1990 in relation with Ml with a unique exception
in 1983 when MMDA were introduced (see section 3.1.4). In 1980 they were 13% of M1
and in 1990 they presented 55% of M1 (see table (T-3.1) and (T-3.2)). At the end of the
1980s, due to disintermediation, other institutions began to offer Money Market Accounts
at very competitive rates due to the lower cost base.45 In 1980, MMMF were included in
M2.46 The MMMF raised funds nationally since restrictions on interstate banking were not
applicable and institutions that were offering them linked them with other mutual fund and
securities services (Keeley1985).
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In 1977, the Cash Management Account (CMA) was introduced by a brokerage
house (Meril Lynch). It combined three different services: a money market mutual fund, a
credit line and a securities account. The minimum balance required was $20,000, an
unlimited number of cheques and there was not any minimum amount for each cheque.
Due to the minimum balance this product was not a close substitute for households'
demand deposits but for corporate time deposits accounts and CDs.
A response of banks to NOW and the above-mentioned innovations was launched
in 1978, when banks were allowed to offer the Automatic Transfer Service (ATS) to their
customers. This service connected a savings and a deposit account. Whenever a check or
any standing order was impending on the current account, the bank transferred the amount
from the savings account. Hence current non-interest bearing accounts were kept at a zero
or minimum balance and customers were receiving interest on the main bulk of their
deposits in the form of saving accounts. Initially one third of banks opposed this novelty as
costly or similar to NOW accounts, but later they were widely introduced (Mingo 1979).
The introduction of ATS made the opportunity cost of holding non-interest accounts
extremely high if we take into consideration that the money market rates were in two digits
(Simonson 1980). This service was offered to corporations as a component of a cash-
concentration financial product. The ATS was caused by both regulation and competition
factors and could be perceived as a responsive off-balance sheet, process innovation that
enhances the liquidity of the depositor. The emergence and proliferation of this financial
process innovation was facilitated by technological improvements and related cost
reductions.
Due to disintermidiation in the 1970s the dominance of thrift institutions in the
housing market was seriously challenged by the banks. Hence, in order to attract deposits
and defend their market share, thrift institutions launched Money Market Certificates
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(MMC) in 1978 and Small Savers Certificates (SSC) in 197947 (Hadjimichalakis 1995).
The MMCs were a six month time deposit of a minimum of $10,000 or $20,000 for seven
to thirty one day certificates. The SSCs had a maturity of thirty to forty eight months. Later
in 1981, the All Saver Certificate was launched with significant success due to its tax
exempt status (Mahoney 1987) All of these financial instruments were responsive, on
balance sheet, enhancing liquidity and incrementally based on the structure of CDs. Their
main function was to exploit regulatory imperfections (including taxation), fil the
spectrum of intermediation of these financial institutions and shaped by strategic objectives
such as to maintain or increase their market share.
Galloping inflation had a direct influence on the wilingness of corporations to use
non or low interest bearing accounts. Banks were pushed by other banks' competitive
activity to innovate in order to offer their clients products that maximised the interest
payments received. The Cash Concentration system directed all payments into one bank
account that was idle, or where a minimum balance was applied, until the arrival of the
check, then an automatic transfer48 from the central interest-bearing account took place.
Another new product was the Lockboxes which were post boxes such that checks payable
to a firm were directly mailed and immediately credited to the firm's account,49 Cash
concentration systems are conceived as a corporate development of ATS.
Repurchasing Agreements (Repos or RPs) offered depositors interest without
sacrificing liquidity. The banks sold Treasury bils to the customer for a short period, and
had the obligation to buy them back.5o It is important to mention that in the case that the
RPs were backed by government securities they were not subject to any reserve
requirements and could better accommodate particular institutional requirements and
preferences. They were introduced in 1970 but their proliferation took place at the end of
the 1970s (we could find Repo figures in table (T- 3.2)). Repos were a substitute for
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Certificates of Deposit or Treasury bils. These financial instruments or process, apart from
liquidity enhancement, also include an element of better risk management.
To summarise this section, and referring to our model (2.1), we have identified
causes of further innovations in bank liabilities such as competition and regulation. We
analysed the importance of technology and we encountered on and off balance sheet,
exploratory and responsive, process and instrument innovations, mainly enhancing the
liquidity of the depositor. Finally, we highlighted the importance of regulatory and taxation
imperfection,filing the spectrum and better risk management.
3.1.4 Money Market Deposit Accounts - MMD accounts and Super NOW
accounts
During this section, we wil discuss further innovations encouraged by changes II
regulation but also shaped by other factors.
Money market mutual funds accelerated growth and drained customer deposits
from banks in 1977 (Federal Reserve System). Money Market Deposit Accounts (MMDA)
and Super NOW were the response partially to ATS and mainly to the Money Market
Mutual Funds. The St Germain Act of 1982 allowed banks and thrift institutions to offer
their depositors MMDA from October 1982 and Super-NOW accounts from January 1983.
Both of them were authorised to pay unregulated interest on savings accounts that required
initially a minimum balance of $2,500 and were insured by the Fed. If the remaining
balance was less than the minimum amount, the interest payment was the same as on a
NOW account. The amount of checks drawn and balance maintained were subject to
regulation. MMDA allowed up to three drafts but unlimited transfers made by Automated
Teller Machines.5I The MMDA had a tremendous success from the first years of their
introduction (see table (T-3.3), including details on the proliferation of MMD accounts).
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On the other hand Super-NOW accounts allowed unlimited amounts of drafts or transfers.
The MMDA and Super NOW were caused by disintermediation and backed by relevant
legislation (re-regulation) and their target was to maintain the competitiveness and market
share of banks by filing the spectrum of the intermediation function. They were responsive
on-balance-sheet financial instruments, enhancing the liquidity of the deposit. Initially,
large banks with extended ATM networks had a competitive advantage.
As we have already mentioned, the monetary authorities perceived Super-NOW
accounts as transaction accounts and consequently part of M1, whereas MMDA, due to its
limited draft facilities, was perceived as not a transaction account and therefore only a
component of M2 and not subject to the same reserve requirements. 
52 This distinction had
significant implications since the excess reserves applicable to Super Now accounts (equal
to 12 percent) could justify a different cost and consequently a different pricing due to this
regulative imperfection (Tatom 1983).
There were two key questions in the debate about their impact on monetary
aggregates and their interpretation. First, what was the source of the transferred funds or
the 'source of shift,53, and second did different reserve requirements on different types of
accounts tempt banks to favour the proliferation of a particular type of deposit. The first
response is that personal MMD accounts were not subject to reserve requirements. 
54 Hence
the introduction of MMDA could have an influence similar to MMMF in the 1970s 55
through a potential increase in the M2 multiplier caused by lower reserves. On the other
hand, Super NOW accounts seemed not to influence monetary aggregates, their multipliers
or their velocity of circulation in the way that had already been observed with NOW
accounts (Tatom 1983).
Important research tried to provide further insight into the source of funds of MMD
accounts. It was found that the main sources of funds in the first years were the large
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Certificate of Deposits (CDs), small time deposits (see table (T-3.3) on US banking
liabilities) and MMMFs (Keeley and Zimmerman 1985). In other words the first two were
directly related to competition or institutional preferences, also taking into account the
different reserve requirements56, and the third one to disintermidiation causes. MMMFs did
not show any tremendous reduction - less than $40 bilion or less than 20% for the first
year - and then resumed their upward trend (see table (T-3.2), for MMMF accounts), an
indication of appropriability of the benefit. This fact was perceived as a sign of low
sensitivity of holders to interest rate changes but we have to bear in mind that providers of
MMMF incorporated significant additional services into the existing product. 57 These
additional services could be perceived as routine or incremental innovations.
MMDA were very interest rate sensitive and attracted large amounts of funds. But
as they became established, depositors became less interest rate sensitive due to switching
costs (Keeley 1985). Consequently they captured a significant amount of funds destined for
MMMFs since they offered significantly higher returns.58 A survey in 1983 identified the
first patterns in the pricing of MMDA and Super NOW accounts. They perceived these
accounts as quasi-fixed factors59 and bankers adopted a more 'offensive' or market-
penetration strategy offering high interest rates (Rogowski 1984). During the first year
MMDA deposit rates were considerably reduced to around 8.5% while the MMMF returns
were fluctuating around 8% during the same period. Super NOW accounts offered
consistently lower returns than MMDA,6o They offer comparable services with NOW
accounts and similar characteristics; this is an indication that the design of Super NOW and
MMDA was based on existing routines (NOW accounts). Reasons associated with these
lower returns could be the higher reserve requirements and a fear of potential
cannibalisation of existing NOW accounts.61 It was observed that thrift institutions were
offering higher rates than banks. Finally the size of the institution did not affect the rates
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offered for both products. It is obvious that they also took into account the experience of
NOW accounts in New England where the majority of institutions offered conditionally -
in terms of minimum balance and penalty - no charges on drafts and accounts. As we have
already discussed for NOW accounts, this an incontestable consequence of research
spilovers.
Banks and S&Ls faced considerably higher costs due to large networks and the
additional services they used to offer.62 In the late 1980s banks reduced their MMDA
interest rates and MMMFs offered higher interest than before. The result was that at the
beginning of the 1990s they had approximately the same amount - $300 bilion each (see
tables (T-3.2) on MMMF proliferation and (T-3.3) on MMDA proliferation). It is worth
mentioning that while weekly data did not support the argument of substitution between
MMDA and MMMF, monthly data provided more impetus to the substitution theory
(Keeley 1984 and Lown 1987).
In 1983 the DIDC removed the ceiling on small time deposits (less than $100,000)
for thrift institutions. The already mentioned Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act enabled thrift institutions to offer NOW accounts and the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 offered them almost the same asset-liabilities
choices as banks already had.63 An ilustrative fact is that in the 1960s banks controlled
34% of financial assets compared to only 23% in 1990.64 In order to attract deposits in this
new disintermediation era, thrift institutions and banks offered higher returns, at least
initially, undermining their profitability and even solvency despite the fact that their assets
and liabilities increased almost fivefold in twenty years (see table (T-3.4) on expansion of
banks' assets and liabilities). The arival of MMDA and Super NOW accounts also resulted
in a further mismatch between short term liabilities and long term assets.
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A concluding research took place in 1987, discussing the retail deposit pricing
policies that financial institutions applied in different States (Mahoney 1987). In
accordance with our already mentioned point, thrift institutions tended to offer higher rates
on all accounts and especially on longer-term ones. Thrift institutions showed a higher
increase in their time and savings deposits than MMDA deposits (see table (T-3.3J).
Similar increases reduced the dependency for banks on CDs and on the other hand
depositors shifted from CDs to MMDA,65 Financial institutions applied very diverse
pricing policies and it was a common feature to follow for a short period an offensive
policy on a particular financial instrument, and then to move back and offer the same
interest rate as their competitors. It is obvious that strategic issues in relation to the pricing
policy and the institution's preference were factors which shaped the proliferation of these
financial instruments in accordance with our model of financial innovation (2.1).
To summarise this section, we have discussed causes of financial innovation related
to regulation or regulation-enhanced competition due to disintermidiation and institutional
preferences. It is possible to observe more than one cause that initiated the innovative
activity. We sustained the importance of existing routines, technology, research spilovers,
appropriability and strategic issues such as market share and cannibalisation. The
important aspects of a successful financial innovation in this case are associated with
regulatory imperfection andfillng the spectrum. We turn now to consider similar types of
innovation in the UK. In particular we want to see whether they were the result of the same
types and causes as in the US, and had the same characteristics.
3.2 United Kingdom
In this second subsection we wil discuss the case of the UK. Firstly we wil review the
money and banking history of the UK. During this discussion we wil notice a remarkable
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inconsistency in relation to the measurement of monetary aggregates, indicating two things:
a lack of ability to manage the economy through the targeting of monetary aggregates, and
it would seem, financial innovative activity of a lesser degree and lower magnitude than in
the US. The very existence of a cartel-oligopoly situation in the commercial sector until the
end of 1980s acted as a potential barier to financial innovation activity. We wil discuss
then innovative activity in the UK and try to clarify its underlying causes and show the
consequences.
3.2.1 A brief Monetary History of the U.K
Here we wil discuss the money and banking history of the UK in order to understand the
potential difference between the US and the UK in terms of innovation in special liabilities.
The central institution in British monetary history, the Bank of England was
established in 1694 and in 1844 became the only issuer of bank notes and creator of money
in United Kingdom.66 At the end of the 1940s half of the currency used in international
trade was British pounds and the biggest bank in the world was Barclays Bank.
In the beginning of the 1960s, the new Special Deposits scheme was launched in
order to restrain the credit-creation ability of banks and consequently their assets and
liabilties. In the following years these restrictions67 were enforced several times. Initially
the restrictions affected only banks, and Non Banking Financial Intermediaries (NBFI)
were free to expand their credit assets. Later they became applicable to other financial
institutions such as non-clearing banks and finance houses. During the 1960s researchers
established the existence of a stable relationship between short-run money demand and
interest rates.68 At the end of the 1960s for the first time explicit mention was made of
monetary aggregates (Artis 1981). But even at the end of the 1960s the monetary
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authorities suspected large evasions by banks of monetary control and the impact of
restrictions was doubtful (Gowland 1982).
In 1971 the Competition and Credit Control (CCC) Act re-introduced the use of
interest rates as a tool of monetary policy and quantitative restrictions were abolished. A
very important novelty was that cartel arrangements for commercial banks were
abolished.69 The M3 aggregate for broad money was constructed in 1970 and became the
main target of monetary policy during the 1970s (see table (T-3.5) which details the
different monetary aggregates for the UK). In 1971 the M1 aggregate for narrow money
was created. In 1973 direct controls such as credit ceilng, were re-introduced under the
name of Supplementary Special Deposits - as extra cash reserves for marginal deposits -
this time the liabilities of banks were targeted. This approach was termed as the 'Corset'
and its purpose was to constrain the growth of Interest Bearing Eligible Liabilities (IBEL)
of banks, especially when their reserves were tight.
During the 1970s the Bank of England systematically helped banks to be above
their ratio of 1.5% of 'cash'to eligible liabilities and it was criticised as a lender of 'first
resort loans' (Griffith 1980). In 1976 the monetary authorities adopted the clear targeting of
the money supply. But again serious evasions by the banks were suspected in the form of
not 'traceable' actions. As a partial response in 1977 a new definition of broad money (M3)
was introduced and DCE ceased to be important.7o
Finally in 1979 Exchange controls were abolished and the Banking Act formalised
the supervisory role of the Bank of England.71 The abolition of exchange controls brought
equality between the offshore and onshore interest rate of sterling and enabled a more
efficient use of funds.72
An extensive review of monetary controls was undertaken by the Bank of England
and the Treasury in 1980. Liquidity became a very serious issue and appropriate
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measurements comprising the monetary assets of the private sector appeared as PSL1 and
PSL273 which initially offered an undistorted picture of current liquidity74 and took into
account NBFIs such as building societies. The Bank of England announced the Medium
Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). During the same year the 'Corset' as well as the reserve
asset ratio were abolished, hence interest rates became again the only available tool of
monetary policy. But unlike 1970 the demand function for money was no longer
predictable (Artis 1981) 75 and the authorities had to commit themselves to targeting the
money supply (Artis 1991). In 1979 and 1980, the monetary authorities published explicit
target growth rates.76 This policy was not entirely new, since it was already applied in
1968-9 and 1976 (Arestis et al 1993). In 1980 the monetary authorities published a measure
of PSL1 which included the estimated holdings of commercial bils in order to provide a
more accurate idea about the liquidity of the economy. Furthermore PSL2 took into
account building societies' deposits.
In 1981 the cash requirement was reduced to 0.5 % and the informal guideline
against mortgage bank lending ended (Congdon 1991). Commercial banks began to pay
interest on current accounts. In 1982 M2 was introduced in order to identify the transaction
balances77, recognising the importance of building societies and short term savings. Ml
could not capture the new blurred area of short time and sight deposits since it was
distorted by increases and reductions not related to transaction needs but emanating from
interest rate movements. M2 was considered as better equipped to capture transactions
balances. During the period 1980-1986, M1, M3 and PSL2 were targeted.78 The Building
Society Act in 1986 enabled building societies to offer unsecured loans and checking
accounts to their customers. In 1987, PSL1 and PSL2 were renamed M4 and M5 and in
1988 M3 ceased to be of primary importance.79
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A lot of research was undertaken in order to demonstrate whether the monetary
authorities were able to have an effective monetary policy. The key question was whether
their assumptions and approaches were correct: particularly whether the demand for money
is stable and predictable. An unquestionable fact was that velocity for M3 fluctuated and
was decreasing during the 1980s. Taylor (1986) proposed that, where the monetary
authorities take into account the impact of financial innovation and inflation effects, it was
possible to have a stable and predictable demand for money. Others like Arestis, Mariscal
and Howells (1995) were more critical of the effectiveness of the tools of monetary policy
(short-term interest rates), given institutional developments and the continuous changes in
targeted monetary aggregates.
During the 1980s the monetary authorities began to pay attention to the control of
the monetary base for the first time.80 At the end of the 1980s the authorities targeted
inflation directly using the interest rate as a tool and MO as a relevant aggregate (see table
(T-3.5) on monetary aggegates) but without targeting any particular larger monetary
aggregate. In 1990 the United Kingdom joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of
the European Monetary System. Currencies in the ERM were not allowed to fluctuate
freely in relation to a basket of currencies. In August after speculative attacks on the British
pound, the British government withdrew the pound from the ERM. During the 1990s the
monitoring of M081 and M4 became the main policy. M4 is perceived as an 'information
variable' along with a range of other variables since 'experience shows that the relationship
between broad money growth and inflation is complex and variable' (Salmon 1994) .82
During this section, we have discussed the relative lack of restrictive regulation in
the UK, at least of the magnitude of the US. We have observed the inability of the
monetary authorities to control any monetary aggregate, expressed by the plethora of
monetary aggregates and policies used and followed all these years. This inabilty provides
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us with sufficient reason to believe that financial innovation took place in the UK too. We
are going to discuss it in depth in the following section.
3.2.2 The particular behaviour of British banking liabilities
In this section, we wil discuss the financial innovative activity in terms of their liabilties
that took place in the UK. We are going to investigate two main financial instruments:
Certificates of Deposit and interest-bearing demand accounts.
In the UK financial institutions tried to circumvent, and reduce the effectiveness of
regulatory restrictions. Like in the US, Certificates of Deposits (CD) were available in the
UK too. The first sterling CD was offered in1968 in accordance with the Finance Act of
1968.83 But despite the fact that all commercial banks were not allowed to offer CDs a
tremendous success was achieved (see table (T-3.6J, ilustrative of the proliferation of
CDs). A secondary market existed and discount houses were the main players. CDs were a
product that was subject to regulative restriction in the 1970s. The 'Corset' regulation
could be circumvented if a bank was able to persuade its customer to buy a commercial bil
instead of a CD. A commercial bil 'accepted' from the bank was hence secure and liquid.
The only factor in consideration was the competitive rate the bil had to offer. The same
process could go in the opposite direction and a customer could be persuaded to issue a
commercial bil instead of requesting a loan84 (Pepper 1993). In other words they applied a
policy of increasing off-balance sheet activities. The introduction of CDs by British banks
was caused by two main reasons: regulation and institutional preferences. The aim of these
responsive, liquidity-enhancing and on balance sheet instruments was to provide higher
returns to the depositor and better risk management for the institution. Their initial aim was
not to take advantage of any regulatory imperfection since there was no related legislation.
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Later due to regulation (the Corset), they were used like their US homologue, in order to
reduce the regulatory burden.
Under this logic of minimising their financial burden and avoiding the negative and
costly consequences of the Corset, banks also used techniques that inflated their balance
sheets before the introduction and wound them down during the period of control (Artis
1981).
In 1973 a strange situation occurred: customers were borrowing money in order to
lend back to a bank. The overdraft rates were lower than deposits rates because of the
unwilingness of banks to increase their overdraft rates.85 It was estimated that around 600
millon pounds were borrowed under this conditions and distorted M3 aggregate. A further
increase in lending was already taking place from the beginning of the 1970s when a tax
loophole enabled borrowers to buy CDs and resell them before their maturity without
having to pay any tax86 or even use them as security for a loan and offset the interest on this
against tax. The estimated amount of CDs purchased for this reason was twice the above
figure i.e. more than 1 bilion pounds. We thus observe that CDs also proliferated due to
taxation reasons and by targeting a regulative impeifection.
So in the United Kingdom commercial bils and off-balance sheet activities were
used in order to circumvent regulation, and CDs created some distortions in the monetary
aggregates.
But other reasons prevented the emergence of financial innovation in the same way
as in the US. The British financial system is characterised by compartmentalisation i.e.
brokering, insurance, banking activities and mortgage-granting were activities undertaken
by distinct financial institutions, such as commercial banks, building societies, insurance
companies and stockbrokers firms. All these institutions were forming institutional groups
which were mainly self regulated. 87
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British banks from the 1950s through the 1960s and even in the 1970s presented a
form of cartel that applied more or less uniform pricing (see table (T-3.7J, including the
different applicable rates in the UK). The fact that five big high street banks accounted for
almost 80% of deposits among them considerably helped the formation and functioning of
this cartel (see table (T-3.8), presenting the concentration of the British banking system).
They were setting minimum commissions, fixing interest rates and the Bank of England
was exercising its influence through Bank rate (Artis 1991). Price competition was avoided
and the Bank of England was wiling to provide liquidity to the system every time it was
required. The system began gradually to change at the end of the 1960s when banks began
to offer other services such as credit cards and mortgages. In the 1970s the CCC dismantled
the cartel, at least officially, and building societies began to enter the market having the
advantage of lower costS.88
Commercial banks lost a significant amount of their deposits and responded in the
1980s by offering explicit interest payments on current accounts89 and entering the
mortgage market.9o We have to remind ourselves that there was not any restriction on
paying interest on sight deposits. They applied this policy deliberately and unilaterally
since commercial banks had a monopoly of sight deposits until 1986. Then, due to
desintermediation-related developments, they had to protect their market share by offering
high interest payment.
The process of offering interest payments on current accounts was not an instant
one. Banks wanted to attract customers but on the other hand did not want the existing
customers to turn their sight deposits into interest bearing accounts. They deliberately
offered complicated terms and conditions in order to delay the process91. In 1988 all
commercial banks were offering explicit interest payments on the balance of accounts
(Ford and Mullneux 1995). After 1986, significant losses appeared in the banking sector
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(see table (T-3.9), reporting profits from British banks), due to causes already mentioned
and further elaborated at the end of the section. The competition among financial
institutions during the following years encouraged to a geometrical increase in time and
sight deposits in the UK (see table (B-3.6J, on British banks expansion). In 1993 more than
95% of M4 was interest-bearing deposits (Arestis 1994). We have to take into account that
in spite of these problems, British banks have one of the highest percentage in Europe,
combined with a higher percentage than the US, of net income from non-financial
products.92
On the other hand, according to Dow and Savile (1988), problems began to appear
in the banking sector for two reasons. Firstly during the 1960s we had the emergence of a
wholesale money market, mainly CDs. Banks had access to funds and used them during the
1970s - when regulation permitted - in order to increase their lending by relaxing their
credit criteria. Secondly, during the 1970s fierce competition among banks for wholesale
deposits (CDs) forced upwards the corresponding rates (Arestis 1994), exactly the opposite
result, and for different reasons, than in the US. Furthermore disintermidiation enabled
firms to find alternative sources of finance through the bank such as the Note Issuing
Facility and the Multiple Option Facility, or independently like corporate and junk bonds.
Banks were forced to relax further their credit criteria during the 1980s. Finally NBFI
competitors appeared to have more favourable cost structures and attract many customers.
By the end of the 1980s, building societies, already facing lower costs followed intense
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, presented initially decreasing and later constant
economies of scale (Simper 1998).93
To summarise this section and referring to our model (2.1), we have discussed the
concept of financial innovation caused by liquidity enhancement, regulation and taxation in
the UK. The strategic objectives and the competitive structure shaped the proliferation of
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financial innovation, with the oligopolistic banking system facing increasing challenges
from the NBFIs. The emergence of off and on balance sheet, responsive, and enhancing the
liquidity financial instruments was successful in that they filed the spectrum or addressed
regulatory imperfections. The lower degree of regulative restrictions in the UK, in
comparison with the US, is the main reason for the reduced level of innovative activity. On
the other hand the lack of regulatory pressure was compensated with the emergence of
competitive and disintermediation-related causes.
3.3 Conclusion
In the US the regulation developed in the Depression was a barrier for some financial
institutions to compete with securities markets and money markets. NOW accounts acted
as a Trojan Horse and an experimentation. Galloping inflation and the emergence of
challenging competitors such as MMMF in the 1970s, brought some institutions into a very
weak position. The arrival of MMDA and Super NOW accounts combined with new
legislation offered all institutions a common level playing field.
On the other hand, the UK has not proved as innovative as the other side of the
Atlantic. CDs were a prominent innovation that influenced in term of liabilities banking
activities and definitions of monetary aggregates. The British banks also offered interest
payment on demand deposits. But the more oligopolistic structure of the British banking
sector which promoted and maintained the banking cartel was definitely a reason that
prevented the emergence of a similar magnitude of new types of deposits account.
The obvious cause of these innovations is regulation. Regulations could shape a
product, either by acting as a barrier so that financial institutions innovate in order to
circumvent it, or to push its development further. But regulations as we said are obvious as
a cause, but not totally adequate to provide a full justification, or account for the final
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shape of the product. Other factors intervene in order to influence the development of the
innovation. These other factors are disintermidiation (MMDA; in the UK, interest bearing
accounts), competition (ATS), liquidity enhancement (ATS; in the UK, CDs) and
institutional preferences (NOW, MMDA). Hence more than one cause contributed to the
emergence of a particular innovation (NOW and MMDA).
Apart from initial causes, financial innovation is also shaped by available existing
routines (Super NOW, MMDA) technology (ATS, NOW) research spilovers (Super
NOW), appropriability (NOW), and strategic objectives of the financial institutions such as
market share (NOW) or the market structure (Super NOW). The financial innovation could
be radical (NOW) or incremental (Super NOW, MMDA) process (ATS) or instrument
(almost all the others), responsive, off (ATS) and on balance sheet usually enhancing
liquidity. The successful innovations usually fil the intermediation spectrum (NOW,
MMMDA), exploit regulative imperfections (NOW, MMMF), temporary monopolies
(NOW) or better risk management (CDs) and cost reduction (ATS) of the financial
institution. Mutations that do not include one of these features (POW) do not survive. The
dynamic nature of our model is initiating by a regulatory action (DIDMCA), where the
proliferation of existing innovations (NOW and MMMF) providing scope for further
innovations (MMDA). It is also worth highlighting that the causal focus, the shaping of
products and their relative success were different for different products, but also for the
same products in different financial environments (here the US and the UK).
The cluster of financial innovations of bank special liabilties, provided us with
supportive evidence for our analytical framework and model of financial innovation, in that
these liabilities could all be analysed satisfactory using the framework. In the next chapter,
we shall investigate another cluster of innovations, related to the emergence of derivative
financial products.
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Endnotes of special liabilities of banks
1 In Graddy 1985, page 35 we could find a detailed analysis of Fed regulation until 1978 relevant to
commercial banking.
2 During the period 1930-1933, 10000 banks failed nationwide (History of US banking, Federal Reserve
System internet address).3 In 1987 JPMorgan found a loophole in section 20 of the Act. Banks could not affiliate with a business
'principally engaged' in securities. The percentage of activities of no 'principal engagement' was defined then
by the Fed at 5%, later 10% and in the mid 1990s 25% (Euromoney, 1996b).
4 It was amended in 1970 in order to supervise any company owning at least one bank.
5 Ceilings were increased in 1970, 1973 and 1979.
6 The ratios were, 6% to 14% for transaction deposit and between 0 and 9% for nonpersona1 time deposits
(Hadjimichalakis 1995).7 Grady (1985) includes a very ilustrative table on financial activities, provided by financial and non-
financial institutions in 1960 and in 1984.8 This Act in brief introduced the following novelties: widening the sources of funds (liabilities) and
expanding the product base (assets) of depository institutions.9 The demand function and velocity of circulation became extremely unstable due to NOW, RPs and Cash
Management in 1970s and later MMMF, Super NOW and MMD accounts. It became also impossible to
anticipate the multiplier for non-borrowed bank reserves. All ex-ante estimations of this multiplier and
models were of doubtful accuracy until the incorporation in 1981 in the models of the information about the
legalisation of NOW accounts. In 1987 Vo1ker, the chairman of the Fed, admitted that institutional and
market development made it difficult to make judgements about the relationship between monetary
aggregates and economic variables (Rasche 1987).
10 The peculiar situation when during a period that interest rates were rising, and borrowers were not wiling
to borrow money. We have also to add the impact of last recession, problems caused to banks due to the fall
of junk bonds prices and problematic estate loans.
11 Through higher monitoring and, mainly, reserve requirements costs (Hadjimichalakis 1995).
12 From 1985 until 1991 the yearly amount of failed banks fluctuated between 100 and 200 cases and the
corresponding figure for 'in-market' mergers fluctuated between 300 and 600 cases (Koch 1992).
13 A megabank is a full service nationwide bank, a superregional is a full service limited expanded bank, and
a community bank is a locally owned and managed bank. Plus two other independent categories: the
investment and specialised sector finance banks (Koch 1992).
14 Federal Reserves using the regulation Q forced banks to pay on their time deposits 3% for 1955-7,3.5% for
1957-62,4% for 1962-70,4.5% for 1970-3,5% for 1973-9 and 5.5% for 1979-85 (Hadjimichalakis 1995).
15 Regulation D was introduced in 1913 and forced banks to maintain reserves in non interest bearing form as
reserve balances in Federal Reserves or cash in their vault (Graddy 1985).
16 Bankers paid 3 percent on deposits, charged 6 percent on loans and hit the golf course at 3 pm (Koch
1992).
17 Reserve requirements could be between zero and three percent. But in 1990 the Fed reduced the reserves
requirements to zero percent (Hadjimicha1kis 1995).
18 The reason behind this regulation was the desire of the Fed to reduce the cost that banks were facing during
and after the depression years. The payment of interest on demand deposits was considered by the Fed as
'excessive' or even destructive competition. They preferred to create an artificial cartel in order to avoid
banks being tempted to invest in high yield but also high risk assets in order to boost their returns (Mingo
1979). In 1971 the Commssion on Financial Structure and Regulation (the Hunt Commission) proposed the
easing of regulation that prevented competition among financial institutions. Its recommendations were not
immediately implemented (Gibson 1975).
19 In relation to the corporate clients, banks were offering additional services below the usual cost in order to
compensate for having their demand deposit without interest payments (Hadjimicha1akis 1995).
20 See Sealey (1979). Many other researchers such as Kane (1970), Py1e (1974) or Spellman (1980) argued
against the regulation 'Q' as promoting the inefficiency (Morgan 1982).
21 We have to add that depositors turned to investors under these circumstances and were facing an enhanced
liquidity and probably credit risk.
127
Part II Special liabilities of banks
22 In Gibson's (1975), there is a detailed analysis of some isolated cases around the US, where thrift
institutions were allowed to offer checking accounts.
23 The name of the institution was the Consumer Savings Bank of Worcester. A detail worthmentioning is that
167 over 179 mutual Savings and Loans in Massachusetts were not Federally regulated i.e. covered by FDIC
and subject to interest rate ceiling practices (Gibson 1975).
24 This action is described by the regulative authorities as 'offering third party payments services' (Basch
1976).
25 All New England States adopted the NOW accounts except Rhode Island, where the vast majority of thrift
institutions were owned by commercial banks, and Vermont, where thrift institutions represented the smallest
proportion in the US (ibid).26 Commercial banks compensated through additional services attached to their savings accounts or better
branching (Kimball1977).
27 Since they offered more services than the smaller ones and the latter probably preferred to see the effect on
the issuing institution, mainly in processing issues, of this novelty and then act (Basch 1976). In
Massachusetts only 34% of Savings banks offered NOW in 1972, 14% in 1973, 34% in 1974, 12% 1975 and
3% in 1976 (Basch 1982). Undoubtedly a NOW account has a higher cost than a savings account and a
different duration profile. The former point was later used by S&Ls in order to explain higher lending rates,
especially in areas where banks did not charge draft fees. It was also argued that NOW accounts, due to their
duration profile were reducing the amount of mortgages offered. None of the above was conclusively proved
(Hartzog 1979).28 A similar observation was that early adopters had high non-interest costs i.e. administration and extended
branching as well as a mobile clientele i.e. a high ratio of closing/opening accounts. Banks with extended
branch networks favoured the free draft accounts (Basch 1976).
29The Herfindahl index could calculate the degree of oligopo1y or less conducive competition. Markets with a
high ratio were characterised by early introduction. Additionally banks that had their headquarters in urban
areas tended to be early adopters (Basch 1976).
30 These two States acted as an experiment for a partial application of the Hunt recommendations (see Gibson
1975). The regulation allowed 5% interest and only 150 drafts per year-in 1974 the last condition was
abolished (Gibson 1975).31 We have to take into account that the cost of NOW accounts is significantly higher than for demand
deposits. It was estimated that in 1974 only 11 % of demand deposits of commercial banks, and 34% in 1975,
were transferred to NOW accounts.
32 In 1975,65 of 145 of commercial banks in Massachusetts did not offer NOW accounts (Basch 1983).
33 This price discrimination was already observed during the 1960s in checking accounts where the 'minimum
balance, no-service charged' policy was not actively promoted by banks and it was offered only in cases that
customers were requesting it (Basch 1983).
34 A detailed analysis is available from Paulus in Federal Reserve Bulletin in 1976. It was estimated also that
at the end of 1975 commercial banks had lost only 3% of their total deposits.
35 They believed that conversion or launch of new ones was too expensive or even that there was a lack of
computer facilities. Kimball (1977) showed that the impact on pre-tax earnings related to the loss of deposits
is higher than the cost of introduction NOW accounts.36 The minimum balance requirements could be a crucial factor for the profitability of NOW accounts in
relation to the minimum average balance maintained (Siminson 1980).37 During the same year Western Savings Fund Society in Philadelphia offered a similar account called
WOW. This account permitted unlimited drafts but they had to be countersigned by the bank (Gibson 1975).
38 The States were Texas, Ilinois, California and Massachusetts and their results were tested on a fifth State,
Pennsylvania (Morgan 1982).
39 The generalisation called 'prices' refers to the above four areas of competition (ibid).
40 Repos and MMDA are not part of M1, but of M2 (Hadjimicha1akis 1995). A rise in the deposit rate could
entrain a further increase in Money Supply since it induced consumers to reallocate funds from other financial
assets (Hadjimicha1akis 1981).
41 In 1980s the reserve requiremnet ratio was 10 between 12 percent (Tatom 1983) .
42 In 1987 some money market funds had a minimum amount of only $500 (Lown 1987)
43 Commercial paper, CDs and Treasury Bills are the most important short term marketable securities.
44 In 1975 MMMFs were less than $3 bilion, in 1979 were $12 bilion and in 1982 reached the $196 billion
and during 1988 surpassed the $300 billion.
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45 In 1990 General Motors offered MMA of only $250 minimum deposit and with a very competitive rate
since they economise significant costs due to reduced personnel and reduced advertising or branching costs
(Forbes 1990).46 Since they were perceived as competitors with time and Savings deposits, they were included in the same
monetary aggregate (M2) with them (Tatom 1983).
47 Both of them were offering rates comparable with Treasury bils.
48 This innovation required extensive and efficient communication networks. The Fedwire (discussed in the
credit cards chapter) facilitated and enabled the Cash Concentration Systems.
49 The MMMF and the cash concentration system considerably reduced the expected demand for money and
created the monetary phenomenon of 'the case of missing money' (Golfeld 1976) during the 1970s. In the
1980s, the monetary authorities incorporated MMMF in their M2 aggregate (Dow 1982).
50 The minimum amount was $100000 and the duration of the Repos was usually overnight, if their maturity
was longer they were called term RPs.
51 Plus three pre-authorised or automatic transfers (Tatom 1983). This loophole discriminated against small
banks with reduced networks of ATMs and branches (Forbes 1983).
52 Remind ourselves that M1 consists of currency, travellers checks, demand deposits and other checkable
deposits. M2 is the sum of M1 plus overnight RPs and Eurodollar, plus MMMF, plus Savings deposits
(including MMDA) and small time deposits. M3 is M2 plus large denomination time deposits, plus term
repurchase agreements and Eurodollar plus MMMF (institutions only) (Lown 1987).
53 Terminology used from Tatom in his paper. He explain three potential shifts: types of deposits belonging in
the same category, types from different categories and other financial assets not belonging to monetary
aggregates like bonds. All these possibilities create different scenarios in relation to the M1, M2 aggregates
and the velocity of circulation (ibid).54 Non personal MMDA are subject to the same reserve requirements as non personal time and savings
balances in 1980s equal to 3% (Tatom 1983) and (Ragowski 1984).55 As we have already mentioned, a rise of M2 and a fall in its velocity, but no significant change in M1
growth and velocity (Tatom 1983).56 We could also observe a type of potential 'cannibalisation' of CDs or small time deposits. Later we will
discuss this concept more and we will see that this cannibalisation took place only for CDs.
57 They reduced their minimum amount and linked their products with brokerage services and other mutual
funds. Also they offered tax-exempt and multiple risk-return profile securities (Keeley 1985).
58 At least three percent since the lowest returns were around 11% and some even offered 24% (Forbes
1983b/c).59 Flannery (1982) advanced the argument that retail deposits were quasi-fixed factors of production. The
establishment of deposits is costly and could reflect a longer term bond for banks. Hence they try to share
their establishment cost with the customer in order to increase the switching cost. Under this reasoning
institutions could pay more than the market rates in order to attract customers (Rogowski 1984).
60 Initially slightly more than 8% and then around 7.5% and almost for the whole period less than the T-bils
rate by 150 to 250 basis points (ibid).
61 This term is used in order to describe the case where a new product is obtaining the market share of a
recently launched product with some common features. Sales of this new product could emanate from new
consumers, consumers of competitive brand and consumer that switch from the old product. Cannibalisation
becomes a problem when it provides no incremental financial benefit (Kerin et al1978).
62 Cashing checks and dealing with payrolls, operating costs could be close to one third of banks total costs
(Forbes 1983b).63 Due to this development thrift institutions entered areas that they had previously ignored and were
authorised to issue credit cards and invest up to 20% of their assets in consumer loans. Mutual Savings were
authorised to make loans up to 5% of their assets. During the period 1980-1989, 1000 institutions failed and
from the remaining 2900, 1000 were considered as not healthy. (White 1995). The Federal Savings and Loans
Insurance Corporation had to inject $150 bilion for the period 1986-1991. The deposit insurance was
increased from $40,000 to 100,000 (Hadjimichalakis 1995).
64 Despite the fact that banks offered new products such as mortgages, Trust services, discount brokerage,
data processing, insurance and other financial products (Koch 1992).65 The demand for large CDs was further reduced since the MMMFs were their main purchasers and their
market was initially reduced (Mahoney 1987).66 The Scottish and Irish banks do not create money since they are obliged to keep a Bank of England pound
in their reserves for every pound they print.
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67 Restrictive periods for credit creation were 1955, 1957-8, 1964, 1966 and 1969. The results affected many
financial institutions but mostly banks (Artis 1981).
68 The research was undertaken by Fisher (1968), Goodhart and Crockett (1970). On the other hand the effort
to calculate the money multiplier connecting GDP and monetary aggregates was not so successful (ibid).
69 The cash reserve ratio was reduced to 1.5% from 8% and a commtment to competitive forces was made
(ibid).70 The new M3 was equal to the old M3 minus the foreign currency deposits of UK residents. Because the
British balance of payment had improved.
71 Unofficially already exercised under the form of 'old boys club' and abolished in 1997 when a new
institution took over the supervisory role for the whole financial sector the Financial Supervisory Authority.
72 During the 1970s their difference reached almost 6% in 1976. After 1979 the possibility of arbitrage
brought them into tandem movement (Artis 1991).
73 It stands for Public Sector Liquidity (PSL). PSLl was private sector holdings of M3 plus money market
instruments plus Certificates of Tax Deposits. PSL2 is PLS1 plus building societies and other savings
deposits. They were first published in 1976 and first used in 1979 (Artis 1981).
74 As we wil discuss in the next paragraph, M3 was distorted between 1974 and 1980 by commercial banks
circumventing IBEL regulation (Pepper 1993).
75 Especially in the non-interest bearing parts of the money supply i.e. sight accounts before 1980s and
currency (Trundle 1982, Heardy 1985, Dow 1988).
76 As part of their Medium Term Financial Strategy. The purpose is to combine them with adequate rhetoric
and provide a stable financial framework for economic agents (Arestis et aI1993).
77 Since neither of M1 or M3 could include all transaction balances because the former is too narrow and the
latter too broad.
78 The M3 was achieved a only target twice nd both times after revisions (Salmon 1994).
79 Due to its components, M3 is a good indicator of bank liabilities. Abandoning it could mean that due to
disintermidiation banks are not the only credit creator hence M3 does not illustrate the magnitude of credit in
the economy.80 The monetary base control would have offered to bank a set of choices in order to comply with the
desirable percentage, which differs significantly from the interest rate approach where banks have not any
real choice (Artis 1981). During 1970s the Bank did not even publish figures these monetary aggregates only
the IMF published them (Niehans 1982).
81It was perceived to have a 'close relationship with money GDP over a period of 40 years' in accordance
with Financial Statement and Budget Report 1990/1991 and selected as an aggregate expressing the money
supply (Godgon 1991).
82 M4 is analysed by the authorities alongside other variables in order to detect inflationary trends (Salmon
1994).
83 The minimum value is £50,000 and are CDs issued in increasing multiples of £10,000 (Pawley 1991).
84 This actually took place in the 1970s each time the 'corset' was introduced. In 1974 - 1975 commercial
bils increased from £350 to £500 milion, in 1977 bils increased from £320 to £430 milons and in 1978-
1980, bils rose from £710 to £2700 milion (Pepper 1993).
85 For mainly two reasons: in previous years large profits were reported and they were afraid that an increase
on overdrafts rate could lead to loss of market share (Gow1and 1982).
86 The 1965 Budget provided this opportunity to individuals but the 1973 budget denied this possibility.
During the period 1971-1973 M3 was thus further distorted (Cow1and 1982).
87 The concept survived and was incorporated even in the Financial Service Act in 1986 during the Big Bang.
88 The Special Deposit scheme was applicable only to commercial banks and extended networks were very
costly.
89 The concept of implicit interest payments is related with the free administration of sight deposits during the
past i.e free bank statements, cash-in of cheques or withdrawls (Ford and Mullineux 1995).
90 Mortgage financial instruments are not considered as routine innovation from the banks' perspective, but
we are not going to discuss this issue at this stage. Mortgages are going to be discussed in the securitization
chapters.
91 The breakthrough came in the middle of 1980s when the Royal Bank of Scotland offered the first simple
interest rate bearing check account (Pepper 1993).
92 During 1980s fluctuated between 3% and 4% over assets. From 1.48% in 1980, to 1,79% in 1986 (Canals
1993).
93 In the same paper, it was suggested that the prolonged period (1991-1996) of intense M&A could not be
very beneficial since probably the lowest possible cost structure had already been reached.
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Chapter four
'.. .plus ultra... '
Francis Bacon on the potential of science
Part II Derivatives
4 Derivatives
Introduction
During this chapter we are going to discuss the emergence and proliferation of our second
cluster of financial innovations: derivative financial instruments. We are also going to
explain the situation where financial innovation or a cluster of financial innovations could
lead to the emergence of further innovative activity in order to remedy the consequences of
the former one. These financial innovations have many features which can be explained
using our analytical framework of financial innovative activity.
This chapter discusses the causes of derivative products and the particular role of
regulation as a potential constraint on the emergence of these instruments. We discuss also
the two sources of derivative products, the over the counter and the Exchange-traded
instruments. Then we refer in detail to forward and future contracts, swaps and financial
options, otherwise called the first generation derivatives. We are going to explain their
particular causes of emergence, their particular characteristics and classification. During
this analysis, we also refer to their income generating ability and their corresponding risk
exposure. Finally, we are going to explain their particular reason for success.
Then we are going to discuss the second generation, following the same approach.
These second generation derivatives consist of swaptions and credit derivatives, and wil
provide us with the first instruments that could be classified as exploratory. In the last
section we shall present the problems that derivatives could cause to financial institutions
and we wil conclude with the emergence of a further innovative process, the VaR model,
that was created in order to measure and ultimately control the risk exposure due to the
derivative financial instruments. This financial process is ilustrative of the dynamic nature
of the financial innovation process.
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4.1 The emergence of Derivatives products
During this section, we shall refer to the main causes of the emergence and proliferation of
derivative products. It wil be clear that the initial cause was reinforced by later
developments. Then we shall discuss the particular role of regulation as both a boost, and
potential barrier, to financial innovative activity. Finally, we shall refer to the particular
role and function of the over the counter and Exchange-traded derivatives.
4.1.1 Causes of the emergence of derivatives
The purpose of this study is not to provide an exhaustive list of derivative products
currently available or a detailed description of the historical evolution of derivatives. We
are going to discuss the main types of derivatives and their risk exposure, limitations,
prudent use and further innovations in response to their characteristics.
Derivatives are also referred to as contingent claims because their performance
depends primarily on the performance of another - underlying - financial asset. Derivative
instruments have involved customized bundles of financial attributes that replicate specific
returns fitting clients' objectives. i Their main characteristic is their immense leverage
effect, i.e. derivatives usually require a small amount to be paid now offering the
possibility of future profits or losses of a multiple leveL.
As we have already mentioned above, major political and economic events have
considerably altered the economic environment from 1970 onwards. The OPEC oil crisis,
combined with the high inflation in the US from Vietnam war expenditures and the
collapse of Bretton Woods created long term and sustained high inflation and Exchange
rate volatility in all major developed countries. It is possible to say that derivatives were
primarily designed as hedging instruments, hence a suitable solution in order to avoid the
undesirable consequences of the Exchange and interest rate volatility and the galloping
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inflation of the 1970's.2 These conditions created an increased demand for hedging
instruments, in other words, financial instrument able to provide protection and insurance
against this market volatility.
Later, derivatives were initially very convenient to reduce the financial burden from
specific regulation3 and they considerably enhance the balance sheet of the bank by
removing items off-balance sheet. This was the case at the initial stages of their
development, when regulation has directed at balance sheet. The situation later changed
(Basle 1988, Capital Adequacy Directive, applicable from 1993) and currently the
regulative burden could vary from bank to bank.4 An additional element is that derivatives
were and stil are usually fee based and enable banks to diversify further their income
generation activities.5 This diversification was most welcomed by the banks and satisfied
their own preferences, because it reduced their exposure due to their position in relation to
market volatility.
But the geometrical expansion (see table (T-4.1) on Exchange and over the counter
total derivatives figures from 1986 until 1994) is due mainly to developments in the
information technology sector. Derivatives would not have been developed without the
emergence of the current huge information-processing capabilities and technology.
Information technology permitted the design, execution and management of these
extremely complex products. These developments were primarily the widespread use of
PCs, the exponential increase in the capacity for storing and processing information and the
development of extremely specialized and sophisticated software programs. These
developments in the information technology area offered financial and corporate
institutions6 a multiplicity of risk positions. Furthermore low cost replication trading
strategies due to low transaction costs and significant low cost leveraged opportunities
were available to users. At the same time a completely new kind of expert was required to
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design these products. These experts have a mathematics or physics background since the
pricing models require significant mathematical skils. We are going to discuss later in
more depth this new requirements and accompanying academic work.
During this sub section we have highlighted the different causes that contributed to
the emergence and proliferation of derivative products. In terms of our models (2.1), it is
clear that the initial cause of market volatility was later combined with additional causes
such as government intervention, regulation and financial institution's preferences. The
proliferation required also advanced technology and new academic work and resulted in
lower costs and an enhanced spectrum of financial instruments. The next subsection is
going to focus on the particular role of regulation in the proliferation of derivative
products.
4.1.2 Role of regulation
The only significant constraint on the exponential increase in derivatives products came
from the regulatory authorities. During this sub section we shall discuss briefly the main
regulatory efforts to control the derivative activities of banks. We shall avoid referring in
detail to each effort and we shall limit ourselves only to their relevant contribution.
Primarily it was the monetary and supervisory authorities in the most developed
financial centers of the 1970s and the 1980s, i.e. the Federal Reserve in the United States
and the Bank of England in the United Kingdom, that tried to control the use of these
instruments via guidelines and directives. But the first organized effort to deal at a global
level was the 1988 Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices
report for capital adequacy requirements.7 These capital requirements became enforceable
from 1993. It also proposed guidelines for the off-balance sheet items and their treatment.8
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Since then the regulatory authorities have acted in response to financial distresses
rising from derivatives, like the Metallgeshelshaft oil company' in Germany (1992)9,
Orange County in the US (1994) 10, and the Barings Bank collapse in the UK (1995).11 In
1992 a BIS study discussed the considerable growth of OTC derivativesY Later a Bank of
England report in 1993 highlighted qualitative requirements of participants. Then the
Group of Thirty (G30) report in 1993 promoted mainly the bankers' point of view. 13 In the
same year a more general report, similar to the Bank of England report, was published from
the Commodities and Futures Exchange Commission in the US. Then in 1994, the BIS
issued the 'Risk Management Guidelines For Derivatives'. These regulatory efforts
presented a common set of recommendations in order to reduce the potential negative
consequences of derivative products.I4 Later a special report on the Barings case of the
Bank of England (1995), discussed the importance of internal controls for derivative users
and the Basle Committee of Banking Supervision and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) discussed the actual disclosure of banks and their
limitations.i Finally in 1996 the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the US issued
an exposure draft on derivatives and hedging activities.16 Concluding, we could say that,
there is not any uniform capital adequacy rate applicable to all derivatives products. The
regulatory capital adequacy charge depends on the type and duration of the instrument.
The post-active or responsive regulation concentrated its efforts on bringing the off-
balance-sheet derivatives items under supervisory control and on promoting the
enhancement of internal controls in the financial institutions. As we wil discuss in the last
sub-section, these efforts on the other hand did not manage to reduce the proliferation of
financial derivative products and their use by banks. In the next sub-section we shall
discuss the over the counter financial institutions function and the particular role of
clearing houses for the proliferation of derivatives.
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4.1.3 Functions of OTe and clearing houses
Before commencing the discussion of the main derivatives products it is essential to
explain the two main sources or providers of derivatives products: the Over the Counter
(OTC) and Exchange traded derivatives (see table (T -4.1) on the proliferation of these two
sources of derivative instruments).
Financial institutions like banks are the suppliers of OTC products. An OTC
derivative instrument could be a customized swap, option or forward contract without the
interposition of clearing houses, tailored to the specific financial needs or requirements of
the buyer. Their pricing formulas enable banks to replicate any conceivable return pattern
and provide endless individual customized products. Often, they are even less expensive
than the off-the rack products. Then this pricing is not uniform and objective. It is possible
for different financial institutions to offer different prices for the same product or a
financial institution to be able to price a product that another institution is not. This
distinction was critical in order to create tangible and intangible comparative advantages
(Tuffano 1990). We have to mention that the initial purpose of the OTC services was to
reconfigure market risk and not to provide liquidity. This enabled a better management of
the risk that financial agents face.
The Exchange traded derivatives (see table (T-4. ID are standardized products like
equity options, Forward Rate Agreements (FRA) or Futures traded on the floor of
Exchanges. They require the existence of a clearing house as an intermediary between
sellers and buyers. The Clearing house provides enhanced liquidity, reduces transactions
costs and reduces credit risk. It requires a margin to be deposited at the beginning of the
agreement and any losses or profits are treated as an adjustment of this margin. When a
position is closed out then open interest contrasts are reduced. An extreme case of reduced
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transaction costs is the Exchange traded equity index (Remolona 1993). The Exchange
traded derivatives did not manage to match the proliferation of the OTC traded instruments
(see table (T-4.1J). But any financial instrument related with Exchange networks presents
network positive externalities, in other words the higher the number and notional amount of
the derivative traded contracts, the more profitable for its user.
At this point, it is possible to discuss the S-shaped life cycle of products. We had
discussed this concept in the first chapter on innovation (1.1.2.4). The current position
(amount of sales) of a financial instrument could be explained as a point on an S-shaped
curve1? or sigmoid diffusion approach. We can integrate the Product Life Cycle theory with
Merton's (1992) contribution on financial innovation and its standardization, that begins
from OTC and then moves to Exchange-traded and then moves further to synthetic
products which are customer-tailored and based on Exchange-traded instruments. Typical
examples are forward and future contracts that we shall discuss in the following section.
During this sub-section, we have discussed the two different sources of derivative
products. In terms of our model, the OTC products provided tailoring of the particular
needs of customers, hence a filing-the-spectrum function and better risk management
abilities. The particular models they used, or the degree of skils their researchers
possessed, could distinguish considerably their pricing and product strategies. Additionally
the existence of intangible benefits could boost the innovative effort. The emergence of
Exchange-traded instruments enabled further reduction of costs, enhanced liquidity through
network positive externalities and provided inputs for further innovative effort. In the
following sections, we shall discuss in detail the different types of derivative products; we
begin with forwards. It is possible to divide them into first generation (forwards, futures,
swaps and options) and second generation (swaptions and credit derivatives).
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4.2 Forwards
During this section, we shall discuss Forward derivative instruments. We are going to
explain the characteristics of a forward contract which classify them as the raw material of
most derivative products, their pricing and the risk involved for the banks.
4.2.1 Characteristics of Forwards
A Forward is a contract between two parties where one party accepts to buy and the other
to sell at a specific date (delivery, expire or maturity date) and price (forward price) a
predetermined financial asset (usually currencies) or commodity.I8 The buyer has a 'long'
position and the seller has a 'short' position. During this chapter we are going to discuss
only currency and interest rate forwards since they and only they are banking products.
However, very often users of commodity forwards involve bank credit lines and letters of
guarantee during their transactions.
A particular type of forward contract is the Forward Rate Agreement (FRA) where
two parties decide that at a particular date the first is going to lend the other a specific
amount of money, for a predetermined period (usually three to six months) and is going to
receive a specific interest rate. This rate is called a forward/forward rate. FRAs very soon
became an extremely popular financial instrument (see table (T-4.1) where FRA's are a
component of the interest rate figure). From 1986 til 1994 their expansion was
exponential. FRAs include a double aspect of risk transferring and equity generating.
Often users do not wait til the maturity date but prefer to 'close down' their
position or unwind by re-arranging the contract with the bank or by simply contracting the
opposite forward contract. In the FRAs case it is possible to compensate for the difference
between the interest rates on the particular date and the agreed forward/forward rates.
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The plethora of choices on dates, denominations and amounts make forwards
impossible to be standardized, hence they are able to fulfil the specific individual
requirements of the user. This particularity places forward contracts under the category of
over the counter (OTC) banking products where the other party is always a dealer or a
financial institution i.e. the bank. The bank on the other hand could make another offsetting
forward contract in order to hedge its own position.
Forwards could be used for hedging and speculative purposes. Their main
advantage as hedging instruments is that users do not have to commit any cash til the
maturity date and they are also certain of the exact price they have to pay. The speculative
use is related to the differences between the expectations of the user and the market.
The price of the forward contract could not be significantly different from the
current price plus the carring cost, i.e. buying at spot the particular amount of the foreign
currency and depositing it in an interest-bearing account or buying foreign government
securities til the maturity date, due to the interest parity theorem (King 1998). If its price
was significantly different i.e. the difference larger than the transactions costs involved, it
would be possible to make a risk-free or arbitrage profit.
In the case of FRA's, they are priced in comparison with the more liquid futures
markets that we are going to discuss later in the section (4.3). It could be supported that
forward contracts are the most important of all derivatives products since many of them
could be explained as complex or 'enhanced' Forwards. Consequently, it is possible to
perceive forward contracts in terms of our model (2.1) as a radical, responsive financial
instrument, initially off and later on-balance sheet, that transfers the risk or generates
credit (the case of FRA's). We are now going to discuss in more depth the income and risk
exposure emanating from forwards contracts.
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4.2.2 Income and exposure from forwards
Income is the difference or the spread between bid and offer price. Every time the bank
buys or sells any amount in foreign currency or any FRA offers the customer two different
prices, this enables the bank to make a profit. Apart from this spread that banks receive, the
main determinant of gain or loss is the difference between the current (at the maturity date)
spot price from the arranged price. Usually clients use lines of credit in order to finance
their transactions. But a real-world complication is that only large corporations, agencies
and big institutions have lines of credit and the cost of obtaining them could be
significantly high and outweigh the potential benefits from the agreement.
Banks face two types of risk from forward contracts: credit and settlement risk.
Credit risk arises from the deviation between forward and spot prices i.e. the bank could
have been wrong in their past expectations about the current price. The settlement risk is
concentrated on the fact that the user has to make, if he is able, only one payment at the
end. An additional risk for banks is that FRAs are used as a substitute for mismatch of
maturities between their assets and liabilties. In general terms, forwards contracts enabled
enhance management of banks' risk exposure. Concluding, FRA and forward Exchange
contracts are considered as a good source of income at medium risk (see appendix (A-4.1)
ilustrating the risk spectrum of financial instruments).
Forwards are the simplest derivative contract. Their main cause of emergence was
the volatility of financial markets. Banks do not require elaborate techniques in order to
price them and they are considered as the basis of most derivative products. They also
enable both users and providers to enhance their risk management. In the next section we
are going to discuss 'standardised' forwards contracts or better known as Futures.
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4.3 Futures
During this section, we shall discuss Futures contracts. They are very similar to forwards
but they differ in two aspects: their degree of risk for the financial institution and their
connection with positive externalities.
4.3.1 Characteristics of Futures
Futures are similar to Forwards except that there is a limited choice of dates and
magnitudes of financial assets or quantities of commodities.I9 One party accepts to deliver
a specific good for an agreed futures price or value at a specific or prompt or last trading
day.2o The most common contracts are currency, commodity, interest rate2I and stock22
index futures23. Financial futures in foreign currency were introduced in 1972 to the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and in interest rates in 1975.
This reduced choice of dates and type, enable them to be standardized and tradable
on the 'floor'. The exchange place is not anymore a bank but a clearing house between the
seller and the buyer, and usually brokers organize and trade. The existence of the clearing
house as we have already mentioned smoothes and enhances the liquidity of these financial
instruments. Any organized financial network (Economides 1993) presents elements of
positive externality in terms of price and type of asset traded for the user. In other words,
the larger the amount, and available types, of futures contract traded, the lower the price
and the wider and more diverse the types of contract traded.
Futures in contrast to forwards also require a continuous process of partial payment
during the period prior to the delivery date, which is called marking-to market. This
procedure spreads the payments during this period by paying every day the difference
between the initially agreed futures price and the day's settlement price for an identical
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futures contract. They also require an initial deposit (called a performance bond) of a
percentage of the contract, called margin or collateral as a guarantee.
This narrow selection makes it significantly easier to 'close out' any position and
encourages speculators24 and arbitrageurs as well as hedgers to use Futures to a great
extent. Usually securities houses and banks are the main users of futures in order to obtain
liquid funds. In recent years their volume has increased considerably and the most popular
type of Futures are interest rate and equity index contracts, and to a lesser degree currency
contracts (BIS 1998).
Futures are used also as Forwards as components of more elaborate and
complicated derivative products such as options on Futures based on existing routines.
During the next sub section, we shall discuss mainly the income from Futures for the
financial institution.
4.3.2 Income and exposure from Futures
Since Futures are not OTC financial products, financial institutions are not the counterparty
of these contracts. But banks buy and sell contracts on behalf of their clients, earning a fee
for these activities. On the other hand they do not face any credit or settlement risk.
Generally the marking to market process reduces the potential exposure and the
performance period is reduced to one trading day; by adding the part played by the clearing
house, credit risk is almost non-existent on Futures contracts.
The pricing of a future contract in interest rates is determined by three factors:
supply, demand and the interest rate yield curve?S This curve is not generally flat due to
market's bullish or bearish expectations and due to liquidity preference.26 The Futures price
should not be materially different from the spot price plus the carring cost; if it was, the
arbitrage opportunities would be obvious?? The profit or loss is determined again as in
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Forwards as the difference between spot price and price paid at the purchase of the
contract. Concluding, Futures' financial instruments are a source of fee based income and
are almost risk free, for the bank (see appendix (A-4.1) on financial instruments' risk
spectrum).
Futures are similar to Forwards and their only difference is that in terms of our
model (2.1), their nature is that they are incremental and based on existing routines nature;
and their cost could be lower due to standardization. The main cause of their emergence
was inflation and exchange rate volatility. They present strong positive network
externalities due to the existence of an Exchange network and they provide risk-free, fee
based income for the bank. Due to their relation with Forwards, they also represent a
perfect example of the cumulative nature of financial innovation. During the next section
we shall discuss a different derivative product, the swap agreements.
4.4 Swaps
During this section, we shall discuss swap agreements. There was a significant
proliferation and diversity from the original types of swap in relation to the income source
and risk involved. It was also more than one factor that caused their emergence and
diffusion.
4.4.1 Characteristics of Swaps
The increased volatilty of interest rates and exchange rates at the end of the 1970s and
early 1980s boosted the demand for hedging instruments. 
28 Generally a swap is an
exchange of income streams or repayments of the principal between two parties. These
parties could be corporations, financial institutions or government agencies.29 Any swap
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agreement has a predetermined period and price. It could be short, less than three years, or
longer.
Regulation was an additional important factor for the emergence and proliferation
of swap agreements. The initial and very successful types of currency swaps were the
Parallel or Back-to back loans where two parties lend to each other for the same period in
different currencies30 and banks could play a significant role as specialists, and agents
which assume the credit risk. The problem with parallel loans was the risk that one party
defaults while the other continue the payments.31 This type of currency swap was used at
the end of the 1970s by British institutions in order to avoid exchange controls and
minimize their tax burden (McClintock 1996). Later developments such as straight
currency swaps required an annual fee to be paid by the provider of the stronger currency to
the other party in order to compensate for exchange rate losses.
There are mainly five types of swap agreement: interest rate, currency, equity
swaps, debt/equity and assets swaps.32 The first interest rate swap took place in 1981
between the World Bank and IBM. The first type of swap is the most popular: it includes
interest rate cups, floors and collars33. Users do not exchange the principal, hence the risk
faced by the bank is a small proportion of this amount. Swap agreements are the largest
component of OTC interest rate derivative (see table (T -4.1 J on the composition of interest
rate derivatives). Participants usually do not deal directly but through an intermediary
dealer, but sometimes it is possible to find a brokered swap, i.e. two parties matched
directly. Before 1991, it was always a financial institution, but in January 1991 the Chicago
Board Of Trade (CBOT) introduced Exchange-traded three and five year interest rate
swaps. Hence it is possible to observe some early signs of network positive externalities.
Interest rate swaps are priced by calculating the NPV of the two legs.34 The floating
rate leg could be estimated by observing the interest rate yield curve which should be
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reflected in the market's forward interest rates. Swaps could be used for speculation and
hedging purposes. They facilitate the restructuring of balance sheets and profit and loss
accounts35 by converting fixed rate financial instruments to floating. They permit users to
exploit their comparative advantage in the credit market and obtain cheaper credit. They
also enable institutions to utilze sterile cash balances and bypass exchange controls.
Arbitrageurs could also use swaps in order to exploit a comparative advantage or
discrepancies in the cost of funding. In the medium term, it is fair to say that swap
agreements enabled the reduction of market imperfections through the reduction of
asymmetry of information. In recent years, due to the economic growth of the 1980s, a
geometrical proliferation and expansion was observed in interest rate swaps and in a lesser
but stil remarkable degree of currency swaps (BIS 1998). This proliferation was also based
on the already enhanced information technology capacities of financial institutions.
Swap agreements in terms of our model (2.1) could be perceived as responsive, and
in a sense a radical, financial instrument or process that was initially offbalance sheet and
offered a credit transferring function. We can classify them as radical, because other
innovations emerged later from the original swaps such as complicated swaps, swaptions
and default swaps (see latter section 4.6.1). In the following sub-section, we shall elaborate
more on the pricing and risk exposure of swap agreements.
4.4.2 Income and exposures of swaps
Initially banks only had to bring together the two parties in a swap. Later banks began to
act as intermediaries and guarantee the payment, hence they had to face considerable credit
risk.
Swap agreements also required credit lines but, as we have already explained, these
are expensive. But due to competition among banks, the terms of swaps have become more
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accessible now to corporations. It is worth saying that the main bulk of swaps used to be
long term until 1988 but later short term swaps by far outnumbered them (FRBNY 1992-
1993). This fact could also imply a more short term and speculative approach,
overshadowing the hedging function of swaps.
For interest rate contracts the swap spread is based on the T-bil rate plus some
basis points and it is determined by the current supply and demand conditions for the
underlying assets and the particular type of contract. Since both parties do not exchange the
principal, the only risk that banks face is the future market risk, since there is not any
additional credit risk except the net payment. Generally interest rate swaps risk declines as
time goes by, but there is a considerable difference in risk exposure between amortizing
(lower) and accreting (higher) interest rates swaps (see appendix (A-4.1) on the risk
spectrum).
The introduction in 1991 of Exchange traded three and five year interest rate swaps
considerably reduced credit risk. But inflexibility could constrain demand and dealers
continue to prefer the higher fees involved in the OTC market. In 1993, 92 percent of the
US financial institutions interviewed were using interest rate swaps to manage their lending
portfolios (Simons 1995).
Currency swap pricing is based on the interest rate yield curve of the
denominations involved i.e. it is treated as a deposit and a loan. It is priced as a long dated
forward contract exchange36 for a period of five years where the bank assumes the credit
risk and its pricing is affected by interest and exchange rates. Currency swaps involve more
credit risk due to: lack of net settlement, swap of principal, much less liquid market. The
marking to market value increases as maturity approaches.
The interest rate and currency swaps were the most important items of off balance
activities of banks and orchestrated efforts took place in order to force banks to report them
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(Matten 1996). As we have already mentioned their increase during the period 1992- 1997
was remarkable: interest rate swaps increased sixfold and currency swaps doubled (BIS
report 1998). A careful observation of the risk spectrum appendix (A-4.1) could support
the argument that swap agreements could include a lot of risk for the financial institution
depending on the type of the agreement. The diversity of swap types as we have already
discussed above does not allow us to form a uniform opinion about their degree of risk. It
was something already noticed by the BIS report in 1988 on financial innovation, where we
encountered three types of swap both off and on balance sheet (BIS report 1998).
Debt /Equity swaps exchange debt for investments and involve a bank, a company
and a government. Timing is extremely important for these deals and provides the bank
with the possibilty to remove a low-rated even written-off debt and receive a fee.3? The
concept was to provide liquidity to banks engaged into international lending to less
developed countries (LDC). The bank sells the loan to an agency at a discount then the
agency sells it at a discount to an investor who can redeem it at a discount to the central
bank of the LDC and acquire equity in a local firm. The benefits for the bank are: the
removal of idle assets from the balance sheet, the receipt of income and the safeguard from
future further loan granting operations to the LDC.38 Asset swaps or synthetics are
conversions from fixed to floating rate bonds and involve a swap spread considerably
higher than interest rate swaps.
Concluding in terms of our model (2.1), there are three causes for the emergence of
swap agreements, financial market volatility, regulation and economic growth. The
existence of new technology made them feasible and supervisory intervention also shaped
the development of these financial innovations. Interest rate swaps are less risky than
currency swaps but the plethora of particular terms and choices available on these
agreements makes it impossible to have a general rule about their credit exposure. It is even
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possible to observe some positive network externalities. Swaps enabled better management
and addressed market imperfections (asymmetry information). In the following section, we
shall turn to an even more important and radical derivative instrument, the option.
4.5 Options
During this section we shall discuss one of the most important derivative products, the
option. Its conception enabled financial institutions to design further innovative products
and its successful providers could have significant advantages.
4.5.1 Characteristics of Options
A financial option is a contract that confers to its holder the right to trade - sell or buy - a
specific financial asset, for a given price at or until a particular date. In contrast with
derivatives discussed so far, it is not an obligation. The price is called an exercise or strike
price, the date is referred to as the maturity or expiration date and the price of the option is
called a premium.
There are two types of option: calls that enable the holder to buy an asset and puts
that enable the holder to sell the underlying asset. The person who has this right is called
the holder of an option, the person who is selling this right is called the writer. If the holder
is able to exercise his right at any moment during the period the option is called an
American Option. If he has the choice only at the maturity date then it is a European
Option. And if few exercising dates are available it is called a Bermudan Option. Options
could have as underlying (real) asset or financial asset: interest rate, commodity, equity (in
lots of 100 shares), stock index, Futures and currency.
Over the counter (OTC) options existed even during the great depression period39,
but it was only after 1973 that options re-emerged, after Congressional and Securities and
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Exchange Commission approval, and began their geometrical expansion.4o The majority of
traded and OTC options have straightforward rules and they are called vanila options. It is
also possible to have a particular customized structure and call them exotic options.4I
If the difference between the spot and the exercise price is favorable to the holder's
position then the option has an intrinsic value; if it is unfavorable then it is called the future
value.42 Buyers of options are attracted due to the low cost they have to pay for 'insurance'
against undesirable movements in the price of the underlying asset. Options also offer a
very low cost leverage ability and could also provide enhanced liquidity due to easy access
to opposite (closing) contracts. This low cost feature is also further enhanced, if we take
into account the cost involved in the alternative, old fashioned protection i.e. acquiring or
disposing of the asset in question.
As we have already mentioned, it is possible to incorporate an option on a particular
asset or even on a derivative product such as Futures and Swaps. The concept of option, i.e.
the choice to exercise or not, and similarly the situation where a financial position is
hedged, maintaining at the same time the right to take advantage of any positive
development, was not entirely new.43 But it has shaped irrevocably the financial sector. In
terms of our model (2.1), options could be considered as radical financial instruments, off
balance sheet, not entirely responsive despite the obvious causes of markets volatilty, and
risk transferring. We are going to discuss in depth the pricing and risk exposure of
financial options.
4.5.2 Income and Exposure from Options
Options pricing or the premium, is calculated using the Binomial model or the Black-
Scholes pricing method.44 The premium is calculated taking into account the time-period
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spot price, exercise price, volatility of the underlying asset, interest rates and storage cost of
the asset.
Brokering can yield fisk free income for the bank as part of its intermediation
without involving any additional credit risk except the transaction costs. Sellng (OTC)
options is not much more risky at least from the credit risk view. But writing an option
could create significant exposure if the holder decides to exercise his right and the bank for
any reason (such as negligence, fraud or deliberate exposure) does not possess the asset and
is obliged to buy from the market at the current price. This case has unlimited market risk
exposure and the position of the bank is called a naked position. Buying options could
involve a settlement risk since the bank pays the premium without knowing if the client is
going to deliver the underlying financial asset.
As we are going to discuss in the last sub section, the pricing of an option is not
objective and uniform, it can vary with the parameters, underlying assumptions and set of
information and data that the bank uses. In the case that a bank offers a lower price
(premium) for the same OTC option due to a superior pricing model, it is possible to
acquire a competitive advantage through either lower prices or more advanced instruments
with lower costs. This could offer them the ability to appropriate the benefit of the
innovation and confer them tangible (abnormal profit) or intangible advantages
(reputation, know-how). A significant novelty of financial options was the emergence of
new organizational structures in financial institutions, specialized in the pricing and
control of exposure of financial options.
High premiums often discouraged users. In order to make their products more
attractive, banks offered OTC and consequently customer tailored options: currency
options of lower premium called Hybrid Currency Options which enable a more flexible
protection based on certain criteria.45 Most of the time they are European style hence the
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premium is further decreased (Briys and Crouhy 1988). It is certain that the emergence and
proliferation of options and option based instruments contributed to the filing of the
intermediation spectrum of the market. The creativity involved in the design of these
products is going to be discussed in a later section (4.6.2).
Concluding, options brokering is very safe where buying or sellng could include a
lot of risk exposure if they are not properly hedged.46 In terms of our model (2.1), options
were originated due to the volatility of the markets and transactions costs involved in
hedging. They were also helped by the significant advancement of relevant academic work
as a basis for pricing. They could also provide significant tangible and intangible
advantages to the issuer through appropriability of the benefit and contribute significantly
to the filing of the intermediation spectrum of the financial markets. They also create new
organizational structures. An additional aspect of financial options is that the concept of
option combined with the pricing method, could be perceived as new financial materials.
In the next section we shall discuss second generation or advanced derivative products such
as swaptions and credit derivatives.
4.6 Second generation or advanced derivative products
During this section, we shall discuss more elaborated, second generation, financial
instruments. We are going to focus on swaptions and credit derivatives. Other instruments
in the same category are the Asian options47 or average price48 and quantos49 (or quantity
adjusted) options. These instruments are often called exotic options due to their less
straightforward pricing methods than the standard derivatives or vanila options (King
1998). All of these could be classified as incremental financial innovations.
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4.6.1 Swaptions
It is possible to combine both characteristics of option and swap agreements. A swap which
includes also the right to change the type of income stream it receives at any time
convenient to the holder is called a swaption. When a floating rate swap could be converted
to a fixed income stream, it is defined as a call or a payer swaption; the opposite case is a
put swaption. It is possible to be European or American.
It is also possible to include the right to end the agreement: a synthetic swap. If the
holder receives a fixed income it is called a callable swap and if he receives a floating
stream, it is a putable swap. If the holder could stop the agreement without any penalty or
extra cost it is called an exit option. Swaptions could be perceived as long term options on
a portfolio ofFRA's (Malhotra and McLeod 1995).
Swaptions do not appear to have appealed until now to large number of users (see
table (T -4.1) on the emergence of the swaption from 1988). This could be the result of their
complicated nature or because users are able to replicate the desirable payoffs by using
other financial instruments or just because their price is not yet appealing to users. But stil
they represent a very attractive financial instrument due to their asymmetric hedging aspect.
The particular characteristics of swaptions make them impossible to be
standardized and to be available on the Exchange. Hence the vast majority of these
financial instruments are OTC. 50 Selling swaptions is considered to be much more risky
than isolated options or swaps (see appendix (A-4.1) on risk spectrum). These financial
hybrids involve both market and credit risk and require extremely elaborate pricing
techniques. Banks' risk profie is particularly affected by the potential replacement cost in
the case that the user decides to terminate or alter the status of the original agreement.
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Swaptions could be classified as incremental financial instruments, predominantly
offbalance sheet, that enable the transfer of risk. It is possible to perceive them as a hybrid
type of exploratory innovation since even if at least one of their component (swaps) is a
responsive innovation. Its is clear that their main cause was to provide more attractive
financial instruments for potential users and fillng the intermediation's spectrum.
4.6.2 Credit derivatives
A credit derivative instrument is a financial contract whose payoff is contingent on changes
in the credit quality of the underlying assets.51 They appeared in 1993 mainly for banks'
protection or to allow them to free their credit lines.52 The investor receives a premium
and, in the case of a predetermined event, he pays a predetermined amount to the holder
of the contract. Very often cash settlements are the most common form of contingent
payment since physical delivery is not possible (International Treasurer 1997). As is
obvious from their name, their main purpose is to address or reduce the credit risk of a
financial asset. Initially it was suppliers, particularly investment banks, that originated this
financial innovation in response to their own requirements.
The emergence of this innovation was facilitated by the fact that banks had
accumulated a significant portfolio of loans and bonds, corporations had large exposure to
single customers or equity investors faced considerable sovereign risk (Euromoney 1996a);
in other words situations that are characteristic of concentration and correlation of risk.
The main credit derivative is the credit option that acts as a put option. It is possible
to discern two types of instrument, one hedging against the deterioration of the asset and
one guaranteeing the spread or return on the asset (Pierides 1997). A particular type of
credit option is the default swap53 or credit swap. It is like a put option on a portfolio of
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bonds or loans which enables the holder to receive a payoff in the case of a particular event
(Euromoney 1996a), in other words it guarantees the principaL.
Related credit derivative products are loan portfolio swaps54 and total return
swaps. 
55 Another type is credit linked notes where the issuer is able to reduce payments in
the case where a financial variable (credit cards receivables) deteriorates (Neal 1996). Later
credit derivative instruments became tailored to cover project risk, or hedging against other
eventualities, including hedging even against even business disruptions (International
Treasurer 1997) such as the consequences for employees' remuneration in the case of
bankruptcy, (Euromoney 1996a). A credit derivative contract, also enables the holder to
tailor better the time dimension of an investment.56 Credit derivatives are only limited by
the creativity of the designer of the instrument - taking into account that the option element
always involves very elaborate techniques - and the competence of the specialized staff to
price the product. Consequently, credit derivatives require the emergence of new structural
organization, as with financial options, in order to create and price their products.
In 1995 the total amount of credit derivative contracts reached the amount of $20
bilion (Neal 1996) in the US and a similar amount in 1996 for the UK,57 In early 1998 the
global figure was $165 bilion and the forecast for 2000 was to reach the notional amount
of $2,000 bilion.58 Unquestionably in the future due to the diversity of potential
applications, it is going to be a heavily contestable field of expertise for the establishment
and exploitation of tangible and intangible advantages.
Credit derivative products face significant uncertainty in relation to their regulatory
status despite the fact that in the future, it is not inconceivable to receive a boost due to
regulation. 
59 Furthermore, the tax treatment could be very ambiguous, depending on the
use of financial instruments such as option, guarantee or swap (International Treasurer
1997). Furthermore, credit derivatives could open completely new markets for banks,
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mostly in the wider area of insurance.6o Finally, insurance companies, and particularly
property and casualty specialists, also entered this domain by using the option structure in
1997 in order to provide credit option productS.61
Despite the fact that credit derivatives emerged in order to satisfy the preferences of
financial institutions, their dynamic evolution could confer them the characteristic of an
exploratory innovation. On the other hand credit derivatives are incremental innovations
since it is clear that they are an option based product even if they acquired a relatively
radical nature. It is possible to describe credit derivative instruments as a hybrid
exploratory and incremental financial instrument, currently offbalance sheet, that transfers
risk (credit and price) and considerably fils the intermediation spectrum. They could be
based on existing routines (financial options), be technology driven, require considerably-
specialized staff and creativity. They could create new markets, and organizational
structures.
4.7 Risk management and banks
During the previous sections we discussed the benefits that derivative products confer on
banks, and thus much of the reason for their development. But in time, derivatives also
imposed costs in the form of new and higher risk exposure. During this section we are
going to discuss some limitations on pricing techniques, and how banks could deal with
these new situations and challenges inter alia by further dynamic innovation.
4.7.1 Problematic pricing
When we analyzed the main derivative instruments we referred to the pricing of these
products. One fundamental advantage of derivative products is that the holder is not forced
to pay the whole amount in order to hedge his position. Additionally the lack of need to
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find a matching counter-party further reduces the transaction costs and thus pricing. Pricing
should reflect mainly the risk to which the particular product exposes the bank. The pricing
could be the result of the interaction between supply and demand forces, like the Exchange
traded Futures or options where only a fee is applicable and the burden of the exposure is
on the clearing house. This fee would normally reflect the exposure that the bank suffers.
On the other hand the pricing of OTC derivatives, especially financial options,
swaptions and credit derivatives, usually is based on pricing models. But pricing models
and theories rely on certain assumptions.62 Unfortunately these assumptions are not always
applicable to the real world. Information is not either free or universal and economic agents
are not always profit maximizers or independent. Transactions costs exist and sometimes
are material, hence they could influence the decision to take a position on a particular asset.
During the same process, liquidity is not always given or perfect and could contribute
further to the agent's decision. Additonally, all customers do not possess the same credit
facilities and lines. Finally historic data are not a certain indication of future movements or
indicative of future price volatility.
Even Black and Scholes, the most important pricing formula for call options, used
fundamental assumptions which are seriously challenged by empirical evidence, especially
the validity of past data, as an indicator of the future potential movements of prices and the
relationship between the underlying stock and the introduction of the option to the stock
market. It is also possible to observe that different users take into account different time
periods in order to calculate volatilty or that the risk free rate (used in the formula) could
be either constant or change during the duration of the financial instrument. 63
A further important aspect of the pricing models is the replication of the payoff of
derivatives implying redundant assets and complete markets. None of the above
corresponds to financial markets (Gibson and Zimmerman 1994). We can also add the
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complication which emerges from the introduction of new products in incomplete markets.
It was suggested by Hart (1975) that opening new markets in incomplete markets could
make things worse matter than better, and consequently the prices charged not the lowest
possible or the optimal ones.64
The regulatory authorities both in the US and UK are also preoccupied by these
limitations.65 It is obvious that the pricing of derivatives instruments could be problematic.
But additional measures could be taken and we are going to discuss them in the following
sub sections.
4.7.2 Proliferation of derivatives and reduction of risk
We have established that a bank could face many different and auto-correlated risks. We
are also aware of the limitations of derivatives pricing models. Consequently banks using
derivative instruments could reshape their risk exposure approach in order to reduce it.
Before discussing this potential reduction, we wil briefly discuss the expansion of these
financial instruments.
It is also worth mentioning the exponential increase - more than 25 times- of the
notional amount of derivative contacts of the US banks between 1985 and 1993 (Simons
1995).66 The concentration of derivatives in the largest banks amounted to 86% of notional
capital of the top nine US commercial banks in 1991 to 94% in 1995.67 During the same
year these top nine banks accounted for more than $16 trilion of outstanding notional
capital (Edwards and Ellen 1996). During the same period the top eight British banks had a
similar high exposure of more than $ 7 bilion (IOSCO 1996). It is possible that large banks
could exploit their economies of scale, enhancing expertise and consequently intangible
advantages.68 In 1995 the global figure for outstanding OTC derivative products was $45.5
trillon. In 1997 the Securities and Exchange Commission forced banks and thrift
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institutions in the US to disclose more information and risk exposure on their derivative
activities.69
In the light of this massive growth and the corresponding exposure of banks to new
risk, we are going to discuss some actions that banks have to undertake in order to reduce
their exposure. These actions are related to deep knowledge of the instruments, the
existence of guarantees or insurance and monitoring of the customer's performance. They
are also possible to be perceived as future incremental innovations, some of them
addressing shortcomings of the existing financial instruments.
Banks must be able to identify what specific instrument is appropriate for the
financial situation of their client and advise him appropriately. Referring to the spectrum of
derivatives products (available in appendix (A-4.1J), banks should move from high riskto
low risk products in order to reduce their risk exposure.
Banks could demand more frequent settlement especially for swap agreements and
insist on imposition of collateral and consequently shape the pricing of the products
depending on the number of settlements or the type of collateraL. 70 In accordance with the
0-30 report, only half of derivative providers require collateral in case the buyer exceeds
his credit limit.7I They could begin default insurance specifically addressing credit risk.72
From the same perspective, the emergence of credit derivative products could
reduce considerably the credit risk that a particular institution faces.73 But the supervisory
authorities ignored any similar development in their capital adequacy requirements (Neal
1996). This fact tended to change, as we are going to discuss in the following section.
Banks should apply in their derivatives products portfolio the marking to market
evaluation. An ilustrative example is interest rate swaps where banks calculate the
potential unrealized losses if current interest rates persist.74 This mark to market valuation
should take into account, if it is applicable, the replacement or substitution cost of the deaL.
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This evaluation could be problematic due to adverse market conditions hence they should
use statistics - with a certain confidence level - to evaluate the potential cost.
In the case of swap agreements, excessive exposure could be reduced if banks
follow the netting approach that the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA)
proposed i.e. master agreements for all off-balance sheet items so that players could net
their obligations. It is still a problem that banks do not publish any detailed list of their
swap, futures and options activity.75
Financial institutions should recognize the credit status of their counter party and
consequently apply not only quantitative but qualitative controls toO.76 Pricing should also
take into account the credit status of the counter-party. Price tiering could avoid high
quality firms being overcharged and low to being undercharged. It could be combined with
active substitution policies.
We did not address systemic risk from the increased amount of derivative
instruments for two reasons. The first is that it is not in the scope of our research. The
second one is that there is not a consensus about their impact on market volatility and the
risk taking capacity of the system.77 It is fair to mention that some researchers believe that
the extensive use of derivatives does not increase the volatility of stock returns and the
existence of supervisory forced (regulation T78) margin requirements do not control the
volatility of the underlying stock's return.79 A related argument was that the more elaborate
and developed the stock market, the lower the volatility.80 Derivative products could also
be perceived as tools that apart from risk sharing, enable information gathering under
imperfect market conditions81 for different aspects such as transaction costs.82 They enable
also the implementation or replication of complex risk strategies with a lower cost than the
cash market. However, we perceive increased systematic risk from the quantity of
derivative instruments used (Michie and Grievie Smith 1995).
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All these measures could be undertaken in order to reduce the risk involved in
derivative financial instruments, can be integrated and further enhanced by the introduction
of a new process financial innovation, the Value at Risk evaluation modeL.
4.7.3 The emergence of Value at Risk (VaR) model and future trend
The massive proliferation of derivative products and potential limitation on their pricing
strategies, created a need for an integrated process innovation that could measure the risk
and exposure undertaken. This new financial process is called VaR.
The Value at Risk (VaR) model, measures the worst expected loss over a given
time interval under normal market conditions at a given confidence leveL. It is important to
define the time dimension of this model and depending on the liquidity of assets, the time
horizon varies. It is perfectly conceivable that a financial institution has to base its model
on a different time horizon than another. 83 Another important factor that VaR models take
into consideration is the confidence level of their estimation.84 Additionally, the period that
data cover and furthermore the weighting on these data85 could differ from financial
institution to financial institution.
There are three main methodologies in estimating the VaR value. The first uses a
normal distribution for yields change or the Delta normal method. The second approach
uses an actual distribution for yield changes or the Historical-Simulation method.86 The
third approach comprise a volatilty correlation.87 A recent analysis by researchers in the
Bank of England, suggested that simulation based models capture some aspects of the
financial markets better most of the time.88
In October 1994, J.P.Morgan launched the RiskMetrics system89, the Delta-Normal
using a 95 % confidence level and a daily or monthly horizon. A few months later Bankers
Trust created an incremental innovation, thè RAROC 2020 using the Monte Carl090
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method, with a 99% level of confidence and an annual time horizon. Depending on the
above parameters the change could be material (Matten 1996). Later other financial
institutions followed the launch of their own models.91 The potential advantages could be
divided into two main categories: enhanced risk management for the innovator and
considerable income from its sales to other financial institutions.
A potential limitation of VaR is that it does not take into account crises and
unknown risks, of fundamental uncertainty that stress analysis is able to simulate. Other
complications, similar to option pricing problems, are the limitations of historic data, and
on the abilty of the financial institution to liquidate its portfolio (Institutional Investor
1995). We have also to mention that financial instruments most of the time present returns
which are skewed rather than normally distributed.92 In addition the relationship
price/payoff is not always linear as the standard model assumes93 and a time horizon longer
than 20 trading days reduces the estimation's reliability.94 Finally VaR models need to
allow for change in the quality of collateral assets.95 A more general and recapitulating
comment is that the VaR model is constructed on some theoretical premises (assumptions);
if these premises do not hold, its estimations are not reliable and further innovations are
required. Improvements or incremental innovations based on the initial VaR models began
to emerge, taking into account other credit related risks.96
The already mentioned G-30 proposal in 1993 and the BIS report in 1994 were the
first to mention the importance of internal models of risk exposure.97 In December 1995
the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a proposal in order to enhance the
estimation of market risk by a choice of three methods. In 1997 the Fed suggested the
connection between the capital charge and the internal risk measurement of the financial
institution98; the Bank of England too investigated aspects of VaR applications.99 Finally at
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the end of 1997, a Basle Committee amendment of the 1988 Capital Accord, was adopted
by the Bank of England and the Fed. ioo
The VaR model could be perceived as a radical and responsive financial process
innovation, is off balance sheet, that considerably improves risk management and could
provide significant advantages for its creator. This innovation is a clear example of the
dynamic approach that we have to adopt during the investigation of the financial
innovation phenomenon. A cluster of derivative-based innovations created an
unprecedented complex and a large risk exposure, combined with a regulatory burden (in
the 1990s). This exposure was able to be better controlled by the emergence of another
financial innovation. They try to analyze each of these risk attributes, isolate and sell any of
those not compatible with their client profile or desired risk exposure. The plethora of
derivative products, limited only by our imagination, could reshape and minimize the risk
that banks face.
4.8 Conclusion
During this chapter we have discussed a cluster of financial innovations that emerged after
the 1970s, mainly due to inflation and exchange rate volatility and shaped by government
and regulative intervention (swaps); institutional requirements (credit derivatives and VaR)
and transaction costs (swaps, options) contributed also to this innovative activity.
Many derivative products were routine based (Futures, swaptions, credit
derivatives) and of a cumulative nature. Derivatives required enhanced technological
capacity (swaps) as well as new academic contributions (options, credit derivatives).
Without these parallel development, their emergence was not feasible. They also presented
features such as increased appropriability of the potential benefit (options) and
considerable creativity (credit derivatives). Some of them were enhanced by the existence
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of positive network externalities (Futures and swaps) and large institutions benefited by
them due probably to economies of scale.
They could rarely be classified as radical (forwards and options) and mostly were
incremental. They were all of them responsive with the exception of those financial options
which could be classified as exploratory. Most of them were off balance sheet but, became
on balance sheet as the capital adequacy regulations changed, and they were mainly risk
and price transferring (FRAs, credit options). They are also based on new financial material
(Options and credit derivatives), created new organizational structures (options and credit
derivatives) and are able to open new financial markets (credit derivatives).
Their main reason of success was their ability to fil the spectrum of intermediation,
enhancing risk management (Forwards, Futures, swaps and VaR) and providing many
tangible and intangible assets (options, credit derivatives and VaR) to their innovators and
adopters.
During our discussion we encountered and explained a financial process
innovation, the VaR, that ilustrated the dynamic nature of the financial innovation process.
The magnitude of the already mentioned cluster of first and second generation derivative
products combined with their pricing limitations and shortcomings created a risk exposure
that a further innovation was required to deal with.
In this chapter, we discussed the emergence and proliferation of financial derivative
products under the analytical framework of our model of financial innovation. The
framework was shown to be capable of encompassing, and throwing light on, a second
cluster of innovations; the causal process, including the inducement to further innovations
in order to solve problems caused by the initial innovation, was shown to be quite different
from the first cluster. In the next chapter, we shall discuss a third cluster of financial
innovations, securitization.
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Endnotes of derivatives
1 The first derivative contract could be traced back to Ancient Greece around 400 BC. Olive producers were
selling their crop in advance (Management Today 1995). Derivative products and particularly options were
unofficially traded during the Dutch Tulip Bu1bb1e in 1647 and in the NYSE in 1817
2 Especially after the collapse of the international fixed Exchange rate system of Bretton Woods in 1973,
combined with the OPEC crisis, resulted in high inflation in the developed countries.3 At the end of the 70's and beginning of the 80's monetary and supervisory authorities in all developed
countries demonstrated a new attempt to control and regulate the financial environment, particularly the
capital adequacy requirement regulation especially after the Mexico 1982 crisis and crystalized in 1988 Basle
agreement that we wil discuss later.
4 As we shall discuss in the last section, after 1996, internal risk control model that banks use could influence
the amount of capital that they had to use in order to back their activities (Derivatives Strategy 1996,BIS
1997, World Bank Colloquium 1998).5 The non income activities are significant for the diversification of income sources of banks. In 1994 non
interest activities represented between 34% and 40% of all US commercial banks (Management Accounting
1995).61n 1995, an analysis undertaken in 12 European countries and the US suggested several reasons why
financial institutions do not use derivatives. The main six reasons were institution's restrictive regulations,
poor understanding by management, perceived unlimited liability, limited liquidity in derivatives markets,
regulatory restrictions and negative press coverage ('INTERSECÆMFA Survey').
7 A detailed classification of 'components of capital' and 'assets capital weight' is included in Matten (1996).
8The Basle proposals also harmonized the capital requirements among countries that historically had
significant differences such as the US, the UK and France and Japan. Exposure risk could be measured either
based on the current exposure i.e. the replacement cost plus a factor (much contested later) provided by the
BIS, or by calculating the original amount's exposure.
91t used futures expecting the oil price to rise and lost $ 500 milion (McClintock 1996).
10 Its investment fund used inverse floaters, betting on the reduction of interest rates, and they lost $2 billion
(ibid).llThey used Nikkei 225 stock index futures and expected an increase in the stock index: they lost $1 bilion
(Ibid). During the same year unauthorized derivatives trading cost the Daiwa bank $ 1.1 billon and the next
year the Sumitomo corporation $1.8 bilion (www.kpmg.ca).
12 It also highlighted the legal, systemic, credit and settlement risks (Recent Reports on the Financial
Derivatives, Geneva Papers, 1995).
13Legal risk was the only risk really discussed by this report (ibid).
14 The two most cited recommendations were the establishment of consistent mark to market valuation over
derivatives and the performance of frequent simulations of different scenarios. Other recommendations were:
-Establishment of independent and knowledgeable risk management.
-Set of standards for independent internal and external audit.
-Assessment of credit risks using consisting methodology.
-Introduction of clearing facilities for OTC derivatives.
-Enforcement of regulatory supervision of credit risks.
-Improvement of information access for regulators.
-Removal of legal uncertainties.
-Acceleration of work on hedge accounting and disclosure standards (idid).
15 This report discussed 67 large financial institutions from the G-lO and Hong Kong (Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision and IOSCO 1996).
16 It recommended that all derivatives should be in the balance sheet at fair value and distinguish hedging and
no hedging use (www.kpmg.ca).
17 In the x-axis we plot the time values and on the y-axis the amount of derivative instruments used. A very
good example is US futures on T bills (Remolona 1992-3).
18 The first Forward contract arose in the twelth century in medieval trade fairs used by Flemish traders (The
Economist 1996a).
19 Contracts like Futures appeared in Amsterdam in the 17th century and in the stock Exchange of Chicago and
New York in the 19th century (The Economist 1996a).
2°The same terminology with Forwards apply about having a short or long position.
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21 Short term futures are T-bils, CDs and Eurodollars, long term are GNMA certificates, Treasury bonds of
the US, France, Japan Germany and the UK long Gi1ts and notes where a fixed amount is paid periodically on
the security itself and not to the holder of the future contract.
22 Types of index futures are S&P 500 and NYSE Composite.
23Lega1 risk was the only risk really discussed by this report (ibid).
24 Sca1pers, day and position traders are traders with a time horizon of minutes, day or a few weeks.
25 During next chapter (5.104), we shall discuss in more depth the yield curves.
26In order to represent it, we use coupon payments of government securities as the best indication of market
expectations.
27 Arbitrage could be defined as risk free profit by taking simultaneously a short and a long position in a
particular asset.
28 In the beginning currency hedgers used rolling forward contacts in order to cover long periods but when in
1979 the Fed changed their policy and interest rates became more volatile, users demanded more elaborate
instruments (Ma1hotra and McLeod 1995).29 In 1989, corporations accounted for 24% and financial institutions for 62% of interest rates swap
agreements. In 1991, corporations increased to 31 % and financial institutions reduced to 31 %. During the
same period, government moved from 7% to 11 %.(FRBNY 1992-1993).30 These swaps could include a topping-up clause in order to compensate for significant Exchange rate
changes.
31 Another problem was the inflated consolidated balance sheet of the parent company.
32We omit the commodity swaps since they are not related with banks.
33Interest rates cups protect for undesirable increases, floors for decreases and collars define an acceptable
area in which interest rates could fluctuate. Additionally every time we discuss interest rates swaps, we refer
to the notional capital, which is the capital that we use in order to calculate the income stream from the
interest payments
34The income streams that parties have to provide and receive are called legs.
35Since a swap due to netting requires much lower periodic cashflows than a straightforward loan.
36 In contrast with the forward contracts they do not require funds transfer at day one or a fixed exchange rate
for the whole period since it is possible to negotiate different rates during the period.
37 These deals are not in fashion anymore due to inflation complications to the country and lack of secondary
market for the investor and tailored products and regulative constraints.
38 During the first five years after the Mexico crisis (1982), less than 3% of outstanding loans were swapped
for equity. The major banks did not participate because they were afraid that their participation could trigger a
more general downgrading of their loan portfolios (Finance and Development, 1988).
39 The Securities and Exchange Act 1934 addressed the issue of their mis-use.
40 A second regulatory effort to investigate the potential problems with options took place in 1977 called the
Options Study. Based on this report, high financial risk is justified by the lower commitment of cost and
capital and should be accompanied by as much awareness as possible. Famous options Exchanges are
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) , Marche a Terme d
Instrument Financiers (MATIF) in Paris.41Two examples of exotic options are Asian (based on average and not spot price) and Barrier options (if
during the exercising period the spot price reaches a predetermined level, the holder loses his exercising
right).
42 The notion of favorable means that by exercising immediately he wil make a profit (in the market).
43 Except from the particular isolated cases in the past, the concept is very similar to the insurance policy
principle.
44The Binomial Model enables the pricing of an option relative to the underlying asset by assuming two
possible outcomes and two time periods The Black and Scholes formulas (1973) could be perceived as a type
of Binomial model dividing the time into small fragments where interest rates and volatility are constant
(King 1998).45 One of the first examples is the 'cylinder option' of Citibank later called 'collar option'. It enables the user
to buy a call and simultaneously sell a put. A particular type of collar option is the zero cost collar (Gardener
and Molyneux 1995).
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46There are some indicators that help us to hedge our position. They are related to the premium's sensitivity to
certain factors and we use four Greek letters in order to measure them:
-Delta: the change in premium if price moves one point.
-Gamma: the change in delta with respect to price.
-Theta: the change in premium with respect to time.
-Kappa: the change in premium with respect to volatility.
47 Asian options are also Exchange traded; the London Market Exchange offered these types of options for
commodities, called TAPOs in 1997(King 1998).
48 An Asian option enables the user to hedge against the average spot price. The premium of an Asian option
could be lower than in a straightforward option due to the diversification effect (Gardener, Mo1yneux 1995).
49 A quanto option is a cross-currency option in which the pay-offs is denominated in a different currency to
the underlying assets. (Cooper and Weston 1995).
50 Deals could be arranged between two traders but they are subject to extremely long and time consuming
negotiations.51 These assets could be single assets or baskets, indices, requiring cash settlement or physical delivery
(international Treasurer 1997).52 The first deal was made by Bankers Trust and Credit Suisse Financial Products who sold notes that their
redemption values depended on default events (Euromoney 1996a).
53 They are designed for investors wiling to accept small losses but, want to hedge themselves against large
ones (Nea1 1996).
54 Two financial institutions with different loan portfolios agree to swap their returns (www.srz.com).
55 In this case one party guarantees payment of interest on a bond and any difference in the price of the
underlying asset and the other party pays a Libor plus some basis points and any adverse change in the price
of the underlying asset (www.srz.com).
56 A very good example is the creation of an investment profile of shorter than the existing maturity due to the
purchase of a credit derivative contract for the remaining period (Euromoney 1996a).
57 According to the Financial Times, the London market was estimated to reach in 2000 the amount of $100
bilion (17/2/98).58 Most activity was concentrated in default swaps, and options on credit spreads were expected to grow
considerably. It is also estimated that Europe is going to be more active than US due to EMU (ibid).
59 The regulatory framework is not very elaborate because they are not clearly defined financial instruments,
like securities, swaps or insurance products, and most of the time are off balance sheet (Nea1 1996). As we
shall discuss in the following section, the purchase of credit derivatives contracts from the financial
institutions could lead to lower capital requirements.
60 We use this concept in order to cover any aspect of hedging for risk undertaken i.e. credit, default,
settlement risk.
61 Since insurance companies are in the risk-management activity they have to address other types of risk such
as the interest rate risk (Forbes 1997).62 Conrad (1989) challenged the assumption that the share price is not affected by the introduction of the
corresponding option, and observed a permanent increase and reduction of volatility. Where Rao and Ma
(1987) had found negative results. Detemple (1990) challenged the redundant element of available prices and
by observing the incompleteness of the market caused by the discontinuity of the connection between new
information and pricing adjustment, and making it impossible to replicate with dynamic strategy all possible
pay-offs. Kabir (1997) in contrast did not find any relationship between option listing and volatility of
underlying asset prices but he found a negative relationship between option introduction and the price of the
underlying asset.
63 The fair value and the current value could differ because of these different approaches (King 1998).
64 The concept of incomplete markets implies that the usual Pareto equilibrium is not attained An economy
with these characteristics is the typical second best situation (Hart 1975).
65 The Bank of England in 1995 issued a paper discussing the pricing models that financial institutions use
(Cooper and Weston 1995) and particularly for credit derivative in 1996 (International Banking and Financial
Market Developments, EIS 1997). The Federal Reserve raised in the capital adequacy guidelines for 1997,
the issue of pricing (World Bank Colloquium 1998).
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66 In the same article, a comparison between 1985 and 1993 showed that the amount of users did improve but
b . 'fnot )y signi icant percentages:
1985 1985 1993 1993
Total bank assets Percent of banks Notional amount Percent of banks Notional amount
using derivatives of derivatives using derivatives of derivatives
100-300 3.71 .58 5.88 4.51
300-500 6.78 .17 19.28 8.48
500-1000 14.01 1.63 30.86 8.91
1000-5000 40.59 1320 58.17 98.17
5000-10000 93.62 20.87 95.52 196.61
over 10000 100.00 247.17 100.00 6,885.40
All banks 10.91 283.62 17.22 7,202.08
67 According to the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, December 1995 (www.occ.treas.gov).68 The profitability of the named financial institutions in the vast majority was boosted by these derivative
related activities (Edwards and Eller, 1996).69 Institutions with stock market value more than $ 2.5 bilions were forced to provide risk information in
accordance to three different valuation methods: Tabular presentation of fair value of future cash flows,
sensitivity analysis of potential loss in future earnings or cash flows and VaR predictions for adverse
movement of the market (Journal of Accountancy 1997).
70In the US this began with savings and loans institutions where posting collateral was common practice.
7lIn defense of this fact we could mention that in 1992 only 0.01 % of the notional principal of derivatives
contracts defaulted (The Economist 1995a).
72 The World Bank pioneered this risk exposure reduction by buying in 1991 from Deutsche Bank a default
insurance for its swap deals with corporations.
73The consequences in aggregate level of systemic risk are not straightforward to evaluate. It really, depends
on institutional behavior in relation to their risk taking and the regulatory authorities approach.
74This practice was introduced by Manufacturers Hanover Trust in 1988.
75In the U.S the gross volume of each bank is reported to the Federal Reserves by the Schedule L (bank) and
H (holding).
76The credit should be allocated in relation to the particular characteristics of the customer and not based on
absolute and universal benchmarks.
77 For a detailed analysis of the negative impact of derivative products in the markets in see Mc Clintock
(1996) and especially Carter (1989).78 It is the regulation that governs credit extension by derivative product providers. It is also supplemented by
regulation GIU/X (Federal Reserve Regulations).
79See the study undertaken by Kupiec (1997) aiming at demonstrating that there is no relationship between
derivatives and volatility or that the existence of margin requirements could reduce the underlined
instrument's volatility as it was previously believed. Margin could only influence the volume of securities
credit lending and the open interest particularly in futures contracts (Kupec 1987).80 In accordance with a survey undertaken in 1995, the annual volatility of the five most advanced stock
markets index was the followin :
Country US
Percenta e 8.8
Source, 'Derivatives are good', www.fortitude.com
81 The factors of trading cost and market lack of liquidity (Gibs on and Zimmerman 1994).
82 Through the observed prices of put, call, exercise price (ibid).
83 The time horizon could vary from one day to a year. If we have a given VaR figure for a day it is easy to
calculate for a longer period. We multiply the daily value by the square root of the number of days (Jorion P,
www.gsm.uni.edu).
84This confidentence intervals depends on the percentage of probability that they assign to the estimation. It
depends on the standard deviation values leftward and rightward form the average (mean) value of the
estimation. Usually the confidence level is 67%, 95%, 97.5% or 99% or one, 1,65,2 or 3 standard deviations
(institutional Investor 1995).
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85 It is possible to use the last 75 or 100 days or even the last three years and apply or not extra weight to the
recent ones (ibid).
86 Both are explained by Jorion (www.gsm.uni.edu).
87 Initially it determines the factors influencing the current position and incorporates these factors in a multi
variance equation estimating price sensitivity (Balance Sheet 1996).
88 In the case of volatility, the parametric approach has a small advantage which is further reduced in well
diversified portfolios (Jackson et a1 1998).
89 In early 1997, they launched an enhanced version called Creditmetrics which tried to quantify credit risk
instead of the market. In a case of a swap or bond, it estimates the risk of loss of the principal and interest
fluctuation. It also allows for stress or event tests to run through the model (Risk 1997).
90 This method runs random simulations and their results could provide statistical likelihood of events (The
Economist 1995c).
91 For example in March 1996, CS First Boston launched their own PrimeRisk (DFM, 9/1996).
92 From the moment that a derivative product includes the element of option, its user is able to exercise and
consequently to reduce his exposure. Hence he does not face a set of potential outcomes normally distributed
due to his option. This problem is also called 'lepto-kurtosis' (DFM, 1996a).
93 We encounter this problem especially in options and it is called the 'curvature' problem. In simple terms
this problem consists of the observation that derivatives and underlying assets do not change by the same
proportion (Matten 1996).A further problem is the particular structure of option based financial claims that do
not follow normal distribution due to their hedging abilities (put option) (DFM 1996b).
94 Mainly because the market factor correlations are not sustainable (Balance Sheet 1996).
95 In order to provide more accurate information on the credit risk exposure of a financial institution, any
model should take into account changes in the quality of its collateral (Matten 1996).
96 The already mentioned Creditmetrics (Risk 1997).
97 They also proposed the VaR as suitable for a set of different institutions (lnstitutional1nvestor 1995).
98 From January 1998, the capital requirement of a financial institution will be based on the internal
measurement of risk, incorporating for the first time in their approach the qualitative aspect of the institution's
risk exposure (Hendricks and Hirtle 1997).
99Including the publication of a paper undertaken by researchers of the Bank (Jackson et a1 1998).
100 This amendment enabled banks to calculate their capital adequacy charges using their own internal models
(International Banking and Financial Market Developments, EIS 1997).
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Chapter five
'There is nothing new under the sun'
(Old proverb)
Part II Securitization
5 Securitization
Introduction
During this chapter, we are going to discuss the phenomenon of securitization and a
corresponding third cluster of innovations. During the discussion of securitization, we wil
consider the applicabilty of the concepts and features of our analytical framework and
model of financial innovation process.
We shall define securitization, since there is not a uniform definition, and then refer
to the main historical causes and events that contributed to its emergence. We shall also
discuss two further innovations that were pre-requisite for the emergence of Asset Backed
Securities, Special Purpose Vehicles (SVP) and credit enhancement.
The following section wil be devoted to the US history of securitization. We shall
refer in detail to the first mortgage-backed asset, the pass-through, GNMA security in
1970. It was a radical, new financial instrument that acted as the prototype for many similar
routine innovations such as CPs and MCMs or more altered versions such as pay-through
securities like CMOs. All of them were government backed and mostly emerged due to
liquidity-enhancement reasons. Then, we shall expand the discussion to other types of asset
backed securities: non-government-backed ones, such as CARs, CARDS and CCDN.
During the 1980s and 1990s economic growth boosted further the ABS-related
innovations. All of them fil the market spectrum and enhance the risk management of
financial institutions.
The next section wil discuss the emergence of securitization in the UK. The British
story is less elaborate and its spectrum narower than the US one. The lack of government
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backing, different legal system and the more favorable condition of its financial
institutions, acted as constraints on the proliferation of ABS. Still many types of ABS
emerged such as MINI and HOMES; and, much later, other securities appeared, based on
lease and auto receivables. The main causes of their emergence were more competition-
related reasons and institutions' preferences than the liquidity enhancement and
government-originated reasons in the US. They also contributed to better risk management
and filing the spectrum of financial instruments available in the markets.
Finally, we shall discuss the risk issues involved, and the emergence of additional
benefits and problems from the proliferation of securitization. These benefits cover areas,
not addressed initially, such as cost structures, strategic objectives and intangible assets.
The problems are related to characteristics of the ABS, expertise, risk management and
regulatory imperfections. These could be addressed with further routine innovations.
Securitization, after all, was a cluster of innovations with beneficial features for financial
institutions.
5.1 Historical perspective and description of the process
During this section, we shall define securitization, discuss the history of securitization
without referring to particular country details, explain two further reasons that enhanced
securitization globally and finally discuss the structure of the securitization process and the
emergence of two additional process and organizational innovations, essential for the
emergence of Asset Backed Securities.
5.1.1 Definition of securitization
It is possible to attribute to securitization a dual meaning: a general and a more narrow one.
This term could be used in order to describe the general phenomenon of raising a
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considerable fraction of finance through the agency of securities. Or it could be used in
order to describe the process by which loans and other receivables are packaged,
underwritten and sold in the form of securities. We are interested in the second definition
as a firm specific innovation.
In other words securitization is a process that separates the originator from the
ultimate investor since the finance emanating from a security enables the originator to be
another economic agent than the investor. Its impact is also to turn income producing assets
into marketable securities and not only use them as backing - collateral - for borrowing.
In the following sub section we shall discuss the history of securitazation from a
more general standpoint, not directly related with the US and the UK.
5.1.2 The story of securitization
Mortgage-loans are closely related to the initial stages of this phenomenon. The beginning
of this phenomenon is situated at the end of the 1960s in both the US and the UK. A
significant proportion of the balance sheet was allocated to mortgages. The purpose was to
use residential mortgages in order to back the issue of new securities 1 and acquire more
funds for new mortgages (Hull 1989). Traditional lending activity requires two main
functions: the initial review of the application for the loan2 and the monitoring function
during the duration of the loan. These two functions are also applicable to the case of
securitization.
It is possible to perceive securitization as a cluster of innovations responsive to the
negative effects or shortcomings, emanating from the proliferation of a previous
innovation: mortgage loans, and part of the dynamic aspect of the financial innovation
process. The proliferation of these innovations created some problems for banks since the
financial institution was also forced to back these loans by equity capitaL. The capital
171
Part II Securitization
adequacy ratio measures the degree of backing that an institution has at any time. The cost
of this capital was estimated to be much higher for the institution than short term debt
funds (Rosenthal and Ocampo 1988). In other words the cost of providing loans is
significantly higher than the cost of providing short term finance. But one of the oldest and
most profitable activities of banks is to provide loans.
Regulation was a financial burden (Silber, 1975 and Kane, 1981) but the situation
was historically addressed by the existence of govermental backed institutions such as the
Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve and the Bank of
England. These institutions, enabled banks and regulated financial institutions to have less
equity capital backing for their lending activities than finance companies.3 This fact in the
middle of the 1980s, after the Mexico crisis, was resented and perceived as a sign of future
dangers by the regulators and many other institutions.4
Even with the existence of government backed institutions, the burden of these
loans for banks is significant. The equity capital is expensive and banks were facing a
dilemma: either to stop granting loans and reduce the amount of equity capital they have to
maintain but lose a considerable source of income, or to continue their granting activity and
back it with capital. Securitization offered a much easier and more convenient solution. It
is possible to make loans and then unload them from the balance sheet and thus reduce the
capital requirements.
Hence any capital requirement could be costly for the financial institution, act as a
barrier and restriction for asset allocation and provide the incentive for securitization. This
incentive could be identified as the regulation in our model (2.1). We are going to discuss
two other factors that influenced the securitization process.
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5.1.3 Further reasons that facilitated the expansion of securitization
Before the discussion of the particular reasons that enabled the emergence of this financial
innovation, we are going to refer to two significant events that shaped the monetary and
banking history of the United States and the United Kingdom. These events were the
syndicate lending crisis and the proliferation of off balance sheet finance.
5.1.3.1 The syndicate story
Before the emergence of Syndicated lending world financial markets experienced the
proliferation of Eurodollars where national regulation restrictions were not applicable and
their credit creation process is based on the banks' own criteria and judgment. 5
Citibank became a leading international player. Other major banks followed her
example and built up large exposures in foreign debt arguing that a country could not go
bankrupt.6 This become the famous 'sovereign - risk hypothesis,.7 When a large bank was
leading a syndicate and earning substantial fees, many smaller institutions wanted to be
involved even if they did not have the amount required and they had to borrow it. The
hypothesis of no sovereign risk was proved completely wrong in 1982, during the Mexico
crisis,S which crisis began by the significant shortening of maturities that appeared in the
beginning of the 1980s. The problem was more acute because of cross-default clauses that
created a chain reaction and the credibility of these institutions was severely damaged. US
banks had lent the equivalent of 1.3 times their capital.9
None of the international monetary authorities was wiling to back the default
countries. Not even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) whose president, Mr.
Witteveen on several occasions had praised and endorsed the lending activity of banks in
Euro-currencies. And he was not the only one.lO
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Hence significant constraints were applicable to the allocation of banks' assets and
a further reduction of loan portfolio was desired. But another factor that also influenced the
emergence of securitization was the exponential increase of the off balance sheet banking
activities.
5.1.3.2 The similar path of Off Balance Sheet finance and securitization
Banks faced regulatory requirements applicable to their assets. Off balance sheet (OBS)
activities were estimated in 1987 to be 200% of on balance sheet assets for many leading
US banks (Gardener 1988). These developments could justify the title, the 'invisible bank'
and created significant problems for the evaluation of bank's risk exposure. These activities
usually take two forms: either trading of instruments or fee generation, Lewis (1988),
classifies banks activities in term of on and off balance sheet in figure 5.1.
Deposit Contract Loan Contact Long-term funding
Lender Short-term funding Deposits Guaranteed Credit access Borrowerpayable at par Guaranteed funding
Withdrawable at short Set interest rate/markup
notice or on demand Choice of currency
Access to loans Flexible draw down
repayment choice
On balance sheet activities
Off balance sheet activities
r - - - -- - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - --- - - - - -- - -- - - - -- - - - - - -- - ~I I:
I
I Credit Risk
i
_--________
I
Siirt-term funds
-----------
i
I
I
Liquidity Needs
Lender
o
i
Credit pfcess
Standby LC/acceptance i
i
I
Revolver /NIF Long-term funds
i
I
I
Creditüne I Liquidit~ Needs
Iverdraft i
I i
i BorroweCap/Collar Interest late risk
i
I Interest rate Swap I Interest ra~e basis
i
. i
I
Cross-currency Swap I Choice of ;irrency
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Drawndo~n
I Futures/Options I
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I
Figure 5.1, On and off Balance sheet activities
Source: Artis and Lewis (1991, page 251)
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The main hypotheses about the proliferation of OBS finance are the regulatory tax,
moral hazard and bank failure hypotheses. The first approach highlights the regulatory
burden. The second one advocates the role of regulatory agents as guarantor of consumers'
wealth. The final one underlines the confidence of customers in the bank acceptance letter
instead of direct claims (Artis and Lewis 1991).
From the 1980s a considerable expansion of other OBS activities took place, related
to derivative products such as futures, options and interest rate swaps. Securitization is at
the core of off balance sheet activity. It is possible to relate the already mentioned
expansion with asset backed securities. i i
Additionally, disintermediation was accelerated by the fact that actual capital
adequacy ratios were reduced after the 1982 crisis and banks tried to relax this pressure by
either altering their balance sheets via securitization (either entering the underwriting
process or debt placing business) and other non-capital based activities (very often off
balance sheet). They adopted a clear cut orientation towards investment banking, making it
extremely difficult to discern where a traditional bank ended and a new financial
conglomerate began. Hence securitization is related with OBS activities that were increased
considerably especially in the 1980s, due, not only to the pressure to minimize capital
requirements, but also because of the emergence and consequences of syndicated lending.
We turn now to discuss the structure of the securitization process.
5.1.4 Structure of Securitization
We are now going to describe the process of securitization and discuss the type of
financial assets that a financial institution could securitize. In a few words the process
normally consists of removing the assets from the balance sheet of the financial institution
(called the originator), transferring them into a new legal entity and creating and issuing
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securities such that their yield depends exclusively on the return of these initial assets, in
other words securities that are backed by the underlying assets.
During that process financial institutions face two types of cost: the one-off fixed
cost associated with the establishment of the appropriate systems that identify, group and
monitor the assets, and expenses related to any individual issue such as legal, rating,
underwriting and credit enhancement fees.
Structured financing is a complex process taking into account the legal accounting
and tax limitations of both parties, and also additional features such as separating the
originator from the new securities, enhancement of credit risk control and reduction of
cost. 12
The assets securitized must have predetermined cash flows, a low default ratio, well
diversified risk, total amortization of principal in maturity and highly valued and liquid
collateraL. We can distinguish four main types of ABS. The first is Asset Backed
Certificates like pass-through, the second is Asset Backed Obligations like Collateralized
Mortgage Obligations, the third is Asset Backed Stock such as trade and consumer
receivables and finally Asset Backed Commercial paper from financial assets (see latter
N orton and Spellman 1991).
In the next sub section we shall discuss an additional process or organizational
innovation that was essential for the securitization process.
5.1.4.1 Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
Financial institutions were forced to further innovate in order to facilitate the emergence of
securitized assets. The purpose of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is to protect investors
from any possible bankruptcy of the originators. The establishment of a SPV - a legal entity
completely independent from the originator - could be under the form of a corporation, trust
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or partnership (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988). It is bound not to undertake any other
activity that could undermine its solvency. I3 The administrative structure and systems of
both the SPV and the servicer, as well as the allocation of its assets, are also subject to
restrictions in order to avoid excessive exposure.I4 The legal form of the SPY is very
important due to taxation reasons in relation to the type of securities that it is going to be
able to issue.I5
The originator sellsI6 the assets to the SPV and the latter is responsible for the
issuing of Asset Backed Securities (ABS) in the form of public underwritten offerings or
private placements. As we have already highlighted, the separation between the originator
and the SPV is crucial in the case of the bankruptcy of the former. I7
The SPY is also subject to rating. This rating is closely related to the type and
allocation of assets that the institution acquires. The rating agency takes into account a
worst-case scenario based on historical data and the credit strength of the source of
receivables in question.I8 It is essential for these assets to be well diversified in order to
reduce default risk and for the nature of their payment and cash-flows to be predictable.
The rating agency is engaged in monitoring during the whole life of the security and it is
possible to downgrade it. 19 It pays particular attention to the experience of the issuer and
the expected life of the security because it has been observed that during the first period of
the security losses are higher and very significant for the investors' returns.20
The structure of the SPY could be altered due to taxation reasons. A remarkable
tax-and-reporting-induced regulatory dialectic has taken place in 1984 in the US, when the
initial structure of ABS had to be transformed, in order to avoid reporting complications.21
The Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) could be perceived as either an organizational
or process-responsive innovation of no radical nature. Its purpose was to facilitate and
support the emergence of securitized assets and its cause mostly based on the regulation
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governing bankruptcy. A further process innovation was required by the development of
ABS credit enhancement, which we consider next.
5.1.4.2 Credit Enhancement
During and after the transfer of the underlying assets, these assets have to receive a credit
enhancement. The purpose of this enhancement is to provide some form of guarantee, and
thus increased confidence, to the potential buyers of the ABS. There are many different
types of credit enhancement.
· A high graded financial institution - usually an investment bank - could provide a Letter
of Credit22. It is an irrevocable credit line that guarantees a loan in case the receivables
are not enough to meet the obligations to the investors.
· A Spread account is created in case the yields of the assets are higher than the return of
the securities, and a surplus is accumulated. This covers any future problem of increased
default on the securitized assets or any unanticipated significant repayment.
. The creation of Reserve funds could be the result of any beneficial mismatch of yields
for the SPY, explained already above, or any repayment taking place in the first periods
of the ABS' expected life. This fund or spread account could initially receive a loan
from the originator until the time that the difference between returns received and paid
reaches a predetermined leveL.
. Over-collateralization is another type and it could take two forms, either the division of
the security into two classes23, or the pooling of a significantly larger amount of
financial assets than the amount of issued securities.
. Another way is by creating a Cash Collateral account in the form of an initial injection
of cash from the originator institution to the SPV. The purpose of this account is the
same as for the reserve and spread account.
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· An additional type of credit enhancement is by structuring a senior/subordinated form.
This structure divides the security into two. parts, as in over-collateralisation, or two
classes. It is possible to sell these different tranches to different investors with different
risk profiles. Sometimes the issuer could hold the riskier ones and subordinate his own
tranche in case interest or principal payments cannot be forwarded to the holders of the
securities.
. An insurance contract that could underwrite either the principal or the interest payments
or both. The credit rating of the guarantor institution is crucial for the final rating of the
securities.
. Finally a third party guarantee, coming from a semi-governmental institution such as the
FHLMC or GNMA in the US could provide adequate security to potential investors and
enable the security to receive a high rating.
In other words, financial institutions have found different ways, or to be more
accurate processes, depending on their particular characteristics in order to facilitate and
support the innovative process. These variations could be classified as routine or
incremental innovations that were shaped by creativity and strategic considerations of the
institutions. Both SPV and credit enhancement were created due to a mixture of legal
considerations and the preferences/requirements of financial institutions in order to
transfer the risk. It is possible to classify them as incremental, responsive new
organizational structures or processes that facilitate the emergence of asset backed
securities. In the following section, we shall discuss the emergence of this phenomenon in
the US.
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5.2 Asset Backed Products
In this section we discuss in more detail four types of assets backed products in the US.
The first category is the Asset Backed Certificate, which is like a pass-through; the second
is Asset Backed Obligations like Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs); the third
category consists of Asset Backed Stock such as trade and consumer receivables; and
finally Asset Backed Commercial paper from financial assets. These four types could be
allocated into two main groups: pass-through and pay-through securities. We are going to
discuss first the development of pass-through ABS in the US.
5.2.1 The history of Pass- Through
In order to understand the emergence of the first ABS, we have to refer to aspects of US
banking history. During the 1970s, there was a significant growth in mortgages 24 with the
active involvement of Savings and Loans institutions (S&L's),zs Hence financial
institutions had to find new ways to finance this significant increase taking into account the
considerably high interest rates of the period.
These institutions experienced a significant mismatch of maturities since they
received fixed income (mortgages-loan payments) when interest rates were galloping on
US during the period. Profits were squeezed and the interest rate spread was at times
negative during the 1970s. Hence using the backing of a government agency, they launched
a new financial product called pass-through security.
A pass-through security is a certificate that represents ownership in a pool of
mortgages which are homogeneous in term of interest rate, quality and terms. The monthly
interest payments, amortization and prepayments of principal are passed 'through' to the
owners of the certificates by the firms servicing the mortgage payments. The latter
withholds a portion of the interest received as fees for his service and the guarantee that he
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is providing for these payments. During that time the investor owns the mortgages. The
most common pass-through certificates are those issued by Government National Mortgage
Association or GNMA (Ginnie Maes) in 1970. A Pass-Through Bond is a mortgage-backed
debt obligation that yields an income to the holder through periodical payments based on
the interest, amortization and prepayments on the principaL.
Two variations or routine innovations of pass-through securities were the
'senior/subordinated' and 'strips'. The first divides a security into two parts: a certificate
that confers undivided interest to the holder and a second part - subordinated - withheld by
the seller acting as credit support in a way similar to over-collateralization. The seller
divides the security into many classes depending on the investors' profile, where some
classes were receiving the principal, others the interest plus principal, and the rest the
remainder of the interest (Hull 1989).
A significant problem arising from pass-through securities is the prepayment rate
which cannot be known in advance. Depending on the market interest rate for mortgages,
initial borrowers could decide to prepay a part of their outstanding mortgage. This
complication could distort significantly the maturity of the pass-through security as well as
its value.26
It is not possible to discuss the history of pass-through securities without discussing
even briefly the importance of the secondary market for their emergence and proliferation.
The mismatch of maturities could be overcome by reducing the holding period of these
assets, hence reducing the potential risk of change in interest rates. Profits could be
generated from the substantial economies of scale and the substantial fees for servicing a
large portfolio. Initially the first move was to sell the whole loans or participations to the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)27 or to private investors. Alternatively
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they could originate mortgage pass-through securities or bonds, both of them guaranteed by
the GNMA.
The emergence of pass-through securities was conditioned and facilitated by
government-backed institutions. Ginnie Maes were created due to a combination of
regulatory, institutional preferences and liquidity-enhancement reasons. They were
responsive, radical, new financial instruments that enhanced risk management and
contributed to the filing of the risk-return spectrum. In the following section we shall
discuss publicly-issued ABS and the role of FHLMC.
5.2.2 The role of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and
other pass-through securities
The role of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC)28 was catalytic in the
emergence and proliferation of the securitization phenomenon in the US. The FHLMC
buys mortgages in quantities, puts them together in more or less homogeneous packages
and sells them to investors?9 Hence it is the first non-private originator of securities.
From its creation, the FHLMC helped the more efficient functioning of the
secondary market by using standardized mortgage documents. They purchased mortgages
or participating interests. They developed two mortgage securities in 1971, the Mortgage
Participation Certificate (PCs) and Guaranteed Mortgage Certificates (GMCs). The PCs
provide monthly interest at a certificate rate together with the pro-rata share of principal
received by the FHLMC. 30
A comparison between PCs and Ginnie Maes enables us to state that PCs present
interests in more homogeneous mortgages, less frequent sale, higher minimum and group
denomination and non-timely payment of principal compared to Ginnie Maes. But they
offer significant safety, marketability and reasonable flexibility for their potential buyers. It
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is possible to perceive them as routine innovations that enabled the diversification of
potential customers in accordance with the strategic objectives of the institutions. The
potential buyers for these products initially were predominantly thrift institutions
(accounting for over 95% until 1977), later bank trusts and insurance companies became
the major buyers.3!
The PCs and CMCs were incremental, on-balance-sheet responsive new financial
instruments that transferred risk. Their causes related to institutional requirements and
preferences related to liquidity enhancement and backing by government. The attributes of
these instruments were further to fil the risk spectrum. Their particular characteristic was
that the issuer was not a private institution but a public one (FHLMC), even if banks were
heavily involved in the process. During the next sub section we shall discuss the second
category of ABS, the pay-through.
5.2.3 Pay-through securities
The next step in the securitization process was the creation of pay-through securities. The
first pay-through security was developed in 1983 by FHLMC and marketed by First Boston
Corporation. The main reason for this innovation was, as already mentioned, the cyclical
nature of payment of pass-through securities, particularly the fact that when interest rates
were fallng, such as in 1986, many borrowers decided to refinance their mortgages.32
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMO) are typical pay-through securities
where the issuer borrows money against the security of the mortgage and pays a cash flow
to the investor. They are backed either by a government agent (Ginnie Mae), or by a
government-sponsored agent (Fannie Mae33). In distinction from pass-through securities,
the owner of the asset is not the owner of the mortgages and the issuer can change the
timing of payments; hence the repayment problem is not completely eliminated.34 The
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timing of payments could further enhance the liquidity of the financial institution. Due to
this diversification we could think of them like corporate bonds.
Using the available technology, a typical structure of CMOs is to divide them into
different tranches depending on the investor's profie. The first tranche is described as the
'fast pay' where investors receive all principal repayments from the pool of mortgages, the
second tranche receives its repayment slower and the last one is like a zero-coupon bond
where no payment takes place until all other holders are paid. The later tranches received
two main boosts: initially in the mid 1980s, for a couple of years, in the US due to loophole
of corporations tax regime, and later, at the end of 1980s, from Japanese investors for
whom the CMO last tranche return was not considered as capital gain for tax purposes.35
As is obvious, in both cases, the innovation was shaped by taxation reasons or regulatory
(tax) imperfections.
The CMOs are available in units of $,1000, significantly lower than the GNMA
units of $25,000. A CMO is usually rated as triple 'A' due to the credit status of the
collateral involved. They are usually over-collateralised and backed by FNMA, GNMA or
FHLMC. A subsidiary or special purpose vehicle (SPV) undertakes the issue process and
its collateral is held by another financial institution. As we have mentioned above there is
stil considerable risk regarding the pace of repayments and their effect on the maturity of
the tranches (Forbes 1984). In case an investor wants to overcome this problem and have a
guaranteed maturity, it is possible to buy new incremental instruments called Planned
Amortization Class of bonds (P AC) with a priority prepayment schedule.
The CMOs increased tenfold in the US from just $5 bilion in 1983 to almost $50
bilion in the beginning of 1987, and reached the half trilion dollar level in 1992. An
additional point is that from 1981 until 1987 the percentage of securitized new mortgages
began from 26.8% and picked up to 92.5% in 1986.36 Apart from the cases already
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mentioned above, CMOS37 experienced significant popularity after 1984 when tax
regulation made them subject to specific beneficial taxation treatment for a particular type
of issuer of ABS38. Needless to say, technological development in the mortgage markets in
the 1990s, which made them more accessible, supported the innovative process behind
ABS.39
Another financial innovation based on the CMO structure was the CMO equity first
issued in 1986 by the Californian Public Employees Retirement System. The equity
component consisted of the extra cash from the servicing - coupon payments - of the
underlying CMO which was the result of over-collateralisation. Its main advantage is the
counter-cyclical nature of payments; as interest rates are rising, the spread between coupon
and yield is widening, less repayments are taking place and the lengthier the duration of the
CMO, consequently the higher the value of the equity. In September 1986, the Floating
Rate Collateralised Mortgage Obligations (FRCMO) first appeared.4o These created
significant problems for the floating rate note market because the floating tranche was
offering more attractive coupons and investors switched from perpetual floating rate notes.
The particularity of this product was the interest rate cap41 that was included in the security.
Regulation and particularly taxation could influence the attractiveness of ABS. It is
also certain that available public and in-house technology enabled the emergence of these
complicated securitized assets. Pay-through securities have some disadvantages compared
with pass-through. The main problem is the target clientele, i.e. tax and regulatory issues
distinguish them. The former ones are classified as real estate investment and consequently
are attractive to REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) and thrift institutions. The latter is
treated as a debt and it has a reduced market depending on the investor's profie. Therefore
the more uniform and predictable is the income stream, and if it is backed by high quality
collateral the more easy it is to securitize a pool of assets.
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In terms of our model (2.1), liquidity enhancement and the existence of government
backing caused the emergence of CMOs. It is worth observing that they are also an
example of dual causality innovation. They were incremental, on balance sheet,
responsive to the limitations of pass-through securities that transferred risk. Technology
enabled their emergence. They filed the spectrum of financial assets in the markets and
enhanced further the risk management of financial institutions. Taxation also considerably
shaped these securities since they took advantage of regulatory (tax) imperfections. In the
following sub section we shall discuss further incremental innovations that were not
backed by government.
5.2.4 Other types of asset backed securities
The main characteristic of these underlying assets is that they are not guaranteed by the
Federal authorities i.e. the government-related credit-enhancement programs such as the
GNMA, the FNMA or the FHLMC. Hence alternative arrangements have to be made in
order to compensate. The issues either have to create a new Spy or a truSt.42
In 1985 the first lease-backed notes were issued to a value of $192 milion43, the
backing assets were computer leases and the pace of their expansion was not very
impressive- reaching the next four years the amount of $36 bilion (Hull 1989). In the same
year automobile loans called CARS (for Certificates of Automobile Receivables) or
FASTBACs (for First Automotive Short Term Bonds )44 and were issued to a value of
$900 milion and in a year's time the amount grew tenfold to $10 bilion.45 Automobile
loans have a maturity of two to six years and stable prepayment patterns. Part of the interest
payment is withheld by the servicer and the remainder plus the entire principal prepayment
are passed through to the investor.46 The majority of lease receivables have stable payment
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cash flows and several years of maturity, easily identifiable and assessed collaterals and
lessees that are often highly graded.47
In 1985 commercial mortgages appeared on the ABS scene. One of the first cases
was the Olympia & York Maiden Lane Company for $200. Initially they were either
privately placed - suitable for short term securities, or targeted the Euromarkets. Other non-
conforming mortgages or jumbo mortgages appeared also in 1985 and mainly in 1986
through pass-through certificates48 paying a monthly payment of principal and interest. In
1987 the first publicly-offered commercial mortgages began to be regrouped, offering asset
backed securities. A major further development was the credit rate granting of commercial
property; hence it was possible for a commercial property to be viewed as a rated security
by itself.
Then in 1986 CARDS™ (Certificates for Amortizing Revolving Debts) were
privately49 and publicly50 placed. Credit cards or trade receivables present a particular
problem: short maturities and low and unpredictable balances. In order to overcome this
problem the SPY - where banks was not directly liable - should create a revolving structure
which enables it to prolong the maturity of the security.5I
In 1987 Credit Card Backed Notes (CCBN) were issued in public either as a true
sale or as a restructuring of an institution's finances,52 hence keeping them in their balance
sheet for regulatory purposes. The creation of this new structure without the existence of a
SPV could maintain its rating due to overcollateralization53, the existence of a spread
account or reserve fund or other guarantees. Briefly, the process that creates stable rates is
related to the allocation of a portion of the receivables to the investors, commitment to add
new accounts in the case of rapid repayments, and a third-party guarantee against any
adverse event. Unquestionably, these innovations were required and facilitated by the
available information technology.
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In order to make them more attractive for the Euromarkets, issuers added further
features by restructuring the payments flow to semi-annual or annual and provided lump-
sum principal payment at maturity. And in order to reduce the risk of prepayment or
default, issuers of Credit cards and auto-loans receivables-backed securities created a
master truSt.54 This master trust included a large number of assets and enabled them to
create many different securities based on the cash flow of these assets, hence the above
mentioned risks were reduced due to the large number of assets and securities issued. Both
of them could be perceived as routine innovations that made the innovation more attractive
to potential customers.
At the end of the 1980s the main providers of ABS were mainly commercial banks
(33.8%), then dealers or investment companies (21.1 %); thrift institutions only accounted
for 10.7%. Apart from financial institutions, manufacturers' subsidiaries issued 30% of all
ABS. Asset backed securities from 1986 until 1991 increased fivefold. 
55 In tables (T-5.l)
and (T-5.2) we can observe the geometrical increase of ABS in the US. We have to pay
particular attention to the increase of consumer credit, tripling in five years (1989-1995)
and particularly revolving credit which sky-rocketed in the 1990s. Another type of asset
whose securitization significantly increased was automobile loans, which increased
fourfold during the 1990s. But unquestionably the main share of the ABS market stil,
during the 1990s, was mortgage-based securities. As we have already discussed, more than
80% of outstanding mortgages are securitzed; and in accordance with table (T-5.3), in 1994
residential mortgages were more than $3 trilion and, adding commercial mortgages,
exceeded $4 trilion. 
56 These developments were also the direct result of considerably
increased economic wealth and an exponential rise in the underlying assets, observable in
the data in tables (T-5.1) and (T-5.2) on ABS, and (T-5.3) on mortgages.
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Unquestionably the standardization of underlying assets or predictability of cash
flows was extremely important for the process. In the 1990s, they begun to cover
completely new areas such as recreational vehicle loans, boat loans, lease receivables and
college student loans (The World of Banking 1992). It is essential to remind ourselves that
without the available information processing technology these special cases, in relation to
their characteristics, could not have been used as underlying securities for ABS (Hall
1989).
But we must bear in mind that, as we have already mentioned non-financial
corporations also entered the ABS market and issued long term bonds which by 1988
amounted to $38 bilion. Commercial paper issues reached $21 bilion in 1988 backed by
assets that were producing stable and predictable cash flows. The paricularity of these
securities is that they could include also a variety of assets such as credit card, auto lease,
trade, equipment and airlines receivables, i.e. limited only by the imagination and creativity
of the designer of the product. Hence institutions were able to re-deploy their equity capital
at their own discretion. 
57
All these pass-through securities in the US, could be explained by our model (2.1)
as incremental, responsive, financial instruments, on balance sheet innovations that
transfer risk. They emerged due to the need of financial institutions to enhance their
liquidity in accordance with their preferences and with economic growth. They were based
on existing routines, highly sophisticated Information Technology systems and sometimes
strategic considerations, such as customer targeting, encouraged routine innovations. They
offered an enhanced risk management and filed further the spectrum of financial
instruments. In the next section, we shall discuss the securitization in the United Kingdom,
in order to consider whether it showed the same pattern as the US.
189
Part II Securitization
5.3 The UK experience
The history of British-originated ABS was different from the US. Despite the fact that in
the United Kingdom interest rates also fluctuated during the 1970s and 1980s we did not
observe the same innovative activity. Despite that, the UK is the second largest issuer of
Asset Backed Securities in the world. The vast majority of issues initially were originated
by the Centralized Mortgage Lenders (CML).58 But later after 1992 banks came to be
involved very actively in the issue of ABS.59 We are going to discuss the main reasons why
the British innovative effort was much inferior to the US one.
One of the first examples in the UK is the £50 milion Mortgage Intermediary Note
Issue (MINI) issued in January 1985 by Bank of America. Later the National Home Loan
Corporation issued floating rate notes (FRN) called HOMES to the Euromarket. The main
difference between these two issues is that the second one was rated as AAA, because the
pool of both mortgage and interest rates was guaranteed. Then the Property Investment
Certificate (PInC) was used as a security backed by commercial buildings and entitling its
owner to receive an income from the rent or sale of the underlying building.6o In 1990
Commerzbank issued securities to the value of 50 milion pounds for show-homes.6I In
1991 the mortgage-backed securities market in the UK reached the amount of $21 bilion.
In 1991 the National Home Loans issued the first security backed by second
mortgages.62 But the pace of change and innovation in the UK was extremely slow.63 The
importance of mortgages for the British homeowner is very different from their US
equivalents.64 The National Home Loans Corporation tried to standardize mortgage
documents but there was stil a significant difference from the US, notably the lack of
governmental backing through an official economic agent like FHLMC or GNMA. Hence
they were forced to find alternative - market oriented - methods to back their issues, usually
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through enhanced structures65 and adequate rating - II most cases triple A - from
established specialized firms like Standard & Poor or Moody.
During the 1980s mortgages increased geometrically (see table (T -5.4 J on
residential mortgages) and net lending increased during the same period fivefold. But ABS
peaked in 1988 at significantly lower levels than their US equivalents. In 1988, less than
10% of new issued mortgages were securitized.66 The issuance of asset backed securities
experienced a significant slowdown during the recession in the early 1990s, particularly
during the years 1992 and 1993. Their total amount had fluctuated considerably in 1988,
1991 and 1994 reaching approximately the same amount (see table (T-5.5J, on British MBS
and ABS issues). Residential mortgages during that period accounted for 100% of ABS
until 1990, falling to 76% in 1994 (OECD, 1995). The most interesting aspect is the
originators of these ABS. As ilustrated in table (T-5.6J, the initial issuers were the
Centralized Mortgage Lenders and later leasing companies, but banks after 1992 took over
as the most important issuers (75% of all issues). This reflected growth in mortgage
lending by banks, from zero in 1986.
An additional reason that reduced the innovative effort of British financial
institutions was that, until the end of the 1980s, British banks or building societies did not
encounter the same acute problems as the US banks and S&L institutions. It was also
argued that UK financial institutions were also better capitalized.67 Both banks and
building societies were well capitalized and they had access to low cost funding68. Before
the 1986 Building Societies Act, building societies faced severe restrictions on their
activities and on the allocation of their asset portfolio. But since 1986 their restrictions
were significantly reduced and they were permitted to diversify their portfolio, including
transferable mortgages, and undertake transactions involving ABS. But, as we could
observe from table (T-5.6J on originators of ABS in the UK, individual building societies
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did not participate in the securitization process due to the lack of appropriate information
technology facilities.
We also have to take into account the fact that the UK legal framework, especially
for non-mortgage assets, is extremely tight and creates additional problems for the
emergence and proliferation of banks' ABS. The British Accounting Standards Board was
extremely preoccupied with any type of connection - direct or indirect - or subsidiarity
between the SPV and the originator.69 In the US, the generally accepted accounting
standards (GAAP) are much more clear, especially in terms of what is and what is not a
sale.7o In October 1991, the British accounting body pronounced that, originators should
include them in their balance sheet.7I
Additionally at the end of 1980s, due to the recession, home-owners were falling
behind in their payments. Property values were fallng and interest rates were moving
upwards. On the other hand credit rating agencies withdrew their triple 'A' rating from
several issues. Given the desirabilty for potential buyers of high rating this created some
negative impressions in the ABS market. The reason for this externality could be located in
the downward rating of financial institutions involved in the insurance of mortgaged-baked
securities. It is worth mentioning the story behind the downward rating of one these
insurance companies. A highly leveraged bid for BAT industries in 1988/1989 created
some negative impressions about the credit status of its insurance subsidiary Eagle Star
and, since the latter was involved in the insurance process of ABS, they faced a downward
rating.
It is clear that the whole process is extremely sensitive to any factor that could
potentially cause any, even remote, problem to the holder of the ABS. The rating
companies were extremely cautious about the UK building societies during the period
1970-1987, when they experienced an average loss on their loans of less than 0.01 % of
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their outstanding mortgages. Credit rating companies like Standard and Poor issued in their
evaluation a default rate of 20-25 percent (Norton and Spellman, 1991).
Finally, it was observed that the yield margin between ASB and T -bils in the
United Kingdom was significantly lower than the margin in the US (Hull 1989). This
reduced premium could be a considerable barrier for potential customers. As a monetary
phenomenon it is not always possible to identify the causal direction. In other words it is
not feasible to discern whether the slow pace of securitization caused these reduced yield
margins, or these reduced yield margins were the result of lack of competition or 'depth' in
the securitization process.
The innovation activity in the UK was thus less impressive than in the US for many
and diverse reasons such as different legal approaches, lack of particular balance sheet
problems and lack of government-backing institutions. In terms of our model (2.1) was
caused due to institutional preferences, competition and disintermediation reasons apart
from the already-cited reason of liquidity enhancement. The British-originated securitized
assets could be perceived as incremental financial instruments, responsive and on balance
sheet that transfer risk. They filed the spectrum and enabled better risk management. This
discussion ilustrates that the same innovations may arise from different causes within
different financial systems as we saw also in chapter on derivatives.
In the following section, we shall recapitulate the discussion of the risk involved
and elaborate more on the benefits and potential problems of securitization.
5.4 Securitization and banks
During this section, we shall present briefly the types of risk that could be addressed by
securitization. Then we shall refer in more detail to the benefits and advantages - some of
them unanticipated - of the proliferation of securitzation for the innovating institution and
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associate them with the particular stages of our analytical framework and model of
financial innovation. In the following section, we shall elaborate more on the potential
problems, and consider them in terms of scope for further innovative effort. Finally, we
shall conclude by presenting a more holistic view of the phenomenon.
5.4.1 Types of risk that banks face
At this stage we have to recapitulate and present a more detailed view of the types of risk
that a contemporary bank faces in relation with the underlying assets. Since there is a
plethora of assets to be securitized, we are going to discuss them within a more general
approach, and establish how they are related to the securitization process and how
securitization could help a bank to reduce them and enable a better risk management. We
are going to discuss the credit, interest rate, and repayment risks, and the principal-agent
problem.
Credit risk is the most important risk and it is inherent to most financial products. It
is associated with default risk. It could be related to the amount of exposure to the
particular client, industrial sector or even country. It could be systematic or specific.
Securitization could not eliminate the credit risk and is affected by this type of risk, since
any default of an underlying asset like a mortgage entails both a loss of principal and
interest payments. In order to reduce this problem financial institutions have created special
structures of SPV that are insured by insurance policies or two tier (senior/junior) issues.72
An additional point is that securitization could allow a reduction of overall credit risk
through diversification. Consequently a bank could expand its activities to other areas,
through this diversification reduce its overall exposure and finally reduce the credit risk.
Interest rate risk embraces a wide range of possible combinations. We can divide
them into two main groups: mismatch of received and owned payments or missed
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opportunities of favorable market conditions. In the first case we receive lower rates and
we pay higher. It could be the result of combinations of different types of interest rate, i.e.
floating and fixed. Securitization could alter the type of income that the bank receives or
balance the risk due to an excessive exposure to a particular type of return. Needless to say,
if we use the securitization process in order to reinforce the type of interest payment that an
institution receives or pays, the potential exposure to the market's adverse movement is
significantly improved. In relation to missed opportunities, the securitization could enable
us to exploit market conditions by altering, through securitization, the allocation of our
portfolio and issue securities in a different interest rate structure than the existing one.
Prepayment risk is able to reduce considerably the duration of an ABS. Whether it
concerns credit card receivables or mortgages, the repayment or refinance could entail
significant alteration of the expected life and yields of the security. Securitization could
aggravate this problem if the overall exposure of the portfolio of the bank does not include
assets and liabilities that could compensate any significant change in the prevailing market
conditions. In order to reduce this problem banks should create revolving structures or
build up reserve funds and spread accounts. The prepayment risk is also related with the
reinvestmeni73 risk that a bank faces. The Discretionary use of funds could be perceived as
a positive point for banks and a negative one for its note, bond and share holders. A bank
could reduce this gap between its own management perception of best use of their funds
and the perception of the other above mentioned groups. It is related to the principal-agent
problem, or mismatch of expectations. By securitizing and diversifying the portfolio a bank
could reduce this discrepancy. We have to add at this point that by securitizing and
expanding the same type of activities this problem is accentuated.
It is obvious that, except for the jillng-the-spectrum attribute of asset backed
securities, the risk management feature related mostly to credit and interest rate risk is
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enhanced; but stil other types of risk may persist. Since it is not crystal clear whether
securitization is able to reduce or increase the risk exposure of a bank and even create new
types of risk exposure, it wil be useful if we categorize the potential benefits and problems
emanating from securitization. In the following sub section, we are going to discuss further
the benefits emanating from securitzation in order to associate them with the different stage
of our model and provide further examples of the dynamic nature of the financial
innovation modeL.
5.4.2 Benefits of securitization.
It is possible to distinguish many advantages 74 related to the use of the securitization
process for the financial institution involved. These advantages are created during the
proliferation of the ABS and could also be reasons for further unanticipated improvements.
It is not by any means a strict classification since the distinctions between some causes and
successful features are not always clear or objective, but the classification is not as
important as the emergence of these unanticipated benefits (see model of financial
innovation in 2.5.1).
The following benefits are associated with the initial causes of innovation such as
liquidity enhancement, cost structure and competitive pressure.
. The transfer of these assets also provides more liquidity to the involved bank. Except for
the already-mentioned reduction of capital required to back its assets it enables lending
without additional deposits to back them.
. A further benefit of securitization is a considerable cost reduction for the financial
institution hence the capital required is significantly lower than for traditional lending
activities. Taking the example of Sperry Corporation, the cost of these ABS was 14.26%
where the corresponding cost in the case of debt issue was estimated at 17.33%
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(Rosenthal and Ocampo 1988). These significant reductions could be beneficial for the
potential buyer since the corresponding price is going to be lower too. The 1988 Basle
Committee on Bank Regulations and Supervisory Practices 'offered' an additional
incentive to banks to securitize by setting the capital requirements on different types of
assets.75
· A further point is the possibilty of reduced fixed costs for the institutions that are going
to participate in this process to a significant degree. As we have already explained, the
one-off costs of creating a system able to facilitate and monitor securitization could be
used more than once. The impact on the cost of future issues could be material and, if
you add the above mentioned acquired and enhanced know-how, the consequences are
not negligible at alL. In other words, it is possible to have economies of scale and scope.
. It enables the financial institution also to manage and match its assets and liabilities
much better and deal with any kind of mismatch of exposure (maturity or interest rate),
especially in order to reduce the exposure of the institution to any particular sector or
type of financial claim. It also provides considerable opportunities for restructuring the
institution's finance. A typical case already mentioned its RepublicBank Delaware,
where they managed to substitute their CDs by these ABS and reduce their financing
cost by 56 basis points (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988). Financial institutions are also in
a position to control their interest rate exposure better if they sell their loans after their
origination.
. Before and especially after the implementation of the Basle capital requirements in
1993, the capital requirements for securitized assets were significantly lower than the
ratios applied on traditional lending activities (commercial, car and credit loans).
Especially in the case of trade receivables the difference could be substantiaL. The
consequence was to 'free' capital for further banking activities.
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. It is possible for an institution to exploit its comparative advantages better. Traditional
lending activity was a vertically integrated process. Securitization enabled more
institutions to participate in this process. Each step of this process requires a particular
expertise and skils since securitization is not a risk-free process.76
. It is possible to enjoy significant premium yields as it is considered a new instrument in
comparison with the conventional borrowing instruments. A typical manifestation of
this phenomenon is the US market for ABS where a permanent differential was
observed in yields of between 50 and 100 basis points from traditional T -bils (Hull
1989). The difference, especially for credit card receivables, went significantly above
these figures.77 This fact could enable financial institutions issuing ABS to be more
competitive than institutions that do not offer ABS.
. It also allows a broader access to capital markets and a considerable fee to the
investment banks that provide the credit enhancement, the structure of the ABS and the
placement of the securities. A typical example was the First Boston initiative to issue
the first AAA, ABS backed by non-mortgages, which generated a considerable fee of
almost a milion dollars and a significant competitive advantage among its competitors,
or Salomon Brothers in creating the revolving structure of credit card receivables
(CARDS).
The following benefits are associated with particular elements of the financial
institution such as strategy objectives.
. A successful originator of loans, as we have already mentioned above, is now free to
expand its activities significantly more since it is not bound by capital requirements and
consequently cost limitations. The originator is now in a better position to increase
market share and boost its growth. Especially during recovery and boom periods where
the demand for loans and generally for financial claims is increased, financial
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institutions could use securitization to unload their balance sheet and respond to the
increased new demand. At this point regulators are worried that this could generate an
imprudent credit policy on the part of the originators but the originator's risk cover is a
considerable dissuasion from this.
· Issuers of asset-backed securities can create diferent securities, based on the same pool
of loans, depending on the risk profile of the investor. These products could be
distinguished into 'slow' and 'fast' paying tranches. It is essential to add that in most
cases the initial owner of the assets keeps the servicing and monitoring of these loans.
The servicing generates substantial fees and sometimes the spread account's balance.
This institution also keeps a significant portion of the risk exposure of these assets.78
Finally, we could encounter many features that enable ABS to be successful
innovations. These features are related to thefilling of spectrum, regulative imperfections,
intangible assets and even initiate further innovative activity in accordance with the
dynamic nature of our model of financial innovation.
· Based on the filing of spectrum approach these new financial instruments enable
different types of investors to find instruments that correspond to their investment
profile.
. The originator very often also has a reasonable degree of flexibility in the case of any
change in the market for the underlying asset. It is possible to have a call option in case
they want to handle any default case differently from the pool insurers. It is also possible
to have an asset-substitution right under certain predetermined conditions.79 We have to
pay particular attention to the possibility that the SPY has recourse to the originator on
actual or moral grounds.8o It is also possible under predefined conditions to refinance
the remaining pool of assets in case of prepayments (Twinn 1994). All these cases could
reduce significantly the cost faced by the financial institution.
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· The pooling of financial assets into homogeneous packages enables the investor and the
financial institution to assess better the type of risk that he faces without having to take
into account the overall exposure of the bank's portfolio. It also permits a better
actuarial calculation of the exposure from the rating agency or credit enhancers.
. It is possible for an institution to determine its target market and decide whether to
adopt a debt or equity structure. A secured debt structure is considered as a debt
instrument - impossible to remove from the balance sheet - whether the delayed pass-
through security is considered as an equity. Sometimes it is better for it to be a debt
instrument mainly for taxation reasons (see further Norton and Spellman 1991).
. The Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which is set up by the bank is much safer and
cannot be restructured by management. This parameter enables the bank to receive a
high rating, enhances the confidence of investors in the ABS and the bank receives the
benefits of offering higher than its own grade-rated securities.
. Another important complication for banks is the significant improvement in their
financial ratios.8I Two ratios especially could be considerably improved: the Return on
Capital Employed (ROE) and the Return on Assets. These two ratios could be improved
by increasing their returns due to servicing fee income and even more by reducing the
denominator of the second ratio, i.e. assets.82 These points are extremely important if we
take into account that investors' perceptions of US banks at the end of the 1980s were
very unfavourable (Hull 1989).
. An efficient servicer should maintain adequate record-keeping and reporting
procedures, and especially be able to enforce the terms of the obligations. At the same
time it is a significant intangible asset that enables the building up of expertise and
simultaneously has the maintenance of a close relationship with many borrowers and
potential customers on products and services.
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The dynamic approach is also highlighted by the initially-contradictory point that,
as rating companies become more familar with the risk involved, privately placed
securities are backed by a wider range of assets. It is possible to observe the typical Product
Life Cycle phenomenon whereby the initial innovative product exhibits specific
characteristics, then it becomes standardized, and at the end it is tailored to the particular
needs of the buyer. In other words the proliferation of securitization is enabling banks to be
innovative, and credit enhancers and credit rating firms to assess better the risks involved.
It is possible that benefits from the proliferation of securitization could encompass
areas that initially were not targeted, and confer advantages in areas such as cost structure,
competitive advantage and strategic choice available to the institution. But at the same
time additional disadvantages could occur and we shall discuss them in the following sub-
section.
5.4.3 Problems emerging from securitization
The process of securitization could create some additional problems for a bank, or even
aggravate existing ones. These problems could occur at all stages of the model of the
financial innovation, and could act as reasons for further innovation, initiating a financial
innovative process. We are going to regroup some of these shortcomings and present them
in a more coherent form; again as in the previous sub-section the classification - in
accordance with the type of shortcoming - is not a definite or absolute one.
During the proliferation of the securitization, it is possible to encounter some
problems that could be attributed to particular features of the innovations such as duration,
type and quality of underlying assets, and expertise.
. A very common problem is the considerable difference between the actual and the stated
maturity for the majority of ASB, including CMO.
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. The liquidity of CMOs is seriously questioned since they represent a significantly
different pool of mortgages or assets in general. The ABS never reached the liquidity of
ordinary corporate bonds because of the extremely diverse prepayments patterns.83 If the
market is thin, as in the UK, it is possible even to face a liquidity risk.
. This tendency could cause significant 'adverse selection' problems since banks are
going to securitize their best-performing loans and leave the most low-rated or poorly-
performing loans on their balance sheets.
. The underwriting process is not a traditional ground for banks since they are not
familiar with this type of activity. Furthermore, banks can be 'forced' to move further
into the middle and low end of the corporate market in order to compete with other
financial institutions or to compete with the corporations or to provide financial services
to corporations.
Other shortcomings could be related to technology, strategic objectives such as
reputation and timing and 'package' of the instruments.
. The technology available is a significant problem. In the UK building societies had
traditionally less sophisticated IT than banks. It is essential to provide detailed
information on payment flows, rates of default and the geographical spread of accounts.
The rating agencies required a lot of information about the breakdown of delinquencies,
write-offs and payment streams.
. An additional less tangible problem of early amortization is the negative impact on the
reputation of the institutions involved since investors are going to suffer a prepayment
exposure due to early amortization and, possibly, loss of income.
. ABS rating is extremely sensitive to any change in their structure or to the participants
of their structuring. Any change in the rating of the enhancer, i.e. the institution
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providing the Letter of Credit or any other type of insurance, could reduce the initial
rating of the security. 84
· Timing is extremely important. Periods with high spreads over Treasury Notes should be
avoided because of high impending costs. As was observed in the US, during the fourth
quarter spreads tend to widen because many issues take place due to the window-
dressing that many banks are doing for the approaching year-end.
. Another problem is a possible divergence between appearances and actuality. Credit
card receivables could be structured to appear as Eurobonds with guaranteed repayment
of principal and specified date. But in the beginning of the 1990s this ilusion was
shattered; they were not bullet bonds, they are amortizing events that could trigger their
repayment. 85
Finally many complications could emerge in relation with the successful features of
securitization, such as the enhancement of the risk management and regulatory
imperfections.
. Related to timing, banks should avoid relying extensively on the securitization process
as a 'pipeline' for the expansion of the institution's portfolio: if a bank undertakes a
spiral of expanding activities based on the systematic use of initial capital commitments
in order to back financial claims; then securitizes them and uses the proceeds for further
expansion; if the market ceases to find the asset backed securities to be attractive, then a
serious problem could emerge for the bank.86
. The prepayment risk became an important issue, initially for mortgage-backed assets,
but later much more acutely for the credit card receivables. The latter were extremely
sensitive to the default and prepayment rate of the underlying asset. A reduction of the
yield below a predetermined level as well as a particular percentage of default8? could
automatically trigger the amortization or the credit enhancer to step in. When this early
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prepayment takes place the asset comes back to the balance sheet of the bank due to the
nature of the credit card backed securities, like a call option on a bond. Credit rating
companies initially perceived the narrow spread as a sign of lower credit enhancement
requirements or as lower default risk for the security and granted a better rating. Credit
rating companies are very powerful when issuers do not desire a private placement or to
keep them in their balance sheet because they are immune from bankruptcy
complications as in the case of banks. 88 They also publish rates for issues that have not
required their rating.89
. It is common that banking systems are significantly interdependent through interbank
lending activities. Securitization could create strong links among banks, and an increase
in systemic risk in the case of a massive collapse of the ABS markets could create
significant problems on both sides of the balance sheet of banks as asset-holders of
securities and a liabilty-source of funds.
. Any change in legislation could initiate significant changes in the attractiveness of the
ABS for investors. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initially had to
grant permission to any credit card and general purpose loans in order for it to be
possible to sell them in public; later this restriction was relaxed. Regulators forced
banks not to remove commercial property mortgages from their balance sheet.
Regulatory pressure on insurance companies' exposure on commercial property in the
beginning of the 1990s made them perfect candidates for commercial property backed
securities. Another typical example was in 1992 when the US Congress announced its
intention to cap interest rates on credit card debt. The pace of new issues was
dramatically reduced but it is a fact that no ABS has defaulted yet.90 Another case is US
tax regulations which consider most of pass-through as 'grantor trusts' where a true sale
and not a refinancing is taking place. Hence they do not apply the tax burden on the
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trust; otherwise they would be taxable as a corporation and payments to investors would
be treated as dividends subject to income tax (Norton and Spellman 1991).
In other words, the proliferation of securitization could create additional problems
in areas of strategic objectives, reputation, technology shortcomings, risk management and
advantageous regulative imperfections. In most cases, these problems could act as causes
for a dynamic response of the financial institutions in the form of further innovative
processes. Unfortunately, it is not analogous to the institution's shortcomings in derivatives
where a single financial process innovation (VaR) could address some of them. In this case,
almost each requires to be addressed separately. In the following sub-section, we shall
conclude by briefly explaining why securitization is on balance beneficial for banks
profitability.
5.4.4 Why banks should undertake securitization
The 'market school' believes that securitization wil reduce the role of banks since
the increasing sophistication of the economic agents reduces considerably the possible
exploitation of imperfections. The 'banker school' perceives securitization as one more
stage in the historical banking process. Since banking history is full of innovations, this
view is reassuring in terms of the survival of banks. Probably the latter view is closer to the
actual situation (Cowen and Kroszner, 1994).
ABS is a relatively low-cost source of funds and credit rating agencies were willng
to offer a triple A rating for issues backed by collateral and particular guarantees to
institutions where even their own unsecured debt did not enjoy this rating. The expansion
of ABS belongs in the 20% band of risk-weighted capital and many financial institutions
could participate in their issues, could deepen the market and considerably improve their
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liquidity and consequently their marketability. These could further lead to standardized
ABS traded on exchanges where even positive network externalities could occur.
At the end of the 1980s, according to Norton (1991), banks owned almost 50% of
all consumer assets. Given the plethora of assets ranging from insurance premiums and gas
reserves, passing through recreational vehicle loans and encompassing assets of uneven
cash flow like commercial loans and high yield bonds, the potential for securitization is
enormous and limited only by the temporary limits to business innovative capacity.
Hence financial institutions in terms of our model (2.1) created these initial
government backed securities in order to enhance their liquidity and remove the regulatory
burden (capital adequacy requirements) and reduce their cost. Securitization was caused by
more than one reason. The technological capacity and strategic objectives of the
institutions shaped these innovations and filed the spectrum of financial assets and
enhanced risk management. But their proliferation offered further positive aspects,
sometimes not anticipated, at the different stages of the development of these innovations.
Apart from the positive aspects some disadvantages and problems occurred, many of them
in areas of further innovative development. Securitization overall was a successful
innovation with much further scope for evolution and development.
5.5 Conclusion
During this chapter, we have discussed the phenomenon of securitization and the cluster of
financial innovations that followed the first securitized asset in 1970. The phenomenon of
securitization also took a further boost due to two other events: the expansion of syndicate
lending and the proliferation of off balance sheet banking activities.
The main causes of emergence were liquidity enhancement, institutional
preferences and later economic growth (CAR, CARDS, CCBN) and competition-
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disintermidiation (MINI). In order to emerge, securitized assets required two additional
innovations: an organizational one (SPV) and a process one (Credit enhancement). The
financial system (government backing and regulation) and the state of the financial
institutions could affect positively (US) or negatively (UK) the emergence of these
innovations. Securitization is thus another cluster of innovations that had more than one
cause to emerge.
Their emergence could be influenced by information technology advancements
(CMO, CARS, CARDS, MINI) by existing routines (GMC, CCBN, CAR) and strategic
objectives such as the target market (CCBN). Some innovations were also characterized by
a cumulative aspect (CMO and other ABS). Asset backed securities are radical (GNMA) or
incremental (PC, CMO, CARS) most of the time on balance sheet, responsive new
financial instruments that transfer the risk and enhance the liquidity.
Their main attribute was the filing the spectrum of financial assets available
(GNMA, CMO, CARD) and mainly the enhancement of risk management and potentially
cost reduction. They could also target regulatory imperfections (CMO).
Their proliferation could bring additional benefits related to cost structure and
enhance the strategic objectives of the institution and emergence of intangible assets. But
they could generate some problems on particular aspects of the financial instrument and the
risk management of the institution. These shortcomings could act as further incentives for
further routine innovations, addressing them since we should not forget that initially
securitization (MBA) is itself a response to existing innovations (mortgages).
In this chapter, we have reviewed the emergence and proliferation of securitized
assets and presented further evidence about the applicability of our financial modeL. In the
next chapter, we shall discuss the last cluster of financial innovations of our research,
plastic cards.
207
Part II Securitization
Endnotes of securitization
1 At the end of the 1980s, two-thirds of residential mortgages were securitized and the outstanding amount of
securitized mortgages were estimated at more than $500 bilion (Mishkin,1989).
2 A loan could be defined as a contractual relationship between two parties: the originator and the borrower.
The originator provides a certain amount to the borrower and the latter is obliged to pay it back at a
prearranged period and paying a predetermined interest rate. A particular type of loan is called a secured loan
where the financial institution is given a prior claim to a collateral in the event of bankruptcy.
3 In 1988 banks were required to have around 7 percent in order to back their lending activities, where finance
companies were estimated to require around 9 percent (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988). In 1997 the figures
were around 5 and 7 percent of equity for backing their respective lending activities.
4 The high leverage that banks created, was a sign of exposure and increased risk. For that reason many
potential buyers of banks' long term debt obligations required a higher yield premium at the end of the 1980s
due to their default risk (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988).5 Euro-dollars initially appeared in 1950's when Communist countries wanted to invest their dollar surplus
outside the US and increased significantly in 1960s when the Federal Reserve imposed restrictions on the
lending of US banks, but took off after the OPEC crisis in 1973. A well illustrative example is that in 1965
they were estimated to be $55 bilion, $650 bilion in 1973 and $2100 bilion at 1984 (Lever and Huhne
1985).6 In 1981, WaIter Winston, head of Citibank, said that bankruptcy is a procedure that was developed in
western law to forgive the obligations of a company that owes more than it has. Any country wil own more
than it owes even if it experiences some cash flow problems in the short term (Lever and Huhne 1985).
7 The problems experienced by Turkey and Zaire in the late 1970s were considered as insignificant and
temporary one and the spread was constantly decreasing, reaching one percent in 1979 for Argentina, Mexico
and Poland.
8The main function of bankruptcy is to seize the assets of the default party, but there was not any procedure
covering this eventuality for default countries. The main reason that makes almost impossible the default risk
is in the case that loans are denominated in the same currency as the borrower country, the typical example is
the US borrowing US dollars.9The purpose of a cross default clause is to assure simultaneous payment to the different borrowers. If one
bank demands repayment then it initiates the immediate repayment of the others. Two thirds of the $87
bullion of debt were originated by 91arge banks, with exposure twice their capital (Congdon 1993).10 In 1976 and 1977, Witteveen praised the useful role of banking system of recycling the surpluses of the
OPEC countries in a manner that has helped to sustain world trade and economic trade. British Labour (1977)
and Conservative (1979) Chancellors on several occasions, as well as the US. Secretary of Treasury (1979)
and the Chairman of Federal Reserve (1980) argued in favor of the lending activities of banks to Less
Developed Countries (LDC). Non oil producing countries had borrowed $294.7 billion until 1979 when their
exposure in 1975 was only $169 bilion in 1975 constant prices. A very detailed analysis is included in Lever
and Huhne (1985).
11 In the US, it was estimated that in 1988, 41.3% of home mortgages, 2.4% of consumer installment credit
and 2.5% of business credit (commercial loans and leases) were off balance sheet. These figures after only
four years, in 1992, were 51 %, 15% and 7.5% respectively, a very significant trend and overall percentage
(FRBNY 1993). A similar analysis highlighting the expansion of off-balance sheet activities during 1980s is
including in Artis and Lewis (1991).
12 A simplified example about the impact of capital adequacy regulation on the cost of funds is the following:
if the ratio is 10% and the expected return an assets is 15% then the spread over the borrowing funds should
be 1.5% omitting any further complication arising from bad debts or administration cost.
13 In the US they often call it a 'bullet-proof or 'bankruptcy-proof' institution (Norton & Spellman 1991).
14 Rating institutions are preoccupied about the experience of the servicer as well as the existence of adequate
systems and the back-up existence of a suitable organization to take over in case of inability of the servicer to
fulfil its task. The most common structure for mortgage backed issues is a mortgage pool and liquid assets
such as cash deposits or short term (three months) highly liquid and marketable investments (Norton and
Spellman, 1991).
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15Depending on the type of legal entity, the nature of income streams could be taxable or not. For example at
the end of 1980s the Limited Purpose Finance Corporation enjoyed significant tax advantage on the treatment
of its profits when it was issuing pass-through securities.
16It must be a valid sale hence the assets are going to disappear from the originator's balance sheet. The
originator has to notify this in an offcial letter (opinion letter) and is also responsible for covering a part of
any losses - based on historical data. It must clear that it is a sale and not a secured loan or any kind of
repurchasing agreement (see Swchartz, in Norton & Spellman, 1991).
17 There are two types of bankruptcy: voluntary and involuntary. Special legal provisions have been created
both in the SPY charters of incorporation and the legal framework covering bankruptcy procedures in order to
safeguard as much as possible the holders of securities issued by SPV (see Swchartz Norton & Spellman). If
it is not structured by a 'bankruptcy remote' style, at least one independent director is required to be
appointed in the SPV (Schwartz, 1994).
18 When these historical data are not available then it has a negative impact on the rating and costs involved,
and may as a result become unattractive (Bank of England 1994).19 If the SPV is created only for a particular transaction (sale) it is also called 'one - off. In order to reduce
the transactions cost involved, an originator could use an existing Special Purpose Vehicle and adopt a
multiseller securitization conduit. Other costs could occur in order to receive the appropriate rating by the
agencies (Schwartz, 1994).
20 A high default rate from the beginning could undermine payments for the rest of the duration of the security
significantly more than in a later stage when reserves could be accumulated or part of the principal payments
made.
21 The ABS was considered as debt and they should remain in the balance sheet. In order to avoid keeping the
transferred loans in their balance sheets, the solution was to transfer any excess yield emanating between
income from the underlying assets and payment to the servicer and security holder to a particular fund
designated to cover credit losses.
22 As we mentioned above, the originator of the assets is still liable for a part of losses. But if larger losses are
incurred, an insurance company or another financial institution provides a Letter of Credit covering a multiple
(six to seven times) of the amount of the originator's contribution.23 Security is divided into two classes (AlB) and the B class is retained by the seller and used as guarantee for
any loss. Another similar form is the purchase by a third party of a subordinated part (tranche) of the security.
24 Based on Federal Reserve Bulletin 1979, from 298.1 bilions Dollars outstanding mortgage debt in 1970,
they reached 761.9 bilions Dollars in 1978. The amount for Total Residential Mortgage Market Originations
increased from $44.4 billion in 1970 to $192.2 bilion in 1978 (Brinkerhoff, 1979).
25 In 1970 the main providers of residential mortgages were S&Ls (37.7%), Mortgage Companies (23.3%)
and Commercial Banks (18.3%) where in 1978 the allocation changed and S&Ls provided 50.1%,
Commercial Banks 22.7% and Mortgage Companies 15.3% (Brinkerhoff, 1979).
26 Many researchers tried to propose a model that could take into account the prepayment factor in order to
assess the value of a pass-through security. An important question is whether the decision to refinance the
mortgage depends on an autonomous probability or this probability depends on different factors such as
mortgage age, the outstanding fraction or seasonality. But the discussion is between the default risk and the
prepayment. The former affects the insurance and consequently the fees charged for that insurance and the
later the maturity. These fees are influenced by current interest rates, prepayments and especially the value of
the underlying mortgages. A much more detailed analysis is discussed by Schwartz and Torous (1992).
27 It was established in 1957 as an institution to buy and sell participation interests in mortgage loans. Its real
role is to enhance the liquidity of mortgage-granting institutions and especially the S&Ls.
28 The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation was chartered by the US Congress and its board of
directors consists of members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB). It acts like a private institution.
29 The process is the following: lenders call and make an offer to the FHLMC, if their offer is accepted, they
have to deliver their loans for underwriting; once it is underwritten funds are passed to the lender. The latter
continues to service the loan and submits monthly reports.
30 They are offered for sale four times per year and have a long duration of 25 to 30 years. The transfer agent
is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and they are not classified as real estate assets
31 In 1979 S&Ls accounted for 21.4%, Bank Trust 17.3%, Insurance Companies 15.2% and dealers 12.4%
(Brinkerhoff, 1979).32 The result of any refinance is a substantial loss of income for the securities holders since the early
repayment forces them to re-invest their money at a lower rate of return due to lower interest rates (Patterson
1987). The same took place also in 1993, when the massive refinance sky-rocketed the origination to $1
trilion. Mortgage providers accommodated this increase and expanded their business considerably. When
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during 1994 the Fed increased their rates seven times, the next year half of the mortgage wholesalers had to
exit the business (Dallas 1996).
33It stands for Federal National Mortgage Association and it was established in 1938 after the Depression. Its
role was to buy and sell mortgages depending on the prevailing economic conditions i.e. when credit was
constrained it was buying mortgages and vice versa.
340niy a handful of issuers, such as Citicorp and FHLMC, guarantee the timing of the prepayment.
(Patters on 1987)35 This example is ilustrative of tax-caused innovation and explained in detail by Miler (1986).
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Source, RosanthaZ & Ocampo (1988)
37 The question of what constitutes a sale is regulated by the Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) No 77
and particularly the treatment of CMOs is defined by FASB Technical Bulletin No 85-2.
38 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) proposed the 'Sears Regulations' and revoke the tax exemptions
applicable to grantor trust (SPV) which were restructuring cash flows.
39 For example the automated underwriting by Freddie Mae, the proliferation of mortgage and credit systems
or direct sale of mortgages based on the above, increased the amount of mortgage origination (Dallas 1996).
40 The first FRCMOs issued were $150 milion by Shears 
on Lehman and $120 million by Centex Acceptance
Corporation and until the end of the year $6.5 bilion were issued.
41 FRCMO initially included an inverse floater tranche that offered returns negatively related with interest
rates in the form of a rate minus Libor. But stil, it was not fully protected from upwards movements of
interest rates.
42 The first non-conforming mortgage securities from Citibank where a trust was created with the participation
of United States Trust Company of New York.
43 First Boston underwrote a lease backed note for Sperry Lease Finance Company. Sperry Corporation was
financing the purchase of its products and wanted to unload its balance sheet from this burden, eliminate
interest rate risk and have access to new capital under better conditions, since its rating was just AlBBB+.
The SLFC was rated AAA, due to back-up from the parent company and third party enhancer (UBS)
(Rosenthal and Ocampo 1988).44 Salomon Brothers for Marine Midland and Valley National first issued CARS and later Drexel Burnham
issued FASTBACs.
45 During the period 1985-1989 auto loan backed securities mounted to $30 bilion (Norton & Spellman,
1991).
46 More or less the same more or less logic could be applied to truck, boat (seasonal pattern on payments) and
recreational vehicle loans (longer maturity, five to fifteen years) where third party buy-outs were used
(Norton and Spellman 1991).47 In Sperry ABS, the Federal government owned 37% and Pennsylvania State 12% of the leases.
48 Citibank was one of the most prominent players that also bought from brokers significant packages of non
conforming mortgages, and only in 1986 issued 22 ABS. A common way to structure these securities was to
create a trust in the place of SPV.
49 The first private issue was by Salomon Brothers on behalf of the Banc One Corporation in March 1986 for
$50 milion for the particular revolving credit example. It was not required to create a SPV because banks are
not subject to the bankruptcy code hence there is not any reason for a SPV. They also created a spread
account in order to remove them from the balance sheet. This spread account acted as a credit enhancement
and since in the first months its level could not have been sufficient they injected, temporarily, one milion
dollars. They did not buy any additional enhancement and consequently Standard and Poor did not offer them
a rating.50 The first to issue these ABS was Bank One in Ohio for $250 millon and Salomon Brother trademarked
(TM) this name. During the above period, Credit cards backed securities reached $20 bilion and the main
underwriters were First Boston, Goldman Sachs and Sa1omon Brothers.
51 Fitch in 1990 down-grated a Sears receivable-backed deal because, in the case of bankruptcy of Sears, the
over-collateralistion could initiate the incorporation of the assets back into the Sears balance sheet
(Euromoney 1991). The SPV uses principal prepayment to purchase new trade receivables balances and it
creates two tranches, one large and fixed, sold to the investor, and a smaller floating one kept by the seller. If
they decide to adopt a senior/subordinated structure then it is possible that over-collateralization could create
problems since it is not inconceivable for it to be interpreted as a 'pledge'.
210
Part II Securitization
52 In 1986 RepublicBank Delaware was wiling to restructure its financing and substitute its floating rate CDs
(150 basis point above Treasury Notes) with lower cost securities.53 Again since it is a bank, and taking into account the history of insolvency of national banks, the creation of a
SPV is not required by the rating agency since, in case of bankruptcy, note holders are not going to suffer any
loss. In addition other sources of enhancement were exploited such as reserve account, and Letter of Credit of
$10 milion from UBS. In the Delaware case, the amount of pooled receivables was 20 percent more than its
outstanding notes.
54 Citibank, the largest issuer of credit card securities, was the first to create these structures (The Economist
1992a).
55 From $10 bilion in 1986 to more than $50 bilion in 1991 (The World of Banking, 1992).
56 During the same year the figure for all the other assets combined were $180 bilion (table (T-5.1)).
57 The most famous structuring program in the late 1980s was the Corporate Asset Funding (CAF) of
Citicorp.
58 In 1993, CML accounted for 76% of issues where banks accounted for 24% (Bank of England, Quarterly
Bulletin 1994). The CML reduced its costs considerably by providing mortgages through brokers and direct
advertising and not requiring an expensive branch network. The Specialized Mortgage Lenders (SML) were
formed in 1986 (OECD, 1995).
59 In 1992 and 1993, banks accounted for 71 % of new issues and CMLs for only 17%.
60 The most common form was a double document, the first creating a contract that confers to its holder an
income from the building and a second a share in the management company that collects and redistributes to
the holders of PINCs income emanating from that building. The main reason for this distinction was the tax
treatment of property companies in the UK.
61 Show-homes are the prototype of a particular design-type of houses that are created. Their particularity is
that they are the first to be built and the last to be sold. The SPV buys the houses and leases them back to the
builders; any change in their value does not affect the holder of the security, but rather the builders that trade
them (Euromoney 1990).
62 This is due to the particular popularity of mortgages during the 1980s in the United Kingdom where some
homeowners obtained more than one mortgage.
63 Until the end of 1991 only two British clearing banks and only one building society had issued ABS. The
British mortgage-finance companies were the main suppliers of ABS (The Economist 1991c).64 It is worth mentioning that the Bank of England does not lose track of the mortgages when they are
securitized; they just change the originator in their records from banks or building societies to Other Financial
Institutions (OFI). During the 1980s residential houses were the most important single financial asset of
British economic agents. A plethora of different commercial banks and building societies were providing
finance for the acquisition of these assets. British homeowners were extremely reluctant to abandon their
traditional financial relation with a familiar financial institution and replace it with an impersonal financial
structure.
65 Over-collateralisation, reserve funds, Letter of Credit, and insurance contracts
66 We have just to compare tables (T-5.4) on net mortgage lending and (T-5.5) on the MBS issued for their
overlapping years 1987-1992.67 This point was made for European banks generally in order to explain the reduced success of ABS in
Europe, combined with a hostile legal framework (The Economist 1991c).
68 According to the OECD (1995), British financial institutions and investors do not manifest any significant
interest in ABS. The main originators were Specialized Mortgage Lenders (SML), formed in 1986, as part of
the business in order to obtain funds to cover the increased demand for mortgages.
69 It is interesting that when a SPV is established in the UK, it automatically has the right to sell its securities
to investors without any special permission from the London Stock Exchange Commssion, whereas in the US
in many cases -we wil discuss them later- they need ad hoc permission.
70 This discrepancy in the definition of sales and subsidiaries, forced the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) to initiate the formulation of Exposure Draft (ED) 42, in 1989 tried to define the nature of a subsidiary
and therefore what could be a sale and the removal of the item under discussion from the balance sheet.
71 Initially the Bank of England issued a Notice in 1989 mentioning explicitly the conditions for transfer of
mortgages. In the Loan Sales notice it was clear that the servicer must 'ensure that its role is not seen as being
more than acting as an agent(para.14). Then the Exposure Draft (ED) 49 issued in 1990 highlighted the
importance of joint presentation between two business entities interconnected either directly (unified
management) or indirectly (exercising major influence), de jure based on the articles of constitution) or de
facto (business practice).
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nIt is a division of notes into junior and senior where the former are deferred payment until the latter are paid.
Nowadays it is possible to have more complicated junior notes act as backing for payment but they are not
paid last as long as there is any outstanding principal deficiency (Norton and Spellman 1991).
73 Reinvestment risk is the risk related to the possibility of receiving an unanticipated payment during a period
where the market rates for re-investment are lower than the return that the bank was receiving before the
repayment.74 We do not discuss the benefits for initial borrowers, although a survey of US. fixed rate mortgage
borrowers indicated that, between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s, borrowers paid less interest by almost 100
basis points in comparison with treasury bils (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988).
75 In this case, we refer to minimum CA requirements defined by the Basle commttee. The US and UK banks
adhered to these requirements, hence an additional 'burden' on their position was enforceable.
76 A famous example of unsuccessful securitization is the Equity Program Investments Co (EPIC) in 1985.
The main reason behind the failure of this real estate syndication company was that, although it applied credit
enhancement, it had an inadequate credit review, an overexposure of the credit enhancer. For more detailed
analysis, see Ronsenthal and Ocampo (1985).
77 In the beginning of 1991 it reached the 130 to 140 basis points (Euromoney 1991).
78 It keeps the first tranche which covers the expected rate of credit loss (already discussed representation on
spread account). But it does not cover the entire exposure; another significant portion (seven to eight times
the initial rate) is covered by the well-capitalized credit enhancer. The final portion, where there is very low
possibility of credit loss, is covered by the holder of the ABS.79 Warranties cover every aspect of the relationship between the SPV and the originator. In the case of
substitution, it must be extremely clearly defined what are the particular characteristics of every new
substitute.
80 We are referring to the possibility of return of non-performing assets as part of the enhancement process. or
in order to sustain a good reputation of the originator.
81 We have to take into account that banks are also firms and as firms their value is closely related to their
share price. Their share price could be significantly affected by the published figures and ratios.
82 We have also to take into account a loss of income from the underlying assets which could more or less
compensate for an equal reduction of income paid to debt holders. This could take place if we reduce the
outstanding debt of the bank by the same amount of the securitized assets.83 Even when Citibank in 1991 structured many deals, distributed them globally, involving many market
makers in order to assure 24-hours trading which failed to materialize. ABS are considered as a 'story' bond
and are subject to 'street' liquidity i.e. the investment mood of the period (Euromoney 1991).
84 In 1990 ABS issued by First USA Credit Card Trust and Colonial Card Trust in 1989 were down-graded
because the Japanese bank that provided their letter of credit was down graded. Many Japanese banks in the
beginning of the 1990s experienced the same problems as the US banks in the beginning of the 1980s.
(Euromoney 1991)85 Prepayment in ABS was one of the most common problem of Japanese institutions in the late 1980s and
beginning of the 1990s in the US (Euromoney 1990).
86 This phenomenon took place in the late 1980,s in the UK when CMLs adopted this approach in order to
cover their operational costs and they had to face a low demand for ABS (Bank of England, 1994).
87 For example Sear's issues in 1991 had a 5% benchmark for triggering early amortization where at the time
of issue only 2-2.5% was the actual default rate (Euromoney 1991).88 Credit rating companies publishes reports analysisis of different types of ABS. These reports could create
strong impressions in the markets. A typical case is Moodys report at the end of 1990 highlighting the
increased default rate and poor quality of credit card receivables which, combined with high spreads (130 to
140 basis points) over Treasury notes, reduced fivefold (from 66% of new issues to 12%) new issues in the
beginning of 1991 (Euromoney 1991).
89 In 1987 Moody's rating company announced that they were going to provide rating even for ABS already
issued.
90 Even if Citibank and Sears admitted to have already restructured some deals (The Economist 1992a).
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Chapter six
'We make war so that we can live in peace'
Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle 340 BC
Part II Plastic Cards
6 Plastic cards
Introduction
During this chapter we are going to discuss the introduction and development of plastic
cards in the banking sector. The initial launch of credit cards followed by a cluster of
further innovations which, in this chapter, we attempt to explain was in accordance with
our analytical framework and model of financial innovation. The discussion of plastic cards
could be divided in three main areas.
First we are going to discuss briefly their history and predecessors in the form of
Travel and Entertainment (TÆ) cards. Then we shall refer to the development of bank
credit cards due to competitive pressure and desintermediation reasons, and their capacity
to generate credit and fil the spectrum. We shall add the importance of banks' expertise for
the emergence of affinity cards.
Secondly, we shall discuss the introduction of debit cards due to cost-structure-
related reasons and the new smart cards which were associated with dealing with the
shortcoming of existing cards and the completion of various more elaborate functions,
monetary and non-monetary. Thirdly in order to understand the introduction and
development of plastic cards we also have to explain other aspects of electronic banking
such as the Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT), Point of Sale (POS) and the Automated Teller
Machines (ATM). Then we wil discuss developments particularly in bank credit cards
since they are the most important for our analysis, and analyze the factors that shaped their
development and led to further innovations.
During the discussion of bank credit cards we shall focus on some aspects and
developments that justify the dynamic perspective of our modeL.
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6.1 Historic development of credit cards
The concept of credit is very old; the first written proof of credit transactions is recorded in
the Code of Hammurabi around 1750 BC (Mandell 1990). Further credit practices
developed on an informal or semi-formal basis.
The first provider of a basic consumer revolving credit was Provident and Clothing
Supply Company in Bradford in the United Kingdom in 18801 where customers used their
vouchers in order to buy from an approved list of shops.2 The first credit card was
developed in the US in 1914 by the General Petroleum Corporation of California.3
We can divide credit cards into monthly charge cards such as American Express
and Diners; option cards like Visa and Mastercard; and budget cards (usually store cards).
We are going to discuss retailers cards briefly in the affinity's cards section. Combinations
of the above are available, like retail cards using the Visa or Mastercard facilities through
an intermediary bank or even a mixture of payment systems.4 During the first sub section,
we shall discuss the first credit cards: the travel and entertainment cards.
6.1.1 Travel and Entertainment cards
Travel and Entertainment cards are also called charge cards, the first one was Diner's Club
in 1949 (Mandell 1990). The initial purpose of this card was to use it in order to settle bils
in hotels and restaurants in New York and pay the total amount at the end of month without
any limit on the amount of expenditure but also without the possibility of extended credit
beyond the end of the month, applying penalties in case of non paying customers.
Later in 1958 American Express, the traveller's cheque innovator, was established
and finally Carte Blanche, initially owned by Hilton Hotel Corporation and later wholly
owned by Citibank, followed in 1959 (Frazer 1985). In 1966 American Express launched
its up-market Gold scheme, an action not followed by the other two. It was offered in
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association with financial institutions in order to provide an instant overdraft facility to the
holder. Later in 1986, Amex launched the Optima, which bypassed the banks and the
revolving credit emerged as a novelty feature (Mandell 1990). In 1990 it reached more than
twelve times the number of cardholders of the other two combined (Hanson 1988).
In 1951 the Diner's Club was initially launched in the UK and in 1954 it expanded
its operations.s American Express was launched in the UK in 1963 and Carte Blanche in
1966. The initial reason was mainly to accommodate visiting US card holders; they had
both an enrollment and an annual fee.6 Until the 1990s, credit was not granted beyond the
end of the month when all balances were due to be paid. The primary source of income for
TÆ cards is the (4% to 5%) discount they receive from merchants (Hanson 1988) and the
secondary source is the annual fee, and finally the enrollment fee.
The only successful non-American TÆ cards were the Eurocard, a charge card
scheme that was extended to 13 European countries and the JCB, standing for Japan Credit
Bureau, which did not offer a revolving credit facility either.
These TÆ cards offer significantly higher spending limits, but normally stil a limit
of some sort, they offer non-financial benefits such as prestige, participation in prize
competitions, special discounts but also immediate replacement and travel insurance.
Amex especially has pioneered different extras such as a diversity of clubs and extra
warranty extensions (Steiner and Teixeira 1990). A specific disadvantage of the TÆ cards
is that they are only accepted by hotels, travel agencies and up-market retailers (Frazer
1985).
The Travel and Entertainment cards were the first financial product, not even
originated by banks, that offered instant consumer credit to their clients. During the next
sub-section we shall discuss the first bank-issued credit cards.
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6.1.2 Bank credit cards
During this sub-section, we shall discuss the emergence and proliferation of bank credit
cards in the US and the UK, and we shall elaborate more on the particular features of bank
credit cards.
6.1.2.1 Bank credit cards in the United States
It is imperative to mention that the situation between the US and the UK in relation to
consumer credit was quite different. Consumer credit especially in the form of installments
and revolving credit was very common in the US at the end of the previous century,
whereas it was completely unknown in the UK (Mandell 1990). The first hybrid credit
cards, as have already mentioned, were developed in the US at the start of the century.
The first bank to launch a credit card to its customer was the Flatbush National
Bank in New York, which introduced 'charge-it' cards in 1947. Then Franklin National
Bank in 1952 was the first bank to offer credit cards to customers of other banks (Drury
and Ferrier 1984). The scheme applicable to card holders that have an account in the
issuing bank has to be called secured?, and the opposite unsecured.
The first years of the expansion of credit cards were extremely slow due to high
installation and maintenance cost and low acceptance from the merchants, making early
issuers sell their operations, as Chase Manhattan did in 1962.8 An exception was Bank of
America which after launching its card program called BankAmericard in 1959, reached
one milion holders in 1961 and 2.7 millon by 1967. The increased number of cards
reduced the cost of issuance and maintenance per card and transaction. The break-through
came in 1966, when the bank set up the BankAmericard Service Corporation whose
purpose was to license its schemes to other banks for a fee. The novelty was that banks did
not require to set up and maintain their own costly schemes, running simultaneously the
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risk of low demand for credit cards or facing the possibility of excess capacity. Hence the
cost per card was reduced to the prevailng fee.9 Based on the above facts, it is fair to say
that the real emergence and proliferation of bank credit cards took place in the second half
of the 1960s.
In 1970 BankAmericard Service Corporation was sold and became the National
BankAmericard Service Incorporated (NBI). Later in 1974 a separate entity was created
called IBANCO in order to provide international credit card schemes. In 1977, the former
became Visa and the later Visa International. Meanwhile in 1966, competitor banksIO in the
same state (California) set up the California Bank Card Association in order to issue and
run their own credit card scheme. The name of the card, Master Charge was bought the
name from First National Bank of Louisvile. In 1983 the name changed to the current one,
Mastercard.
By the end of the 1960s, both Visa and Mastercard launched a huge promotional
campaign using unsolicited mailing of credit cards which led to a significant increase in the
number of holders (Mande1l1990).ii
Initially in the states in which branch banking was allowed, banks offered state-
wide credit cards.I2 In states where it was not permitted such as llinois and Indiana, banks
formed associations in order to circumvent the regulation and be able to offer their credit
card schemes (Drury and Ferrier 1984). Continental Bank of Chicago and later Citibank
began to expand their credit card operations across the country as a means of building a
national presence, in advance of the anticipated legislation. I3
Until 1976 it was not possible for a bank to issue both cards but a federal court
ruling on grounds of discriminatory practices enabled banks to offer both of them - the
duality principle. But very soon - by the end of 1977 - banks had abused this liberty. Not
only had they massively opted for this duality, they also tried to reduce their cost by
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merging the application, biling marketing and administration process, making competition
non-existent. The Justice Department forced banks to abandon this practice for some years,
forcing some banks to abandon the dual practice.14
The creation of NIB and ICA promoted the launch of nationwide advertising
campaigns in order to boost the demand for the above schemes. In order to cope with the
large numbers of transactions, special systems were created that enabled the authorizationI5
and recording of credit card transactions.16 In the following sub-section, we shall discuss
bank-issued credit cards in the UK to provide some comparison with the US.
6.1.2.2 Bank cards in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the BankAmerica Service Corporation licensed Barclays Bank in
1966 to use the colors of BankAmericard as well as providing adequate software to run the
operation. The result was the issue of Barclaycard initially as a cheque guarantee card. But
the credit card function prevailed and from 1.3 milion cards in 1970, business grew to
more than 12 milion in 1986 (Hanson 1988). In 1977 it began to use the Visa logo.
Barclaycard processed for other banks such as the Yorkshire Bank and the Bank of
Scotland and, until 1983, the Trustcard of TSB which joined the Visa network in 1978
(ibid).
In 1970 National Westminster, Midland and Lloyds banks established a joint
ventureI7 in order to share research, marketing, data processing and accounting costs and
launched in 1972 their own credit card called Access and mailed a considerable number of
unsolicited credit cards.IS In 1975 they had issued 3.2 milion cards and reached ten milion
cards in 1986. In 1975 Access joined the Interbank Card Association.
In 1981 the first gold card in the UK was the product of cooperation between
Lloyds bank and American ExpressI9, then the following year other banks like Barclays
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(Visa) and Midland (Mastercard) issued their own. In the following sub section, we shall
discuss the main features of bank credit cards, which are common to both the US and the
UK.
6.1.2.3 The main features of credit cards
The main feature of credit cards from their beginning is that they offer credit to their
holders. Usually they offer extended credit periods and only a minimum - 5% of the
balance - monthly compulsory payment (Drury and Ferrier 1985). If the holder does not pay
the full balance, the outstanding amount or in some cases the full initial credited amount is
subject to interest charges. On the other hand banks receive a discount of between 1.5 and
5 percent from the merchants.2o These discounts are lower than the discounts received by
the TÆ cards (Frazer 1985). The discount received by banks is subject to competitive
downward pressure and a typical example could be Barclaycard's discount reduction from
2.8 percent in 1978 to 2.4 percent in 1984 (ibid). In the 1990s the discount war continued
and intensified between the Visa, Mastercard networks and Amex (The Economist 1991a).
This price war could be viewed as routine or incremental innovations in accordance with
the strategic objectives of the financial institution.
In the UK historically banks did not charge fees where as in the US usually they
did.2I The main differences between bankcards and T Æ cards were that the former had
initially a local significance due to the banking legislation in the US, and their cards did not
have an annual subscription. The local dimension disappeared at the end of the 1960s when
BankAmericard licensed its scheme, and in 1967 the ieA (later Mastercard) was
established. In other words, credit card networks acted as an avenue in order to deliver
nationwide financial services and circumvent the Glass-Steagall regulation. Banks began to
increase the spending limit on their credit cards and offer additional services in order to
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compete with the American Express products such as travel insurance or insurance cover
for purchases using their own credit card.22 These financial and non-financial services
could be perceived as incremental financial innovations.
Credit cards were not acting as cost-reduction instruments in comparison with the
cheque or debit processing cost. It was estimated that their costs were significantly
higher.23 Building societies also offer credit cards under arrangement with the Visa or
Mastercard network or other banks participating on these networks.24 Some credit cards
like Barclaycard or Trustcard could be used simultaneously as cheque guarantee cards.
They could also be used in order to draw cash from any cash dispenser or counter of banks
that belongs to the same network, subject to a daily, weekly or monthly maximum amount.
Cash withdrawals are subject to a servicing fee or an immediate interest charge. These
services and functions of credit cards could be perceived as further incremental
innovations.
Additional revenues emanating from credit cards result from the cross-sellng of
credit cards or the policy to include them in packages with other financial products such as
debit cards or chequing accounts. For a short period issuers used to sell their database to
third parties, but later in 1973 this was banned.25 Another development that enabled banks
to better manage their credit card operations was the emergence of securitization. It enabled
banks to issue securities backed by the receivables from their credit cards and reduce their
cost of finance by attracting low cost funds and be able to reduce the interest charged to
their cardholders. Most issues were AAA but they were considered as quite unregulated
and a significant slow-down was observed after 1992 (The Economist 1992b).
A very important aspect of credit card operations is the prevention of fraudulent
activities. Fraud increased considerably by the unsolicited mailing at the end of the 1960s
and card losses in the US had significantly increased due to bad screening and theft. 26 Later
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losses occurred due to the lowering of credit criteria in the 1970s and 1980s in order to
expand the cardholder's base in accordance with their strategic objectives. Bad debts
constantly increased from 2% in 1970 to 3% in 1980 and then peaked in 1991 and 1992 at
approximately 5%. After 1992 the situation stabilized to around 3.5% of outstanding
balances (The Economist 1996b).
In 1985, fraud was estimated for Barclaycard to be around 0.27% in the UK (see
Hanson 1988); this is a considerable increase from the 1980 figure of 0.16% (The
Economist 1985). Bad debts in 1995 were reduced to 0.10% or 0.19%, depending on the
source (see table (T-6.1) on the card fraud during 1990s in the UK). Mainly authorization
techniques reduced the amount of fraud and increased the level of security (Drury and
Ferrier 1985). In the UK banks co-operated under the co-ordination of the Association for
Payment Clearing Services (APACS) and it is believed that this is the main reason that
losses are not proportionately as high as in the US.
All major card-issuing banks like Citibank and Barclays extensively use expert
systems and scoring models in order to enhance their credit system (Steiner and Teixeira
1990). It was suggested that, with the introduction of smart cards, credit scoring and
transactions-recording system could use neural networks in order to provide enhanced
control. 27 These were additional innovations, either new financial processes or new
financial instruments that emerged in order to facilitate the functioning of the initial
innovation - highlighting the dynamic development emanating from initial shortcomings of
the innovation i.e. the credit cards. We have to mention that credit cards are a typical
example of positive network externalities (Economides 1995).
At this point, we can summarize and classify credit cards in terms of our model
(2.1) as competition- or disintermediation-caused financial innovations. It is possible to
classify them as both instruments and processes since they act as instant credit generated.
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Additionally, they could also be described as radical innovations since a cluster of further
related innovations followed their initial creation. Some doubts could exist since it was not
initially a banking-originated innovation. Their design was shaped by technological
developments - we are going to refer to them later in more detail - and strategic objectives
of the financial institutions in terms of additional features. Hence they were responsive, on-
balance-sheet financial innovations that generated credit; filed the spectrum of
intermediation; and temporarily took advantage (in the US) of regulative imperfections.
The dynamic perspective of these innovations could be ilustrated by further innovations,
either process (credit scoring) or instrument (smart cards), that emerged in order to deal
with the initial shortcomings. In the following sub-section we shall discuss affinity cards
and their implications for banks.
6.1.3 Proprietary and Affinity cards
Before discussing affnity cards we are going to discuss the private label card schemes that
pre-existed. At the beginning of the century in the US, coins or tokens were developed in
order to enable customers to buy goods from the issuing store, in the 1920s oil companies
applied courtesy cards to affilated petrol stations, and in 1936 American Airlines issued
their own credit plan (UATP)?S
A major innovation in the 1970s in both the US and the UK was budget accounts,
where the customer was paying a monthly amount to the issuer and was able to spend a
multiple. The proliferation of these financial products lost their momentum when in the
1970s financial institutions offered their own labeled cards, since there was not any other
clear benefit emanating from these budget cards.29 It was also suggested that budget cards
had higher interest rates and no interest-free period.
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Then loyalty schemes appeared related to discounts received by customers when
they were purchasing from a particular retailer like Sears and Roebuck and Marks and
Spencer, or a petrol company such as Mobil or Esso. The purpose of these cards was not to
generate a direct profit to the firm but mainly to boost loyalty as a marketing tool.
Usually loyalty schemes did not offer extended credit. But in the 1990s they moved
to the credit-granting area too. In 1985 both Visa and Mastercard offered affinity cards of
three different types: product benefit, lifestyle and personality cards. The product-benefit
cards associate the use with a special bonus like the American Airlines card. The use of
lifestyle ones provides an extra income for a third organization or institution, such as a
University, a Club or a Charity. Finally the personality card is related to a certain individual
or group of individuals like the Rolling Stones or Elvis Presley and its use provides these
individuals with extra income.
The main contribution that affinity cards offered to banks was a useful database
enabling them to target a particular group of customers! in other words a niche market. In
order to apply any successful targeting banks need two types of information: accurate
historical data concerning its customers and reliable demographic information. It is crucial
to tailor its products in relation to the particular characteristics of the different sub-markets
or in other words apply a micro-segmentation of the market.
At the end of the 1980s affinity cards had tremendous success but the market
seemed to be saturated (Bright 1988). The most important world issuer apart from Visa and
Mastercard is MBNA which specializes in affinity cards.3D This financial institution
initially was the MNC Financial but in 1990 it was closed due to bankruptcy and regrouped
its activities around the affinity business already created in 1982 (Forbes 1996).
In 1989 AT &T decided to convert its proprietary telephone cards into a credit card
called Universal without any annual fee and taking advantage of the tremendous
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information that it already possessed acting as a credit check. The final step in that
direction, i.e. non banks entering financial services, not in order to boost or safeguard their
sales but to diversify their activities, was made by Sears in the US in 1986. They launched
their own credit card called Discover after the acquisition of the Dean Witter brokerage
firm in 1980s as the first step in providing a wide range of financial services to its
customers as a consequence of disintermediation.3I In the UK, Sainsbury's in 1996 and
Tesco in 1997 with the assistance of Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland
respectively, offered a significant range of financial services.32 It was estimated that in the
1990s Sainsbury's had 8 milion potential customers per week and Tesco 11 milion at very
low establishment costs (less than 20 milion pounds). Furthermore, they had very low
operational costs since they have two or three employees in each superstore dealing with
basic banking transactions and the rest of the business is conducted by phone, and post, and
internet in the foreseeable future.
All these developments had a common feature. They were a potential source of
income for already-established issuers of credit cards possessing the appropriate know-how
(intangible asset), since essentially they could offer their expertise to other non-financial
firms. We are going to elaborate on this more in the final section. In the following section,
we shall discuss other plastic cards such as debit and smart cards.
6.2. Other plastic cards
During this section, we shall discuss two other important financial innovations: debit cards
and smart cards. Both of them emerged during the proliferation of credit cards, and banks
were heavily involved in their development.
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6.2.1 Debit cards
We have initially to distinguish between ATM access cards and debit cards. A debit card is
a card that is acceptable from a third party as a mean of payment. The first debit card was
issued by the First Federal Savings Association of Lincoln, in 1968, which later introduced
terminals in supermarkets.33 Later in the mid 1970s other financial institutions, initially
especially Savings and Loans,34 launched their own debit cards in co-operation with chain
stores. By 1975, 12% of commercial banks were offering debit cards to their customers.
The National BankAmericard Service Incorporated (NBI) in 1975 offered its own debit
card called 'Entree' and in 1976 Interbank Card Association (ICA) offered its 'Signet'
debit and cheque guarantee card.
After the launch of its own debit card (Entree) later in 1993, Visa launched the
Visa Cheque Card, replacing Visa Debit, and in two years (1995) had issued more than
16.5 million cards. Mastercard in 1976 also issued its debit card called Signet and later in
1991 issued its on-line card called Maestro reaching in two years 8.6 milion holders and
the off-line card, called MasterMoney having 3.2 milion holders. Many banks and
financial institutions adopted these debit cards, as had happened with the initial credit cards
(Mandell 1990). Visa and Mastercard had already acquired national - which later become
international - fund transfer networks such as Cirrus, Interlink, and Plus.35 In the mid 1990s
these two networks combined, accounting for 77% of all debit transactions in US.
In the United Kingdom in 1965 the National Provincial Bank issued the first cheque
guarantee card within prescribed limits. In 1971 it was estimated that there were almost one
milion cheque cards in the UK, and in 1981 they reached 16 milion (Hanson 1988).
Barclaycard was the first credit card in the UK that introduced, in 1972, the dual-role card
for credit transactions and cheque guarantee. In 1987, Visa launched its debit card and
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Barclays called its own one 'Connect'. In 1988 SWITCH was launched by Midland,
NatWest and Royal Bank of Scotland as a response to the Connect card.36 This fact
combined with the above mentioned involvement of Visa and Mastercard networks,
provides us an indication that research spilovers, and possibly learning curves, could exist
in the credit card industry.
Initially the card's main purpose was a medium of obtaining cash from ATMs using
a PIN or to obtain some basic information such as the current account balance (Drury and
Ferrier 1985). Later they enabled their holder to buy goods, by presenting the card to the
appropriate point of sale (POS). The holder nowadays could obtain cash and make more
elaborate transactions, such as transfers among accounts or other payments, and obtain
bank statements. Payments are directly debited from the holder's bank account. The
development of debit cards was linked closely with the development of Electronic Fund
Transfer (EFT). It is clear that these routine innovations were conditioned by the
emergence and application of adequate information technology systems.
We have to make clear that the purposes of debit cards, in contrast with the credit
card, were primarily to reduce the cost of cheque processing and then to sell more financial
products and decongest branches. We could say that the first goal especially was attained
since in the US during the 1990s a relative reduction was observed in the usage of cheque
books37 and it was predicted to decrease further in the future (Bank Marketing 1994). The
cost of a direct debit is also comparable with the cost of credit cards. It was estimated that
an on-line debit transaction in the 1990s cost 14 cents, an off-line transactions $2.00 and a
credit one $2.50.38 Cashless instruments in the US such as direct debits and paperless
transfer increased considerably in the 1990s. Both almost doubled in five years, when the
value of cheques increased only by 2 and direct debits increased threefold during the same
period (Kennickell and Kwait 1997).
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Debit card holders in the UK during the 1990s were able to use their cards in ATMs
that belonged to other banks, since British banks had formed big networks in order to
accommodate their customers. Both in the US and the UK debit cards in the 1990s were by
far the most fast-growing product (The Economist 1997).
Initially the whole Visa philosophy was to provide together a payment mechanism
and an instant loan. Developments such as debit cards and the launch of Visa and
Mastercard debit or connect (1987) cards or the creation of the SWIFT network in the UK,
enabled banks to separate these two functions and leave it to the discretion of the bank to
assess whether it was going to offer to its customers one or both of these financial
products.39 Hence by dis-bundling the features of the initial innovation (credit card) a
further innovation took place (debit card).
Based on the US experience, Savings and Loans (SIL) institutions opted more for
debit cards based on the Visa or Mastercard networks than credit cards. Building societies
in the UK initially followed their example using the SWIFT network. It was believed that
the impact could be significant if we take into account that the advantage of debit cards is
that they do not offer free monthly credit, hence the cost impact could be significant
(Frazer 1985).40 But as the difference between building societies and banks blurred due to
disintermediation, building societies began in the 1990s to offer credit cards belonging
mostly to the Visa network.
Concluding, in terms of our model (2.1), the main causes for debit cards were
potential reductions in the cost structure, disintermidiation and competitive forces. They
were responsive, both instruments and processes, off-balance-sheet, that enhanced
liquidity, filed the spectrum of intermediation and reduced costs. Their emergence was
shaped by technological development and they were also based on features of existing
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routines (for credit cards) of financial institutions. In the following sub-section, we shall
discuss smart cards.
6.2.2 Smart cards
Smart cards were created in the early 1970s by Roland Moreno (Spectrum 1984) although a
similar innovation was registered in 1970 in Japan by Dr Arimura.41 The main problems
with existing magnetic strip cards was their 'passive' or basic approach, in other words the
lack of any on-board intellgence, small storage ability, and it was easy to counterfeit them.
But they presented some crucial advantages, such as low cost, heavy investment already
undertaken and an acceptable level of security.
Smart cards could be described as plastic cards that carry an extra microchip instead
of the magnetic strip that conventional plastic cards have. This microchip is a
microprocessor and can compute as well as hold data. It enables the identification of the
holder through a PIN number, as well as the encryption and transportation of information.
French banks were the first to use smart cards in large numbers at the end of the 1980s
mainly in order to reduce their cheque processing costs and off-line fraudulent activities.42
Later it was observed that fraud was reduced by more than 35%.43
In the US one of the first trials was undertaken by Mastercard in 1985, and Visa in
1988 (Financial Services Yearbook 1998). During the same period Citibank launched a
special pilot for up-market clients offering immediate access to large funds around the
world. The two main problems were the lack of an international standard, at least between
the two large networks and the heavy cost of transformation or substitution of existing POS
and ATM.44 Mastercard approached the issue by testing a more basic smart card where
Visa tested a super smart cart requiring very high costS.45 It was also expected that cost per
card was going to increase significantly.46 The first mixture of smart cards and Home
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Banking (discussed later) took place in 1982 from First Bank System of Minneapolis,
targeting a group of farmers.
In the UK, Midland Bank in 1987 ran a pilot scheme highlighting the electronic
purse aspects of the card. Later in 1994, Midland joined forces with NatWest and British
Telecom and made a joint venture called Mondex promoting a particular aspect of smart
cards: the electronic purse. Later in 1996, Mastercardjoined the venture and acquired 51 %,
providing the real international perspective.47
One significant advantage is that a smart card's memory is not volatile; in other
words information is not deleted when the power is shut off (Spectrum 1984). The holder
could chose his own PIN code and smart cards could be used off-and on-line. When they
are on-line they have an encryption device that codes all the data before sending to the
terminaL. The security is further enhanced if we take into account that the estimated cost of
counterfeit is exponential in relation to magnetic strip cards.48 When the card is used as
electronic money, banks have a unique opportunity to manage the funds of the customer
until the actual moment of the transfer (The Banker 1994). Combining the electronic purse
attributes with Home Banking, it is the first time that customers wil be able to receive and
not only to transfer money from their account. In accordance with the 1985- 1 987
Mastercard pilot, there is also a customer demand for additional non-financial services that
could be incorporated in the smart card (Bright 1988).
Many non banking institutions were also involved in the development of smart
cards, for example ATT joined by Chemical bank in 1993 to access ATM and perform
debit transactions (The Banker 1994), or IBM created a joint venture with Sears. It was
estimated that in 1995,688 milion smart cards were in European wallets.49 In 1997, in the
US, a special report to Congress discussed the implications for Electronic Stored-Value
Products from the latest legislation (Regulation E).5o The existence of economies of scale
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stil to be reaped, highlighted the limited experience from this type of product and some
risks not addressed, such as the unauthorized use or issuer's bankruptcy. It is fair to say that
they stil are in an infant stage.
In terms of our model (2.1), therefore, smart cards were tested and partially adopted
by banks in order to remedy problems emanating from the existing limitations of plastic
cards. Smart cards are responsive, new financial instruments. Since they are not yet fully
developed, it is very early to classify them as radical or incremental. But since credit cards
already included non-financial features, they are closer to be considered as incremental
innovations. They were technology-shaped, and strategic objectives defined their particular
features and they wil probably present positive network externalities. Finally, they
contributed to the filing of the intermediation spectrum and enhance the risk management
of financial institutions.
6.3 Reasons affecting the proliferation of plastic cards
The reasons that enabled the development and proliferation of plastic cards are of a diverse
nature. They could be allocated into three main types: technologically-oriented reasons,
new channels of providing financial and non-financial services, and particular
developments in the US and the UK and their consequence for the evolution of the product.
6.3.1 Technological reasons
Technological reasons are related to the development of two main information systems: the
Electronic Fund Transfer and the Automated Teller Machine. During the discussion of EFT
we wil mention briefly the emergence of Home Banking which is associated with the
emergence of EFT. We are going to discuss in the same section as the ATM, the
introductiot1 and over the last decade's proliferation of point of sale (POS).
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6.3.1.1 Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) and Point Of Sales (POS)
The main concept of Electronic Fund Transfer is to eliminate unnecessary transactions and
paperwork. It transfers funds from one account such as the customers bank account to
another bank account such as the merchant's, through a terminal such as Point of Sale
(POS).
In the US the idea of establishing national electronic data interchange or fund
transfer networks emerged at the end of 1960s. It was used for the creation in 1972 of the
first Automatic Clearing House (ACH) dealing with transfers, ATM's, POS and
government-related payments.5I After this event, many other clearing houses and networks
were created. The most important electronic system of fund transfer are: CHIPS, SWIFT,
Bankwire and Fedwire.
During the 1990s, as we already mentioned above, the paperless transfers and direct
debits using the above EFT networks thus doubled during the period 1990-1994, and debit
cards tripled their amount (Kenninckell and Kwast 1997). The above systems and the
fragmented nature of the US banking landscape permitted non-financial institutions, like
Meril Lynch, Pierce Fenner and Smith and Sears Roebuck to offer banking services
including credit cards (Drury and Ferrier 1985). The idea of an Electronic Fund Transfer
Point of Sale (EFTPOS) was discussed in the UK in 1980. In 1985 English and Scottish
clearing banks reached an agreement to implement it. The significant contribution was the
payment of purchases without any paperwork at the point of sale.
The development of Home banking was based on the proliferation of EFT and data
storage and the processing capacities of banks. The first initiator of Home Banking in the
US was the Chemical Bank in New York in 198152, the Nottingham Building Society with
Bank of Scotland from 197953 and Midland Bank in 1983 in the UK. The experience was
not initially successful in the US since, in the mid 1980s while 30-35 different banks
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offered home banking facilities, the majority stopped or slowed down their promotion
(Choraffas 1988). The Home or Office banking service required a TV set or a PC terminaL.
The customer was able to check his balances, transfer funds, pay bils or even apply for
loans. In the 1990s the picture changed considerably for many reasons: PC prices decreased
considerably, telecommunications tariffs decreased too and customers became accustomed
with electronic banking through their exposure and use of ATM. Hence technology related
reasons enabled Home Banking to emerge.
The first effort to develop a POS took place in 1966 with the Bank of Delaware.
Since then many aborted efforts took place, such as Citibank's in i 978 and Banc One
Corporation's fruitless effort in 1979.54 The development of Point of Sale (PaS) had the
double function of debiting an account and crediting another. In the beginning of the 1980s,
many oil companies were involved in most of the pilot programs and some wide base
joined ventures appeared.55
It was crucial for banks to get involved in the development of pas for at least two
reasons: the excessive cost of processing cheques, and catching the free riders who were
using the float and paying the full balance at the end of month. Both were side effects of
the proliferation of credit cards. In 1982 it was calculated that 34.4 cents out of the total 53
cents of cheque processing costs, are labour-related costs. The main barriers to the massive
adoption of POS were the lack of common standards and the high costs involved in having
an on-line connection between banks and customers. But after 1985, a significant increase
took place and merchants began to invest in POS as they had done the previous decade by
accepting credit cards.
A significant boost, as we already mentioned in the debit card subsection, came also
from the acquisition of fund transfer networks from Visa and Mastercard, in the 1980s,
combined with the offensive marketing campaign undertaken later by them. In the 1990s
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we had two types of POS: the off-line and the on-line. The on-line is a one-step transaction
(transfer), the off-line a two-step transaction (authorization and later settlement) (Bank
Marketing 1994).
In terms of our model, cost structures can therefore be said to have caused the
emergence of the Electronic Fund Transfer and Point of Sales. They were responsive
process innovations that enhanced liquidity, partially filed the spectrum of intermediation
and reduced costs. Especially in the case of POS, negative effects from the proliferation of
credit card instruments, boosted their emergence. In the following sub-section, we shall
discuss the A TM and POS financial innovations.
6.3.1.2 Automated Teller Machines (ATM)
A TMs are significant applications of the EFT concept. The first application, as a particular
case of the EFT/paS innovative process, was the Docutel cash dispenser in 1969 in the
US.56 In 1975 Amex added a magnetic strip to its gold card (Mandell 1990). In the UK the
first cash dispenser appeared in 1967 from Barclays Bank.57 ATMs were highly successful
during the 1970s; in 1985 52,000 were operating in the US and over 80,000 by 1988; 3,300
were operating in the UK in 1985, and 10,000 by 1992. Their cost has been reduced by
almost 70% in the last ten years. The On-line Teller terminal could be classified as a more
basic and less sophisticated ATM and is extremely successful in the US where it was
estimated in 1985 to operate 255,000 units.
During the 1970s, the ATMs in the US presented three advantages: it was a cost-
reduction innovation, it provided the customer with more convenient access (place and
time) and could be a marketing advantage; due to Regulation Q, banks could not compete
on the level of interest rates they offer to their clients. In the UK on the other hand, ATMs
initially were used in order to by-pass the problem of government restrictions in the 1970s
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in relation to the time and days (Saturday forced closure) bank branches were allowed to
operate. Hence directly or indirectly, government intervention or regulation boosted their
expansion but not their creation.
Initially ATMs operated by credit card, but in 1972 the first special debit card was
introduced in the US by City National Bank of Columbus in Ohio. Automatically milions
of new debit bankcards were used and banks on both side of the Atlantic formed or joined
national networks (six in 1982 in the US). These ATM networks were designed to provide
cash and balance services for their customers, like LINK and MATRIX in the UK (late
1980s) and Cirrus internationally. Very recent research in the UK found that institution's
size, growth in deposits and profitability were positively related with the adoption of ATM
technology by British banks (Gourlay 1998). The existence of learning-by-doing effects
was identified, but this was not significantly related with labour-saving effects. Information
technology spilovers were also observed during the development of ATMs. The diffusion
process presented epidemic signs and institutions' expectations (for future demand) also
influenced the adoption of the innovation during the period 1972-1992. Hence financial
institutions' particular characteristics could influence the adoption of the innovation.
The tremendous expansion of ATMs in the UK is detailed in our table (T-6.2). It is
worth-noting, the fivefold increase in the first ten years and the significant increase of
building societies' ATMs after 1986, doubling their number in three years. After 1990, a
slower increase in both banks and building societies was observed. Another observation
could be made in terms of the number of the ATM cards in the UK, from 1975 until 1980
they increased tenfold and in 1985 they were forty times more than ten years before
(Ingham and Thompson 1992).
Thrift institutions in both countries joined immediately and participated in the
innovative process by locating ATMs for the first time in different places than the location
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of the bank. Very soon many of these ATM networks acquired (Cirrus and Plus in late
1980s), or became accessible to, the Visa and Mastercard network (Mandell 1990). From
1976 they issued their own respective debit cards (Entree and Signet). Amex soon (in
1977) used banks' ATM network in order to deliver traveller cheques.
During the 1980s competition between banks also embraced the domain of ATM
and they began to offer more sophisticated ATM machines. These machines were based on
existing routines of previous models and research spillovers. But this competition involved
significant cost and ATMs were operating below break-even level.58 Many banks began to
charge either a transaction fee or an annual fee to their customers.
In terms of our model (2.1), Automated Tellng Machines were thus caused by the
cost structure, the potential competitive edge and partially to circumvent regulation. They
are responsive, financial instrument and process innovations, offbalance sheet that enhance
liquidity. They are shaped by existing routines, IT spilovers, positive network externalities
and strategic objectives of the financial institution such as the existence of economies of
scale. Their main features are that they support existing innovations (plastic cards and
EFT) and partially they fil the spectrum of intermediation. In the following sub-section, we
shall discuss banks' profitability and other developments.
6.3.2 Banks profitability and developments
We are going to discuss development that took place over almost thirty years in the US and
the UK which determined the evolution of credit cards in term of bank profitabilty. We are
going to summarize at the end of this sub-section the emergence, proliferation and further
dynamic development from credit cards.
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6.3.2.1 The US developments
In the US, after the clear-out of the end of the 1960s, the main credit card networks were
BankAmericard and MasterCharge. Consequently it was expected that in the early and mid
1970s, profits would be reported in the industry. A significant part of the profits came from
the interest charges which accounted for two third of income. Interest was charged in the
case of outstanding balances. An important difference between the UK and the US banks
was that Access and Visa in the UK charged interest for the whole amount in the case of an
outstanding balance; in the US initially banks used to charge for the outstanding amount
only, but later in the 1980s they adopted the same method of calculating the interest charge
(Mandell 1990).
In 1976 Citibank tried to find counter-measures in order to obtain revenues from
cardholders that paid their full balance at the end of the month. It introduced a 50 cent
monthly payment for these holders, but customers' reaction and Congress's censure forced
them to abandon it (ibid). It is possible to view it as an unsuccessful incremental financial
innovation. Annual fees initially were not imposed in the US during the 1970s because
banks feared that they might lose customers and in 1973, despite the unsolicited mailing
that took place at the end of 1960s, only 11 percent of all credit cards were bank issued.59
During the same period predators were invading the market, since Savings and
Loans institutions after 1972 were able to offer cheque accounts to their customers. In 1973
NBI, and in 1974 Interbank, offered Savings and Loans the possibility of joining its
network, while Credit Unions had to use the intermediation of a bank. At the end of the
1980s approximately 3,000 credit unions were issuing their cards through banks (Steiner
and Teixera 1990). A typical example of expertise-generated income took place in 1977.
Visa offered the first proprietary card to a Savings and Loans institution and they started to
compete with banks offering lower interest rates. They introduced many innovations and
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opted more for the debit-charge card structure. Many of them used their clients' savings
account in order to pay the full balance.6o They also followed a strategy of applying a lower
finance rate to all their customers in order to compensate for the users who were paying
their balance in full, or they applied a type of security in the form of a credit limit of only
50% of deposits for the customer.
In 1977 bank credit cards stil accounted only for 6% (Hanson 1988) of outstanding
commercial credit. An American consumer had many alternatives and could use budget
accounts, retailers accounts, trading cheques, hire purchase and TÆ cards. The distribution
of credit card during the above mentioned period in the US was: Store cards 50%, Gasoline
cards 33%, and Banks cards and TÆ cards 16%.
Later, at the end of 1970s and early 1980s, losses occurred due to the high interest
rates which caused many bad debtors (ibid) This had not occurred for TÆ cards due to the
better selection of holders and restricted credit facilities; remind ourselves that extending
consumer credit is considered as very risky during high interest rate periods. During this
period, the US banks made an incremental innovation and introduced fees in order to
compensate for the considerable problems from Carter's administration in 1980, when it
forced banks to create a special non-interest bearing reserve for all credit accounts they
possessed; and this was combined with the interest rate ceiling based on usury law
(Mandell 1990). These problems caused a credit crunch, but not the initially-feared
significant reduction of cardholders. This is ilustrated in table (T-6.3) which includes
information on consumer revolving credit during the period 1968-1996. During the years
1980-1982 a slow down in consumer credit was observed. But after 1983 a geometrical
increase took place, reaching in five years an amount five times the 1982's leveL.
Commercial banks were by far the more significant provider of this credit and non-finance
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firms were clearly the second most important, while credit unions and savings and loans
were not significant market participants.
These fees, combined with the reduction in interest rates after 1981 and the
abolition of usury legislation (F orbes 1991), led to massive profits from 1982 until 1986 in
the US, since banks did not pass this reduction on to their customers (Mandell 1990). A
significant sluggishness and stickness in the interest rate that banks charged from 1975
until the 1990s was observed in the US. A reason advanced by research by the Federal
Reserve Board in 1988, covering the period 1975-1990, was that imperfect information
caused a variation in the interest rate in anticipation of higher risk undertaken by banks
when offered their revolving credit facilities (Wooley 1988).
The graph in appendix (A-6.1) on spreads of the US banks for the period 1975-
1995 makes this pattern clear. The spread between cost of funds (CDs) and the credit card
rate fluctuated from 6% to almost 14% apart from the three years we have already
discussed (1979-1981). Initially cardholders were not insensitive to interest rate changes
(Hanson 1988), but in the mid 1980s US holders were so accustomed to the use of credit
cards that they did not act against the maintenance of high charges despite the low cost of
funds. That enabled banks during the 1980s, where consumer loans fell by almost 6
percent, not to reduce the number of credit cards.
From 1976, 34 of the top 100 volume shops accepted bank credit cards (ibid). Then
a major blow came from J.C Penny's in 1979 when, despite being one of the most
successful store issuers, they decided to join the Visa network directly without using any
financial institution as a middleman.61 The main problem for the banks previously was that
the regional retailers in the US tried to join together and use a financial institution to
provide their card management. In 1981, after J.c.Penny joined Visa, half of the country's
major retailers accepted bank credit cards, while Amex was accepted by three quarters of
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department stores. After the J.c.Penny case, it was obvious that credit card networks were
able to operate without the help of a bank, and the banks lost significant scope for
providing their expertise.
During the 1980s in the US the situation changed considerably in favour of banks
because store cards reached saturation point. Travel and Entertainment cards (notably
American Express), increased steadily but bank credit cards sky-rocketed. Especially in the
installment credit area, bank credit cards were covering 9.5% in 1980 and 17.4% of the
total in 1988.62 The total amount charged jumped from $14 bilion in 1973 to $183 bilion
in 1988 (Steiner and Teixeira 1990). In the same period it was estimated that 28 percent of
holders were convenience users, in other words they were paying their balance at the end of
the month. At the end of the 1980s in the US, after a further clearing that took place in the
1970s, the top five banks were issuing 40 percent of cards.63
It was calculated in the US that during the 1980s, the profits for banks which got
involved in the credit card business were around 2.5 percent of transactions or, based on a
different source, an average of 3 percent of assets (The Economist 1990) and in particular,
2% for inefficient issuers and 5% for low-cost issuers (The Economist 1992b).64
Additionally, the potential profit margin in the early 1980s was estimated at around 85
basis points (0.85%), and in 1990 it was estimated to be around 70 basis points (0.70%), a
reduction of 20 percent.65 Particularly earnings were significantly reduced from 3.45% in
1986, to 3.10% in 1990 and reached the 2.14% in 1996, of the assets.66
It was also observed that the card industry enjoys significant economies of scale in
the range of 25,000 to two millon cards equal to almost to 400 basis points, and it was
estimated that ten milion is the optimal efficient leveL. The processing business could also
be perceived as the development of new organizational structures. This observation is in
accordance with the US transaction processing market at the end of 1980s. It was
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dominated by Amex (27%), Citicorp (14.6%), Sear-Discovery (8.1 %), Total Systems
Services (7.6%) and Chase Manhattan (5.2%) processing more than sixty percent of the
155 milion outstanding credit/charge cards (Steiner and Texeira 1990).
During the slow down in profitability observed in the 1990s, a few institutions
abandoned their card issuing activities and concentrated on the processing business (The
Economist 1992b). In other words a process innovation became a product or service for
sale by banks i.e. a source of income. Consolidation in the US at the end of the 1980s
applied also to the processing business, since in 1987 the top ten credit card issuers
accounted for 37% of the market and in 1989 accounted for 55% (The Economist 1990).
Secured credit cards were launched at the end of the 1980s in order to attract lower-income
applicants. The applicant makes a deposit, used by the bank as collateral, and he has access
to credit of equal amount (Mandell1990).
Interest rates tended to move in tandem for all banks but lately, during the 1990s,
the situation changed dramatically. Banks began to follow more independent strategies and
an explosion of incremental or routine innovations took place during this period. Banks
began to publish their interest rates and even engage in comparative advertising. Some
offered a fixed rate and some a variable rate - connected with bank's prime rate - which
could differ by more than 10%; some banks charge an annual fee of $40 and others do
not.67 Practices like fee-waiving for the first year and fierce competition on interest charged
broke out in the 1990s (Forbes 1991). If we distinguish further between secured and
unsecured cards the difference is even more impressive, reaching 14%.68 The concept of
secured cards was very similar to the original credit cards. Consequently, existing routines
and research spilovers facilitated its emergence. A final point is that many US banks,
. issuing credit cards, applied different pricing strategies in the mid 1990s depending on the
credit risk of their consumers (Report FRB, 1997)
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It is worth mentioning that the main initiators of this interest rate war were the
specialized or 'monoline' issuers that had an extremely low cost base and were able to
reduce their rate and squeeze their gross margins and their profitabilty in order to expand
their base.69 Institutions involved in these competitive practices could face serious
problems due to reduced credit criteria already applied and in relation to fixed and variable
rates, since their cost of funds is not normally fixed. The average US adult had 8 credit
cards of which 2.5 were from banks (Forbes 1991). In the US in 1990 only 30% were
paying the full outstanding amount (Fortune 1991).
A final point is about regulation in the US, since regulation very often shapes
financial innovation. Apart from the Carter administration's special reserve imposed in the
mid and late 1970s, and the different state usury laws applicable until the mid 1980s, the
banks did not face any particular monetary pressure from the Federal Reserve.
During the next sub-section, we are going to discuss the British approach to the
credit cards business and summarize the features of credit cards and their dynamic
development.
6.3.2.2 UK developments
In the UK the first years of issuing credit cards were characterized by heavy installation,
training and huge promotional costs. In 1974 in particular, banks failed to increase their
rates in spite of extremely high market rates. Later, at the end of the 1970s significant
government regulation of a retrospective nature occurred (Hanson 1988). From the
beginning of the 1980s significant profits occurred.
In the UK, Barclay's considered in 1976 applying charges for any individual
transaction, but based on the US experience it was believed that cardholders would just
switch cards. 70 As we have already mentioned, the duality principle was allowed in the US
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from the mid 1970s. But by the end of the 1970s, and in the early 1980s, Barclays' fears
were proved inaccurate as it was observed that cardholders were extremely insensitive to
interest rate changes (Hanson 1988).
In the UK during 1978, credit cards covered only 2 percent of outstanding credit
(ibid). But in the UK during this period almost 95% of outstanding credit cards were bank
cards and the types of alternative available to the British consumer were minimaL. He did
not have access to the plethora of biidget accounts, retailers' account, trading cheques, hire
purchases and TIE cards that the US consumer had. It was a more oligopolistic situation in
two ways: less available options and a concentrated banking sector (the Big Six). The
oligopolistic approach and tacit price fixing are obvious in the graph in appendix (A-6.2J
which shows the main British banks' prevailing credit card rates during the period 1975-
1995.
As we could observe in appendix (A-6.3J spreads between cost of funds (CD) and
interest charges for the period 1975 until 1995 were between 13% and almost 18%. They
were significantly higher than their US counterparts (see comparative graph in appendix
(A-6.4J). As we have already mentioned, Access and Visa in the UK charged interest
payments for the whole amount in the case of outstanding balances, taking into account the
prevailing card rates. We conclude that the profitability of credit card operations was
considerable. During the 1980s total consumer loans fell by almost 6 percent but credit
cards stayed almost at the same level (The Economist 1991a).
A nuisance for the UK banks took place at the end of 1970s when they were facing
considerable government restrictions on extended credit and escalating cost of funds i.e.
soaring interest rates (Drury and Ferrier 1985).
Additionally, on the other hand, there is not any clear reduction in the labour cost of
British financial institutions, as we can observe in table (T-6.4J on employment in the UK
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during 1974-1994. Until 1990, employment constantly increased, but then reduced
thereafter. But since they are total figures, their significance is not overwhelming and we
should restrain ourselves from extracting any major conclusion, other than that banks faced
high costs during this period and the proliferation of plastic cards did not manage to reduce
them.
By not allowing unsolicited mailing after the complaints rising from Access's
actions, the British government effectively established Barclaycard and Access as the only
credit cards networks. The only attempt to create a third network took place from Co-
operative Bank in 1984 but with very limited scope and success. In the UK even from the
late 1970s until the beginning of 1990s, it was believed that the majority of merchants
accepted bank credit cards with the notorious exception of Marks and Spencer. In relation
to regional retailers, both Mastercard and Visa tried to make them join.
In 1986 the Co-operative Bank was the first bank in the UK to offer competitive
rates to cardholders that maintained credit balances (Hanson 1988). It was like a current
account combined with the Visa network in indirect competition with the Swift network in
the UK, allowing for the difference in the loan-granted element, partially compensated by
the overdraft facilities of the current accounts in the 1980s.
In the UK existing holders were also - as in the US - encouraged to increase the use
of their cards71 or, especially in 1990s, to transfer balances. They were encouraged by
either waiving annual fees - equal to 10 pounds where it was applicable - in case they
charge more than a predefined annual benchmark or by offering low interest rates for the
first year.72 Banks followed different strategies - as in the US - and adopted offensive
comparative advertising. Another strategy targeted non-holders either by reducing the
credit criteria as in the case of students in the UK,73 or by using the wide acceptance of
cards in order to attract late adopters and reluctant users.
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At the end of this section, we can summarize some aspects of bank credit cards in
relation to our modeL. They were caused by high cost structures and competitive pressure
from other financial and non-financial institutions. The emergence of bank credit cards was
conditioned by the existing technology in information-processing areas, positive network
externalities, research spilovers (secured credit cards) and strategic objectives of the
institutions. The cluster of later innovations, debit and smart cards, classify them as partial
radical innovations. The dual nature of credit cards as a new process and instrument
innovation filed the spectrum and provided the successful issuers with further intangible
assets (expertise). These strategic objectives were also the source of many incremental
innovations that supported the existing innovation and facilitated the proliferation of credit
cards. These innovations took different forms, such as advanced scoring and application
screening process, secured credit or combining many features in the same card. The short-
lived government intervention in both countries did not create any persistent problem for
this proliferation.
6.4 Conclusion
During this chapter, we have discussed the financial innovations related with plastic cards.
We concentrated the main part of our discussion on bank credit cards because we consider
them as the main innovation, encompassing many aspects of other plastic cards and as the
most important for banks' profitability.
The main causes of bank credit cards were the competitive or disintermediation
pressure from financial and non financial institutions, whereas the main cause for debit
cards was cost structure.
Their design was shaped by technological developments in the information
technology area (particularly smart cards). Some of these development were also financial
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innovations such as Electronic Fund Transfer, Point of Sales and Automated Teller
Machines which were conditioned by similar reasons and meeting similar objectives to the
plastic card innovations. Bank cards faced positive network externalities. It is also possible
to observe research spilovers and existing routines between original credit cards and the
emergence of debit cards and secured credit cards or in ATM developments. Finally,
strategic objectives such as additional features (especially smart cards) and pricing
influenced the development mainly of the credit cards.
Bank credit cards could be classified as responsive, on-balance-sheet financial
innovations that generated credit. They have the characteristic of both a new financial
process and a new financial instrument and they generated credit. But in the case of debit
cards, they enhanced liquidity. Credit cards could also be perceived as a partially-radical
innovation since a cluster of innovations followed their proliferation.
Bank cards filed the intermediation spectrum and initially took advantage in the
US of regulatory imperfections. Further features of successful innovators were the
reduction on costs (debit card and EFT/POS) and intangible assets in the form of expertise,
especially used for store and affinity cards. Bank credit cards created some additional
problems in terms of competition, limitations, cost and fraud. Many incremental
innovations took place in order to remedy them such as multipurpose cards, smart cards,
advanced scoring systems and secured credit.
During this chapter, we have provided additional evidence in support of our model
and in accordance with our analytical framework, demonstrating that it can encompass, and
iluminate the analysis of our fourth cluster of innovations. Following the detailed analysis
of four clusters of innovations in this and the preceding three chapters, we turn now to
make a final assessment of financial innovation in relation to the framework developed in
chapter 2.
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Endnotes of plastic cards
1 Joshua Kelly Waddilove issued in 1880 redeemable cheques to local shops (Drury and Ferrier 1984).
2 
Payments of these vouchers were made in weekly installments (Hanson 1988).3 It was offered to their employees and selected customers and was based on a special agreement with
different establishments and not in the current form of extended credit. (Drury and Ferrier 1984).
4 In the UK initially stores like Mark and Spencer provided pre-printed cheque books and cheque guarantee
cards accepted only in their stores. The Citibank Tandem or Mark and Spencer's Scheme of minimum
monthly payments even when the customer's account is in credit (Drury and Ferrier 1984).
5 From the establishment of reciprocal arrangements between Finder's Dining Club and Diner's Club Inc in
America.
6 Diner's had less than 70,000 cardho1ders in 1967 and American Express less than 35,000 but things changed
considerably later and by 1984 Diner's had 300,000 and Amex almost 800,000 due to an extremely intensive
marketing campaign.
7 The same definition was used in order to describe credit cards which the holders had to deposit an amount
and be allowed to spend the equivalent of this amount.
8 Until1957, 26 banks issued only 754000 cards which were accepted by 11000 merchants (Drury and Ferrier
1984).
9 This fundamental change in banks' perception is highlighted by the fact that, in September 1967, 197 banks
had plans to move into the credit card business and in June 1971, 1514 had similar plans (Mathis 1972).
10 Wells Fargo Bank, United California Bank, Bank of California and Crocker National Bank.
11 Something already tried by Standard Oil Of Indiana during 1930's and which caused significant losses due
to fraud (Mandell 1990).
12 Like the Marine Midland Bank in New York or Valley National Bank in Arizona (Drury and Ferrier 1984).
13 Citybank also in order to circumvient the usury legislation of its native state (New York) moved its credit
card operation to another (South Dakota) (Mandell 1990).
14 The most famous case was Chase Manhattan Bank in 1979 (Mandell 1990).
15 The INAS for Mastercard and Base I for Visa.
16 The INET for MasterCard and Base 11 for Visa.
17 Later they were joined by Royal Bank of Scotland and WiIiams and G1yn's Bank. Sharing cost could be
very beneficial as in the case of Access case where security is assured. Each bank exercises discretionary
control on the interest rate setting, fixed its limit and dealing with queries. The cost allocation is based on a
system of applied discount for volume above a pre-arranged level and surcharge for lower leveL.
18 That caused many complaints and the UK government followed the US example and banned this practice
(Farzer 1985).19 After the first five years half of its holders (53,000) were not customers of the bank.
20 The percentage depends on the type of goods, the profit margin of the merchant and the possibility of
fraudulent transaction (Frazer 1985).
21 That could be the reason that in the UK there was a strong bias in favor of bank credit cards (Frazer 1985).
22 In excess of that, in accordance with British legal provision for defective goods, banks are considered liable
for purchases undertaken by their card (ibid).
23 The simple processing cost was around 40 cents, but the full cost was estimated to be $3.40, much higher
than the cheque-related cost estimated at 80 cents (Steiner and Teixeira 1990).
24 A typical example is the Leicestercard, which Citibank issued for the Leicester Building Society where it
combines the credit facilities with a discount on 3,500 high street shops (Drury and Ferrier 1984).
25 In accordance with the Federal Privacy Act in the US and the Consumer Protection Act in the UK (Mandell
1990).
26 In 1970 bank card losses were estimated at $115 million, 50 percent higher than 1969 and significantly
higher than $ 20 milion charged in 1966 (Mandell 1990).
27 The main contribution of neural networks is that could take into account factors and process significant
more information that current non-neural models can not (The Banker 1996b).
28 A coupon book issued against an initial deposit part of the Universal Air Travel Plan (Mandell 1990).
29 The only important independent store card issuer in the UK was Welbeck Financial Services belonging to
Debenhams and accommodating during the 1980s 40 other stores (Frazer 1985). Only for stores like Mark
and Spencer in the UK or Sears Roeburk in the US which did not initially accept other credit cards.
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30 In 1995 it had 4,200 groups in the US and 250 organization in the UK (The Economist 1995).
31 We have to mention that during the first years "Discover" achieved a large cardho1ders base of more than
30 milion during the 1990s but the operation was not at all profitable for Sears until 1989 (MandeIl1990).
32 They offered deposits, credit cards, mortgages and household insurance (Financial Times 1998).
33 The state of Nebraska and the Nebraskan Independent Bankers Association in 1976 sued the bank
unsuccessfully for violation of banking laws.
34By 1976 the Federal Home Loan Association had approved 54 applications (Drury and Ferrier 1984).
35 Cirrus was acquired in 1988 by Mastercard, Interlink was acquired in 1994 and Plus in 1987 by Visa. It
was even argued that Point Of Sale products were idle for almost twenty years until these network decided to
invest in them and promote them (Forbes 1997b).36 After five years in 1992, Switch reached 13 milion cardholders and Connect reached 11 milion
(Marketing 1992b). Then the following two years they stabilized their cardholders at these level (Marketing
1994).
37 A slower growth was observed and not a reduction in absolute numbers (Kennickell and Kwast 1997).
38 Offline debit was 62% of the total usage, and on-line 38%, in the mid 1990's (Forbes 1997).
39 This is the case for Barclays Visa Delta connect card launched in 1987.
40 This argument is simplistic and is based on the assumption that holders pay the outstanding balance and
omits the point that the outstanding balance could yield significant returns.41 But he only applied for a Japanese protection patent, where as Moreno in 1974 had applied for an
international patent (Bright 1988).
42 French consumers used their cheques extensively as a mode of payment and French banks had to process at
the end of 1980's more than 3 bilion cheques (ibid).
43 From FF467 milion in 1991 to FF300 million in 1993 (The Banker 1994).
44 Mastrecard ran a trial pilot scheme in 1985 and in 1987 decided to proceed further since they believed that
there were significant benefits such as reduction of authorization cost, better credit control, reduction of
fraud, expansion of merchants base and less replacement cards. Visa ran its own pilots and were less
enthusiastic since they believed that the only improvement was in the fraud area, already under their own
control (Bright 1988).45 Offering services as PIN, currency exchange table, log of transactions, notes, clock-calendar and a
magnetic strip for ATM and POS (PC Week 1988). Visa estimated that they would need to spend $4 bilion
where Mastrecard only $2 bilion "Financial services Yearbook" (1988, p5).
46 From one dollar for old plastic cards to $2 -$5 for smart cards and reaching $5-$20 for super smart cards,
(ibid, p6).47 When VISA already was running its own Visa cash scheme (The Banker 1997a). Mondex theoretically was
international because it was franchised to 15 countries and 30 participating banks (The Banker 1994).48 In 1988 it was estimated that the cost of a counterfeited magnetic card was $14 and the mainframes
necessary to create a counterfeit smart card required almost $2.5 milion "Financial services Yearbook"
(1988,p4).49 And the forecast for 2001 was to reach 3 bilion and 450 milion of them are going electronic purses (The
Banker 1997).50 These products have one or more of the following features: a device electronically stored with funds, a
device enabling access to an account or a device not connected with a particular account (Report on the
Application of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 1997).
51 In California, it is run by the local Federal Reserve Bank (Chorafas 1988).
52 A TV set, a telephone and an Attari terminal were necessary in order to make the banking transactions
53 A TV set and an adaptor were required in order to make the transactions with NBS and the Bank of
Scotland with the Chemical Bank (1981).54 Citibank dropped its TransAction system, Banc One Corp. Discontinued its Post 11 project and First
National Bank of Atlanta sold its own one in 1981 (Tay1or 1984).
55 It was introduced in 1983 by Exon and First City National Bank of Houston, where Exon was providing the
machines and the bank had to provide the technology in the process of transactions (ibid).
56 But the prototype was presented in 1965 also in the American Bankers Association (MandeIl1990).
57 In 1965, the DeLa Rue instruments company starting from the concept of automated gas dispenser
proposed to Barclays Bank the idea of a cash dispenser (MandeIl1990).
58 It was estimated that an ATM should undertake at least 8,000 transactions per month and from 7,200 in
1982 transactions fell to 5,000 in 1987 (MandeIl1990).
59 Retail cards accounted for 50%, oil company for 27% and TIE for 2% (MandeIl1990).
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60 The example of Home Savings and Loan Association of California, the biggest S&L institution in 1977
(Mandell1990).61 The main reasons advanced were the better discount and the comparative advantages gained in relation to
its competitors (ibid).
62 Where the retailers percent dropped from 7.7% to 5.8%, (Technology in Banking, 1990, pl18, table 5-3).
63 The top two were Citicorp with more than 15 millon and BankAmerica with more than 7 milion.
64 But this is a gross estimation because we have to allow for the particular characteristics of the banks
portfolio (ibid).
65 Potential profits were defined as the difference between the merchant's discount and Bankcard intercharge
(http://mu1 tiplex.com.)66 Net before tax earnings over assets during the period 1986-1996 (Federal Reserve Board 1997).
67 The Federal Reserve web page includes a survey and information on rates charged and annual fees. For
Bank of Hoven has a fixed rate of 18.90% plus $49 annual fee, Capital One Fixed 9.90% and $20 annual fee,
First USA 12.90% fixed no fee, or Homes FS&LA, variable 10.68% and zero fee. The main banks like
Citibank offered 17.90% variable, Bank of America applied 17.99% variable and BANC One charged
16.50% variable and all of them no fees.68 The greatest difference is between Sterling Bank & Trust, secured card, charging 22% and $78 application
fee to 7.99% for Pulaski Bank and Trust applying variable rate and 9.90% for fixed rate
(http://www.credit.com. ).69 These specialized issuers were Advanta, First USA and MBNA and their rates were fallng as market
nterest rates were going up (Fortune 1997).
7°Card holders in the US gave up some of their cards and preferred to increase the credit limits on their other
cards (Frazer 1985).71 An extreme case was the group of holders that considered that credit cards should be used only in
emergency cases; in order to alter their perception "activation policies" were used.
72 The prevailing interest rates in 1996 were around 22% and some financial institutions, mostly non banks
offered as little as 9%, the Capital One (Federal Reserve System).
73 Something already tried by TÆ cards in 1960's and bankcards in beginning of 1970's in the US creating
significant losses (Mandell 1990).
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Chapter Seven
"...human history is determined by the eternal recurrence... "
F.Nietzsche, 'The twilight of idols ", 1886
Conclusion
7. Conclusion
During the previous chapters, we introduced an analytical framework and model that
encapsulates the many elements of the process of financial innovation. The novelty of
the model is that it takes into account the integral process of financial innovation and
adds concepts predominantly derived from the standard innovation theory. Furthermore,
it highlights the potential for dual causality and introduces a new type of classification.
Another contribution is the dynamic aspect of our model i.e. the shortcomings of
existing innovations initiate further innovative activity. Finally, in order to support this
model, we made a comprehensive presentation of four clusters of financial innovations:
special liabilities, derivatives, securitization and plastic cards. During this chapter, we
are going recapitulate the model and the supportive evidence and provide some
directions for future research.
7.1 The model
We believe that in order to be able to better understand the phenomenon of financial
innovation we are bound to use a more holistic and less reductionist approach than is
frequently found in the innovation literature, providing information about the different
stages of the innovative process.
Before discussing the model, we have to recapitulate some aspects and concepts
from standard innovation theory. Remind ourselves that this is one of the contributions
of our modeL. The available literature on innovation is extremely confusing and does not
provide any definite conclusion in the form of a set of universally acceptable and
coherent factors explaining the innovative activities. We therefore highlighted the
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importance of factors such as the size of the financial institution, the importance of the
available public and firm-specific technology, existing routines (especially for
incremental innovations), research spilovers, appropriabilty, network externalities and
strategic objectives.
In the following sub section, we shall discuss the first stage of the model,
devoted to the causes of financial innovation, in the light of the detailed case studies in
the last four chapters,
7.1.1 The causes of financial innovation
During this sub-section we shall discuss the diversity of causes that initialized the
innovative activity of financial institutions in the US and the UK over the last thirty
years. The financial burden theory (Silber 1975), provides us with a general concept that
could embrace many of the causes of financial innovation. Within this concept, we are
able to discern thirteen main causes and we allocated them, to two main categories:
internal and external to the financial institution. There are also four causes that could be
either internal or external to the institution. i
The mainly external causes were seven. The first two were volatility of interest
rates and exchange rates observed after the abandonment of the Bretton- Woods system.
This volatility was a significant reason for the emergence of Forward and Future
contracts, swaps agreements and financial options. The third cause is related to the rapid
economic growth that was observed during the end of the 1970' s and the 1980' s. Swaps,
asset-backed securities such as CARS, CARDS and CCBNs are the typical examples
emanating from economic growth. The next cause is related to regulative action. These
i We are going to use past tense, since we refer to examples of financial innovation that emerged over the
last thirty years. By no means this grammatical approach, implies that our model has only a historic
value. In the following sub-sections, we are going to ilustrate the applicability of our modeL.
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restrictions acted as shadow prices for financial institutions and forced them to innovate.
Typical examples of this cause are NOW accounts, MMDAs, CDs, swaps and mostly in
the UK ATMs, and supportive process innovations, such as SPVs and credit
enhancements. The fifth cause is governmental initiative expressed under the form of
special institutions backing particular financial assets. These assets were the Ginnie
Maes, PCs, GMCs and CMOs, all of them related to securitization. Disintermediation is
the sixth cause and the most prominent examples were the MMDAs as a response to the
MMMFs, MINIs and HOMES' as a response to the heavy involvement of British banks
in the mortgage business, and bank-originated credit cards as a response to Travel and
Entertainment cards. The final pure external cause is competition, or the acquisition of a
competitive edge, highlighting the importance of demand (Miler 1991 and Merton et. al
1995). Innovation enabled greater competition (Levich 1987). Interest earnings deposit
accounts in the UK, ATS, ATMs, credit and debit cards were the typical examples of
that cause.
The first cause that could be either internal or external to the financial institution
is the support for existing innovations. Typical financial innovations emanating from
this cause are, the VaR, the SPY and credit enhancement, the POS, smart cards and
ATMs. Another potential cause was liquidity enhancement. Automated Transfer
Services, in the UK Certificate of Deposits, Ginnie Maes, PCs, GMCs and CMOs were
examples of financial innovation emanating from that cause. A further cause was
transaction costs and the most significant examples were swap agreements and financial
options. The final cause from this category, was institutional requirements. Repos in the
UK, SPVs and credit enhancement in the US, were the most prominent innovations,
caused by these requirements.
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The first purely internal cause is the institutional preferences that caused the
emergence of NOW accounts, MMDAs, credit derivatives (initially), Ginnie Maes, and
the British originated MINIs and HOMES. The second internal cause is the cost
structure and this was the reason behind the emergence of debit cards, EFTs and
EFTPOS, ATMs and Home Banking.
One significant observation that was made during the discussion of the above
causes and corresponding financial innovations, referred to the fact that many financial
innovations had more than one cause justifying their emergence. Amongst others, NOW
accounts and MMDAs emerged due to regulation but also institutional preferences; ATS
were caused by liquidity enhancement and the acquisition of competitive edge. Similarly
swap agreements were caused by a mixture of regulation, market volatility and
economic growth. Finally, Ginnie Mae emanated from government intervention,
institutional preferences and liquidity enhancement and credit cards from a combination
of disentermidiation and acquisition of competitive edge. Unquestionably there was a
primary cause of larger significance such as regulation for NOW sand MMDAs or
government intervention for Ginnie Mae, but other causes (probably secondary ones)
also contributed to the emergence of the particular financial innovation. An additional
observation is that the same innovation could have different causes in the US and the
UK. Very ilustrative examples were the interest bearing current account (non-uniform
regulation) and the mortgage backed securities (non-uniform government intervention).
The importance of these observations consists in underlining the complexity of the
phenomenon of financial innovation and the necessity of taking into account as many
factors as possible when we investigate it.
The following sub-section provides us with further detailed discussion of the
factors affecting the emergence of the financial innovation, relevant to the financial
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institution. The analysis continues to follow the pattern of the framework developed in
chapter 2, concerning the factors which shape financial innovations, a classification of
innovations, and the features which are associated with successful innovations.
7.1.2 Factors shaping financial innovative activity
During this sub-section, we shall discuss factors that contribute to the emergence of
financial innovative activity. Most of these factors are related with concepts that we
encountered in the standard innovation theories. Some of these factors are related with
R&D relevant theories but we are not going to discuss at this stage whether R&D are
important or not for the emergence of financial innovations since we are going to
address this issue in the following sub-section.
The first aspect that could influence the emergence of financial innovation is
existing routines. Innovations that were based on, or influenced by, routines were
Futures, Super Now accounts, credit derivatives, CARS, CARDs, CCBNs and direct
debit cards. All of them were incremental innovations based on existing ones. It is worth
remarking that every financial instrument that follows the standardization process
(Merton 1992), and further incremental innovation, was based on existing routines. The
importance of existing routines is also in accordance with the evolutionary economics
idea that many innovations have a cumulative characteristic (Dosi 1988) and involve
path dependency (Hodgson 1995a).
Another aspect is knowledge, in-house and publicly available. The most
ilustrative example is the pricing of options based on the Black and Scholes and
binomial models, and credit derivatives. A factor of paramount importance is
technology, both institution-specific and publicly available. The following innovations
are good ilustrations of the impact of technology: NOW accounts, ATS, swap
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agreements, financial options, CARS, CARDs, CCBNs and smart cards and Home
Banking. These innovations were not feasible without the necessary information
technology developments; some of them existed before such as Home Banking but their
proliferation was connected with the introduction of the appropriate technology.
A further factor that shapes innovative activity is research spilovers under the
more wide interpretation of benefit from existing research or innovations. llustrative
examples are NOW accounts, MMMFs, CMOs, smart cards, ATMs and secured credit
cards. Research spilovers are closely associated with existing routines, when the
financial institution has already undertaken research or has launched similar
innovations. Creativity is another factor which is essential for the emergence of every
novelty in business world, one of the most appropriate examples being credit
derivatives.
Profitability is associated with appropriability (Hippel 1981); financial
instruments do not have patterns and the "free rider" problem frequently occurs
(Poyago-Theotoky 1996). Typical examples of even partial appropriability are options,
securitized assets and credit-cards-scoring systems that confer on financial institutions
intangible assets (to be discussed later). Another factor that shapes the emergence of
financial innovation is positive network externalities. Typical examples of positive
network externalities are Futures, swaps agreements, credit cards, smart cards and
ATMs. Network positive externalities are also important for the diffusion of innovation
(Katz and Shapiro 1985) and the innovator could even subsidize in order to increase
network effect and shift demand upwards (Economides 1995).
Finally, strategic objectives of the financial institution could shape financial
innovative activity. These objectives could be related to defending market share
(NOWs), pricing policies (NOWs and MMDAs), potential cannibalisation (Super
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NOWs), use of economies of scale (NOWs, MMDAs, credit card processing), particular
needs of the customer (ABS), expanding to other areas of expertise (ABS), and
including additional features in existing innovations (smart cards, secured credit). It is
essential to mention that these strategic objectives could be additional reasons for the
emergence of incremental or routine innovations based on pricing and features of
existing innovations.
The financial innovative effort that we described above, taking place inside the
financial institution, generates many 'mutations' or varations, not randomly but based
on or guided by the prevailing conditions, structures and objectives. These variations
contain information from previous endeavors or mutations and this process is a biased
transmission taking into account these standards. It is essential to bear in mind that a
concept of cumulativeness is also relevant, and many examples highlight this: the
relation between NOW and Super NOW accounts, MMMFs and MMDAs, Forwards
and Futures, financial options and credit derivatives, and Ginnie Maes and CMOs or
even other ABS. This point could also be explained in terms of existing routines and
spilovers in the case of incremental innovations.
In the following sub-section we shall allocate the product of the innovative
activity in accordance with particular types and classification of financial innovations.
7.1.3 Types of financial innovation
During this sub-section, we shall ilustrate the allocation of financial innovations
according to some classifications. These classifications and potential taxonomies, enable
us to describe a financial innovation in a very detailed manner, highlighting different
aspects and attributes of the innovation.
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The first type of classification divides financial innovation into two types:
radical and incremental. A radical innovation is the creator of a cluster of innovations
called incremental ones. The concept of radical innovation is closely associated with an
evolutionary economics principle of 'innovation avenues' (Sahal 1985, Dosi 1988).
Typical radical innovations that we encountered were NOW accounts, Forwards,
financial options, swap agreements and VaR, Ginnie Maes, and partially credit cards
(since they did not originally emerge in the banking sector). Incremental innovation
could be endogenous to the financial firm (Richardson 1996) and a result of learning-by-
doing improvements (Audretesch 1995). Product differentiation could be perceived as
routine innovations (Knight 1967). The majority of innovations are incremental
(Audretesch 1995) and closely associated with existing routines and learning-by-doing.
Typical incremental innovations are MMDAs, Super NOW accounts, Futures, swaptions
and credit derivatives, PCs, GMCs, CMOs, and other ABS as well as smart cards (since
plastic and credit cards already included further non-financial aspects).
Then we used Schumpeter's definition of innovation for mainly two reasons: it
encompassed all types of innovative activity i.e. product, process, structure, material and
markets and, based on these definitions, it highlighted that competition through
innovation enables other "external" players and potential competitors to enter the
market. Schumpeter distinguished five different types of innovation and we adapted
them to the financial innovative process. The first is new instruments (or products); the
vast majority of our examples belong to this category. The most prominent examples
were NOW and Super NOW accounts, Forwards, Futures, Options, CMOs and other
ABS such as CARS, CARDS and CCBNs. The second type is new processes and
ilustrative examples were CC, ATS, VaR, SPVs and credit enhancement, EFTs and
ATMs. The other three categories do not include so many numerous examples as the
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instrument and process innovations. An example of new markets is credit derivatives;
another example for new material is financial options as a completely new approach,
and particularly the notion of option; and finally examples of new structures were the
pricing teams or the SPV or even the processing departments of credit cards.
Many innovations could present more than one characteristic. A typical example
is an option which exploits a new material, i.e. the pricing model, and is a new product
or financial instrument; or a credit card could be described as both an instrument (for
purchases) and process (instant loan). An extreme example is credit derivatives which
include characteristics of three different types: instrument, material, market.
Our third classification allocates innovations into two groups: responsive, which
is the vast majority, and exploratory ones. Before providing examples for this
classification it is important to discuss the concept of exploratory innovations. We could
analogize by highlighting the importance of market factors which appeared in the
standard innovation literature initially from Smookler and the demand-pull economists.
Extensive research (SAPPHO) provided them with satisfactory empirical results about
the importance of understanding the "user's needs" for the success of an innovation. It is
essential for the innovator to know the area (Rosenberg 1979). They proposed that a
combination of both technological capabilities and user needs should be addressed, like
"the two blades of a scissors" (Smookler 1966).
On the other hand, as we have already mentioned, the importance and impact of
R&D for innovative activity is not universally acceptable. Some authors argued that they
are positively related with innovations at a decreasing rate (Acs and Audretsch 1988), or
the existence of a threshold (Symeonidis 1996). But their measure of R&D could omit
the contribution of managers (Freeman 1982), since they show only formal research
(Kleinknecht 1987 and Symeonidis 1996). But we circumvented the discussion of the
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importance of R&D for financial institutions since we adhered to Pavitt s (1984)
approach. Remind ourselves that he proposed that the diversity observed in innovative
activity among sectors could be justified through the cumulative characteristic of
technology and innovation. He distinguished three types: supplier dominated (little
R&D), production intensive (considerable R&D) and science-based (high R&D).
Financial institutions belong to the first category. The consequence is that R&D
activities were neither well organized nor very intensive in comparison with other
industries and only in the last years has an institutionalization of R&D activities been
observed (BIS 1986). This institutionalization of Research and Development activities
plus the existence of a relationship between them and the emergence of financial
innovation, endogenizes the research activity of financial institutions.
As disintermidiation and evolution of the banking sector takes place, exploratory
innovations emerge from these R&D departments. An exploratory innovation could in
some cases be associated with types of new products, new markets, new materials or
new organizational structures. The only example we encountered, and which by
coincidence presents these characteristics, is credit derivatives. Despite the fact that their
emergence was based on filing institutional preferences, their development showed the
characteristics of an exploratory innovation. We are going to refer more to exploratory
.innovations at the end of this chapter. On the other hand, any innovation that was
created in order to respond to any "burden" that the financial institution faces, internal
or external, is a responsive innovation. A responsive innovation could be associated
with a new product, process, market or organizational structure. All the financial
innovations we encountered belong to this category (NOWs, MMDAs, Forwards, ABS,
credit cards).
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Furthermore, we could divide the existing types of financial product or
organizational structure innovations according to this novelty is included in the balance
sheet or is not included ("off' balance sheet). Whether typical on-balance-sheet
examples are NOW and Super NOW accounts, MMDAs, CMOs and other ABS and
credit cards. Example of "off' balance sheet in the strict notion are ATS, SPVs, credit
enhancements, ATMs and debit cards and credit derivatives. During the discussion of
financial innovations, we encountered examples of innovations that initially were OBS
and later, due to regulative efforts, became "on" balance sheet as far as capital adequacy
ratios were concerned. Typical examples were Forwards, swap agreement and financial
options before the Basle accord (1988).
Finally due to the intermediation function, we divided financial instruments into
three categories (instead of the five proposed in the BIS report in 1986): liquidity
enhancing, risk transferring and credit generating. In the first category we could allocate
NOW accounts, MMDAs, CMAs, ATS', Repos, ABS' and ATMs. In the second
category, the transfer of risk, we allocated swap agreements, options, swaptions, credit
derivatives, credit enhancement process, CMOs and other ABS. The credit generation
innovations were mainly the FRAs and credit cards.
In the following sub section, we shall discuss the features of financial
innovations that enable them to "survive" and become successfuL.
7.1.4 Successful features of innovations
During this sub-section, we shall discuss the features of a successful innovation.
According to our previous chapters, we encountered seven main features that successful
financial innovations include.
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The first successful feature is filing the spectrum of intermediation. It is one of
the most frequent features in our research. Typical examples were NOW accounts,
MMDAs, financial options, swaptions and credit derivatives, Ginnie Maes, credit cards,
debit cards.
The second feature of successful innovation is the enhancement of risk
management. It is also one of the most frequently-cited aspects of successful financial
innovation. Innovations enabled better risk management (Miler 1992) and a
considerable reduction of the uncertainty that institutions faced (Bhatt 1986). Typical
examples were Repos, Forwards, swaps agreements, VaRs, Ginnie Mae and credit cards
and applicable new scoring systems.
Another feature is related to addressing regulatory imperfections. Very often it is
of a temporal nature. Typical examples were NOW accounts, MMMFs, CMOs (tax
implications) and the British CDs. Very often this regulatory imperfection ceased to
exist or the market "clears up" without the need for government intervention (van Horne
1985).
A similar feature addresses market imperfections. The typical example was swap
agreements (asymmetry of information) and reduction of transactions costs (Levich
1987). The fifth element is related to potential temporary monopolies. The existence of
regulatory lags could encourage innovations and protect the first mover (Corkish et al
1997). But even if many researchers such as van Horne (1985), Artus and Boisseau
(1988), Allen and Gale (1994) advanced this feature of successful innovation, in reality
it is not common to encounter this type of temporary monopoly. The only potential
examples were NOW accounts, initially in two states, and the designing and pricing of
credit derivatives.
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On the other hand, since the first mover advantage does not exist, then intangible
advantages could apply. A very important aspect of successful innovations is the
acquisition of intangible assets. Typical intangible advantages are the expertise and the
reputation that accompanies it (Tuffano 1990). Typical examples were financial option
pricing, issue of ABS and expertise on processing and managing credit cards, leading
also to issue of affinity cards.
Finally a further successful feature is cost reduction. Typical examples of that
feature were ATS, debit cards and EFTs. This feature could be associated with the
overall çost structure of the institution. This is crucial for the ABS-related innovation,
which significantly alters the portfolio, exposure and regulatory burden of banking
institutions.
We have now summarized our conclusion as to how the numerous innovations
that we encountered during the comprehensive presentation of the four clusters of
financial innovations were successful applications of our financial modeL. We could
mention that, apart from the financial model itself, the case studies themselves are
offered as a further contribution of our research. In the following section, we shall
discuss the dynamic nature of our model of the financial innovation process.
7.2 The dynamic nature of the model
A further key feature of our model is its dynamic and evolutionary dimension. The
dynamic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis which becomes a new thesis was explained
in Kane's (1981), (1988) 'regulatory dialectic' theory. The main theme of this approach
was a regulatory response such as the DIDMCA in 1980 in the US that addressed the
issue of NOW accounts and the proliferation of MMMFs products.
261
Conclusion
This evolutionary approach could provide us with a more general dynamic view,
where the dialectic process could be divided in four stages: the current status of the
financial institution, then due to internal or external reasons an innovative process is
initialized, a selection and diffusion of the financial innovation takes place and this
innovation becomes part of the arsenal and routines of the institution until a new cause
puts in motion again this process. The cause of this innovative activity could be one of
the twelve causes already mentioned or a shortcoming, initially not anticipated, of a
particular innovation.
Consequently new innovation is required in order to remedy these shortcomings.
The nature of this new innovative activity could be determined by the past behavior of
firms in accordance with the already-explained concept of cumulativeness. Remind
ourselves that innovation is after all a "problem solving procedure" (Dosi i 988) hence
this new innovation should take into account the particular characteristics of the
problematic initial innovation.
llustrative examples that we encountered during our research were, the
emergence of VaR in order to reduce the risk and later the regulatory burden that
financial institutions faced, due to their large amount of derivative contracts, the
emergence of SPY and the credit enhancement process in order to allow securitization
and the launch of ABS, and finally the creation of advanced scoring systems, smart
cards and secured credit cards in order to address the shortcomings of the original credit
cards. We can go even further and consider the whole phenomenon of securitization as a
dynamic response to the proliferation of mortgages in the US.
During this section, we discussed the dynamic nature of our modeL. In the
following section, we shall discuss the potential future research on related areas of
financial innovative activities.
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7.3 Further research
During this final section, we shall discuss potential further research that could be
undertaken in relation to the phenomenon of financial innovation.
Banks have a unique role in the intermediation process and the economic
development of a country. Their role is unique due to their expertise to grant, monitor
and screen the credit granted (Davis 1993). The future of financial innovation is
prosperous since there are areas of financial intermediation still underdeveloped
(Merton 1986). Financial innovation is stil not uniform to all countries (Artus and
Boisseau 1988) and the next round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations is
aiming to further open up financial markets. Due to market imperfections, policy or
behavioural reasons, the law of one price does not apply (Levich 1987). Especially in
developing countries a lot of financial innovation is expected to take place (Zahid 1995)
during the process that financial systems move from government to banking and capital
dominated systems (Cole and Slade 1996). Hence there is much scope for further
research by extending the usage of case studies to a wider range of countries. Apart the
countries' perspective, we could also try to use this model as an analytical tool for
banking activities and their impact on the regional development (Chick and Dow 1988).
In addition, further research could be directed into two main areas: the financial
institution and the financial system, in order to extend the reach of the model and use it
to address specific questions.
It is possible to investigate whether innovative institutions are less susceptible
than the rest to business cycle fluctuations as happens for non-financial firms (Geroski
1995). Another intriguing question is whether the shareholders' regime is important for
the innovative effort as happens for other firms (Dosi and Orsenigo 1988). It is also
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worth investigating the point that the business cycle and innovative activity are not
independent and whether the innovative effort of financial institutions is affected by the
profitability of the institutions.
In relation to the financial system, it is possible to investigate the diffusion of
financial innovation and whether diffusion could be shaped by the concepts of
profitabilty, scale of investment and communication with early adopters, as in the non-
financial firms (Freeman 1988). It is also possible to discuss the distinction between
endogenous and exogenous causes and factors (Arestis and Howells 1992) shaping the
innovative activity.
Finally, it is possible in the light of these new areas for research to continue to
study further our model, enriching it with other clusters of innovations such as banking
assets i.e. loans and try to identify further causes, expand the classification and include
additional types such as equity generating innovations (BIS 1986), and additional
successful features of these innovations. It could also be possible to elaborate further
and find potential interconnections among causes and particular types of innovation or
discuss the concept of timing in the emergence of financial innovative activity.
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(A-I.I) Classification of Innovations
Smith (3) Labour emanated
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Speculative, or combinin~ existing technology
Veblen (2) Product (particular good)
Process (way of doin2)
Schumpeter (5) New product
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(A-l.2) Firm's Structure and innovation
"Bigness wins" Small and medium firms
0 Schumpeter, from established leaders
economies of scale. Galbraith, cost of
innovation and structure of the new
capitalist society.
0 Hambert (1963), large firms have higher 0 Hambert (1963),small firms due to their
percentage of commercialised structure count for major innovations.
innovations and better finance conditions.
0 Smookler (1966), the ratio of productivity 0 Freeman (1982), SAPPHO project in U.K
over research is biased against large firms during 1945-1976, highlighting the
due to larger output. importance of other factors than R&D in
innovative activity.
0 Scherer (1968), large firms are the 0 Rothwell (1986), small and medium
originators for most US innovations. firms enhance the national rates of
technological progress.
0 Kamien and Schwartz (1982), highlighted 0 Kleinknecht (1987), formal laboratory 
the critical point on R&D investment and research undermines the significance of
innovativeness. small firms innovative activity.
0 Cohen and Klepper (1994), R&D 0 Symeonidis (1996), small firms do not
increase proportionally with size but undertake formal R&D hence
large firms keep patterns. underestimate their innovativeness.
0 The CIS (1995) of the EU sustained the 0 Audretsch and Feldman (1996),
point that large firms innovate significant application of new economic knowledge
more than small ones. is spatially concentrated.
Related studies
. Arrow (1962), proposed that incentives to . Mansfield (1968), Large firms do not
innovate are greater when purchasers are spend proportionally more than small
forming competitive market. ones.
. Pavitt (1984), innovation is positive . Geroski (1988), competition and
associated with R&D and cumulative. innovativeness are mutually re-enforcing.
. Acs and Audretesch (1988), innovation . Dosi (1988), log-linear relationship
decreasing positive related with R&D, between R&D and size and cumulative
where concentration negative related. nature of innovation.
. Audretesch (1995), innovative activity . Love and Roper (1997), highlighted the
could be incremental and alternative importance of transfer technologies and
application of existing technology. networking.
. Wood (1997), innovative activity is
enhanced by R&D and technically skiled
labour force.
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Appendices (A)
(A-l.3) Causes of financial innovation
Author(s) Causes
Silber (1975) -Reduction of Utility
Kane (1981) -Regulation
Van Horne (1985) -Volatility of inflation and interests
-Regulatory changes
-Tax changes
-Technological advances
- Increased economic activity
-New academic work
Miler (1986) -Taxation and Regulation
-Academic qualification
-Government initiated innovations
-Filing the spectrum
-Reduction of transaction cost
Gardener (1988) -Technology advances
-Profit opportunities from temporary monopoly
Artus /Boisseau (1988) -Financial deregulation
-Marketization, Securitization
- Desintermediation
-Globalisation
Ross (1989) - Tailoring the product
-Institutional arrangements
Flood (1992) -Transaction costs
-Liquidity
Arestis and Howells (1992) - Technological change
- Deregulation
-Competition
-Cost of intermediation
Mishkin (1992) -Interest rates volatility
-Technological advances
-A void tax regulation
-Re-regulation induced
Miler (1992) -Volatile exchange rates
-Information technology advances
-Economic growth
-Regulatory activity 
Merton (1992) -Demand for more complete markets
-Reduction of transaction costs
-Increased liquidity
Davis (1993) -Interest rate volatility
-Restrictions on banks BaL. Sheets
- Disintermediation
Merton and ale (1995) -Cost structure
-Demand requirements
Ford / Molluneux (1995) -Competition
-Technological advance
Blake (1995) -Supply and demand interaction
-Cost structure
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Appendices (A)
(A-L.4) Further contributions based on the BIS classification
Author(s) Types Factors influencing the process
BIS report (1986) Risk transferring Technological progress
Liquiditv enhancing Regulatory pressure
Credit generating Increased financial competition
Equity-generating Historical/evolutionary dynamics
Levich (1987) BIS types Policy oriented imperfections
Behaviora1 barriers imperfections
Walmsley (1988) BIS types Intense competition
Aggressive (demand induced) The impact of regulation
Defensive (response to environment or Technological advances
internal causes)
Llewellyn (1992) EIS types Increased wealth
Alterations in portfolio behavior
Change in suppliers or users preferences
Changes in the market environment
Regulatory policy originated
Spectrum filing
Technology advances
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Appendices (A)
(A-L.S) Types of financial innovations activity
Author(s) Types
Veblen (1896) Product
Process
Silber (1975) Product/practice
Adversity/ Success
Silber (1983) Cash management
Investment contracts
Market structures
Institutional Organization
Kane (1981) Non Monetary
Indirect Monetary
Monetary
Niehans (1983) Adoptive
Technological
BIS report (1986) On Balance sheet
Off Balances sheet
Walmsley (1988) Defensive
Aggressive
Artus /Boisseau (1988) Cash management
Financial indermediation instruments
New instruments to existing markets
Instruments to new markets
Vilas (1988) Special Debt instruments
Debt-equity hybrid instruments
Special equity
Risk covering
Tuffano (1990) Mortgage backed
Asset backed
Non equity debt linked instruments
Equity linked instruments
Preferred stock
Equity products
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Appendices (A)
(A-l.6) Potential benefits and problems from financial
innovation
Benefits Problems
-Abnormal profits (Van Horne 1985) -Benefits not accessible to all firms (Vinal
Borges 1988)
-Positive regulation (Corkish and ale Large volumes required to amortize
1997) (Walmsley 1988)
-Positive complementarities (Corkish and -Potential duplication (Pesendorfer 1995)
ale 1997)
- Intangible assets (Tuffano 1990) -Negative complementarities (Pesendorfer
1995)
-Enhanced risk management (Levich 1987) -Problematic monetary control (Mishkin
1992, Llewellyn 1992)
-Reduction of transaction cost (Allen and -Limited information about the pricing
Gale 1984) (Conrad 1989, Detemple 1990)
-Enhanced liquidity (Levich 1987) -Systematic instability (Raines 1992)
-Reduction of intermediation cost
(Llewellyn 1992)
-Reduction of uncertainty (Bhatt 1986)
,
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Appendices (A)
(A-4.1) Risk Spectrum of Derivatives products
Low Risk Area -Cash market Alternatives
-Selling options
-Brokering Futures and Options
-Forward Rate Agreements (FRA)
-Forward Exchange Contracts
-Interest rate Swaps (***)
-Selling Swaptions
-Currency Swaps
High Risk Area -Buying Options
(***)Interest Rate Swaps:
Low Risk Area -Amortizing Swaps
-More Frequent Payments
-Zero Coupon Swaps
-Accreting Swaps
-Forward SwapsHigh Risk Area
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Appendices (A)
(A-6.1) Credit cards and CDs rates in the US (1975-95)
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Appendices (A)
(A-6.2) Credit cards charge rates in the UK (1975-95) (%)
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(A-6.3) Credit cards and CDs rates in the UK (1975-95)
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(A-6.4) Spread of US and UK bank credit cards
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Tables (T)
fT-3.1) US Monetary aggregates during 1959-1992 (SA)
(in $ bilion)
Ml Ml M2 M3
NOW accounts
(Jan.) Currency Demand Deposits Bank Thrift Total
1959 28.5 110.0 0.0 0.0 138.9 286.6 288.8
1960 28.8 110.9 0.0 0.0 140.0 298.2 300.1
1961 28.7 112.0 0.0 0.0 141.1 314.1 317.1
1962 29.4 115.5 0.0 0.0 145.2 337.5 343.0
1963 30.4 117.4 0.0 0.1 148.3 365.2 374.2
1964 32.3 121.0 0.0 0.1 153.7 395.2 408.5
1965 34.0 126.1 0.0 0.1 160.7 427.5 445.8
1966 36.2 132.2 0.0 0.1 169.1 462.0 485.1
1967 38.2 133.0 0.0 0.1 171.9 481.6 509.1
1968 40.2 143.1 0.0 0.1 184.0 527.1 560.1
1969 43.1 154.7 0.0 0.1 198.7 569.3 607.9
1970 46.0 159.3 0.0 0.1 206.2 589.6 616.1
1971 48.9 165.6 0.0 0.1 215.5 633.0 685.6
1972 52.3 176.6 0.0 0.2 230.1 717.7 783.8
1973 56.6 193.4 0.0 0.3 251.5 810.3 896.3
1974 61.3 200.7 0.0 0.4 263.8 859.7 993.9
1975 67.4 204.2 0.1 0.4 273.8 906.5 1076.1
1976 73.2 212.2 0.4 0.6 288.6 1027.2 1182.5
1977 80.2 223.4 1.4 1.5 309.1 1166.7 1324.2
1978 88.0 239.5 1.9 2.4 334.8 1280.9 1487.4
1979 96.8 248.6 6.8 3.2 358.8 1372.7 1657.3
1980 106.0 258.8 13.1 4.3 385.7 1483.6 1819.0
1981 115.4 248.4 34.9 9.0 411.6 1608.5 2016.0
1982 123.3 234.2 65.5 16.3 443.4 1772.6 2265.2
1983 133.6 234.1 80.5 25.5 477.7 1965.5 2476.3
1984 147.3 240.2 97.6 35.2 525.0 2143.2 2702.6
1985 157.0 244.6 106.2 46.3 556.2 2337.3 3004.9
1986 168.6 265.0 126.0 55.7 620.9 2507.3 3221.6
1987 182.1 299.3 166.7 75.9 730.1 2750.0 3511.4
1988 197.9 289.9 180.7 81.9 757.1 2855.3 3698.3
1989 213.2 285.0 192.4 88.4 786.0 2999.8 3920.3
1990 224.4 278.1 198.5 87.3 795.3 3173.1 4072.5
1991 251.1 273.5 209.4 84.8 826.7 3293.4 4150.3
1992 268.9 295.9 245.4 92.1 910.0 3388.1 4189.6
Source, Federal Reserve System
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Tables (T)
(T -3.2) MMMF and other accounts in the US (1959-1992)(SA)
( in $ bilion)
MMMF
(Jan.) Retail Institutions Total Eurodollar RPs Banker's Accept. CPs
1959 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.6 3.1
1960 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.6 3.9
1961 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 5.1
1962 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.1 5.4
1963 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.1 6.8
1964 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.2 7.7
1965 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 1.3 9.2
1966 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.6 10.3
1967 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 1.8 15.1
1968 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.9 18.5
1969 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 2.4 22.7
1970 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.4 3.3 35.6
1971 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 3.2 3.6 33.8
1972 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.8 3.8 33.1
1973 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 7.5 3.4 35.3
1974 0.1 0.0 0.1 5.8 13.3 5.2 44.8
1975 2.1 0.2 2.3 8.5 13.8 13.1 50.5
1976 2.8 0.4 3.2 11.7 15.9 10.8 47.8
1977 2.4 0.7 3.1 15.0 24.2 11.5 52.4
1978 2.7 1.2 3.9 22.7 33.5 14.5 64.8
1979 8.0 3.7 11.7 36.1 46.2 22.2. 82.1
1980 39.2 11.0 50.2 52.3 46.2 27.3 100.8
1981 65.9 16.6 82.5 59.1 60.1 32.4 99.1
1982 158.0 37.9 195.9 81.2 66.4 40.4 106.6
1983 171.4 47.6 219.0 90.3 70.4 45.0 11 1.9
1984 139.4 42.0 181.4 100.2 95.1 44.1 136.4
1985 172.9 64.4 237.3 96.1 104.7 45.3 161.3
1986 179.5 66.7 246.2 95.8 120.2 42.5 208.0
1987 211.8 83.9 295.7 107.7 146.7 37.8 237.0
1988 228.7 94.9 323.6 105.8 176.3 43.2 270.8
1989 247.6 92.2 339.8 115.1 188.9 39.8 341.8
1990 326.6 111.3 437.9 92.2 156.9 41.0 342.1
1991 365.0 146.5 511.5 90.8 135.8 35.1 362.0
1992 369.1 191.0 560.1 78.1 119.6 23.0 333.4
Source, Federal Reserve System
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Tables (T)
(T -3.3) US banks liabilities (1959-1992) (SA)
( in $ bilion)
MMDAS Savings Small Time Large Time
(Jan.) Banks Thrift Banks Thrift Banks Thrift Banks Thrift
1959 0.0 0.0 51.8 84.2 9.4 2.3 1.6 0.0
1960 0.0 0.0 54.5 92.1 9.0 2.6 1.2 0.0
1961 0.0 0.0 58.8 101.5 9.8 2.9 2.2 0.0
1962 0.0 0.0 64.6 112.0 11.9 3.8 4.1 0.0
1963 0.0 0.0 71.8 124.5 15.9 4.7 7.3 0.0
1964 0.0 0.0 77.1 138.5 20.1 5.8 11.3 0.0
1965 0.0 0.0 83.7 153.2 23.0 6.9 15.9 0.0
1966 0.0 0.0 92.5 165.1 27.4 7.9 21.4 0.0
1967 0.0 0.0 89.6 163.1 39.7 17.4 25.3 0.0
1968 0.0 0.0 94.3 168.9 51.7 28.1 30.7 0.0
1969 0.0 0.0 96.1 172.6 64.3 37.7 35.8 0.0
1970 0.0 0.0 93.7 169.0 71.3 49.3 19.1 0.0
1971 0.0 0.0 99.8 163.8 80.2 73.6 46.3 0.8
1972 0.0 0.0 114.1 180.6 95.5 97.4 56.7 1.6
1973 0.0 0.0 125.0 197.7 110.3 125.9 71.8 2.5
1974 0.0 0.0 128.6 198.9 117.5 150.8 111.4 3.7
1975 0.0 0.0 137.7 203.3 123.6 165.9 141.4 5.6
1976 0.0 0.0 164.8 229.5 142.9 198.7 120.8 6.4
1977 0.0 0.0 205.4 253.7 156.8 239.3 109.8 7.8
1978 0.0 0.0 219.7 274.9 168.4 280.4 138.4 10.7
1979 0.0 0.0 212.8 259.8 189.2 344.1 181.3 17.3
1980 0.0 0.0 192.5 224.7 240.0 401.5 192.0 33.7
1981 0.0 0.0 177.3 204.9 296.7 452.0 225.5 46.2
1982 0.0 0.0 159.7 186.8 350.9 473.8 252.3 54.8
1983 113.4 76.2 264.2 257.3 356.9 438.0 242.0 60.4
1984 232.1 150.2 364.3 321.2 353.8 439.4 220.4 101.4
1985 277.8 158.0 399.6 320.6 386.9 501.0 252.9 149.5
1986 333.7 183.5 459.0 358.2 388.4 501.2 279.1 152.4
1987 378.7 196.7 539.5 412.6 368.4 487.5 273.8 149.2
1988 356.8 168.4 536.4 400.1 395.3 537.8 301.8 164.1
1989 346.9 148.7 537.2 379.1 460.4 589.7 349.1 175.2
1990 355.9 132.1 548.1 352.5 535.7 614.9 379.3 159.6
1991 379.8 126.5 585.0 342.1 615.3 559.3 365.8 118.0
1992 411.3 135.2 677.6 387.4 589.8 454.2 330.8 82.1
Source, Federal Reserve System
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Tables (T)
(T -3.4) US banks assets and liabilities (1973-1996)(SA)
( in $ bilion)
Domestic Commercial Banks All Commercial Banks
(Jan.) Assets Liabilties Capital Assets Liabilties Capital
1973 703.6 639.9 63.7 722.6 660.9 61.7
1974 804.0 735.9 68.1 830.5 764.8 65.7
1975 870.2 792.6 77.6 903.8 830.0 73.8
1976 909.6 827.5 82.1 945.8 868.1 77.7
1977 977.2 893.6 83.6 1017.9 940.7 77.2
1978 1078.7 991.0 87.7 1130.1 1051.1 79.0
1979 1210.3 1107.0 103.3 1283.9 1196.2 87.7
1980 1355.0 1232.4 122.6 1452.0 1347.6 104.4
1981 1479.9 1363.7 116.2 1608.9 1515.0 93.9
1982 1594.5 1474.6 119.9 1729.6 1608.5 121.1
1983 1746.9 1632.0 114.9 1881.8 1764.6 117.2
1984 1903.3 1757.1 146.2 2031.7 1879.0 152.7
1985 2065.4 1900.9 164.5 2211.8 2040.1 171.7
1986 2278.9 2091.2 187.7 2438.9 2243.9 195.0
1987 2475.8 2268.4 207.4 2680.6 2463.6 217.0
1988 2534.8 2339.4 195.4 2769.9 2572.6 197.3
1989 2696.0 2495.5 200.5 2960.0 2758.4 201.6
1990 2863.6 2653.1 210.5 3164.9 2952.6 212.3
1991 2941.7 2709.3 232.4 3291.3 3058.4 232.9
1992 3011.6 2764.0 247.6 3401.5 3154.5 247.0
1993 3053.5 2770.1 283.4 3475.9 3190.1 285.8
1994 3235.2 2940.0 295.2 3657.9 3363.9 294.0
1995 3452.4 3139.1 313.3 3909.5 3597.5 312.0
1996 3695.5 3354.9 340.6 4245.6 3893.9 351.7
Source, Federal Reserve System
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Tables (T)
(T -3.5) Monetary Aggregates of the UK (1968-1996) (SA)
( in million pounds)
Q4 Coins/Notes Ml* Ml** M2 M3 M3** M4
1968 2859 N/A 8620 N/A N/A 17900 N/A
1969 3006 N/A 9430 N/A N/A 20280 N/A
1970 3320 N/A 10940 N/A N/A 25690 27009
1971 3589 N/A 12320 N/A 24890 33040 31400
1972 4079 N/A 13120 N/A 31610 37230 38674
1973 4377 N/A 14550 N/A 34840 37080 47119
1974 5085 N/A 15170 N/A 35730 38080 52197
1975 5904 9724 17340 N/A 37200 40170 58983
1976 6714 10258 19150 N/A 40570 44540 64970
1977 7699 12691 23330 N/A 44660 48940 74595
1978 8733 14660 26860 N/A 51100 56150 85770
1979 9511 16026 29300 N/A 57640 63140 97700
1980 10239 16218 30490 N/A 68560 75110 114600
1981 10767 17781 35700 N/A 85270 95550 138200
1982 11232 19438 40130 124840 93550 106680 155000
1983 11908 21622 44700 140120 103360 120190 175600
1984 11543 23921 51560 156764 111957 132904 199700
1985 12071 24339 60960 176376 126976 147120 214700
1986 12824 28088 74694 199257 151147 179749 246300
1987 13592 31427 91866 219345 185623 216401 286300
1988 14756 35823 105048 255241 223674 257209 336100
1989 14877 31800 114388 270675 246312 288104 398800
1990 18172 N/A N/A 308514 N/A N/A 461000
1991 18643 N/A N/A 334871 N/A N/A 495800
1992 19233 N/A N/A 372317 N/A N/A 515900
1993 20361 N/A N/A 393741 N/A N/A 533100
1994 21702 N/A N/A 409693 N/A N/A 557300
1995 22996 N/A N/A 436220 N/A N/A 599200
1996 24556 N/A N/A 458433 N/A N/A 658000
M1 * : Coins plus sight deposits (from 1975)
M1 ** : Note, coins ,sight deposits plus interest bearing
M2 : Notes plus no-interest bearing deposits plus other banks retail deposit
and building societies deposits (M2 was published from 1992 until1996)
M3 : Bank deposits in sterlings
M3** : M3 plus UK deposits in other currencies
M4 : Deposits in banks and building societies (started from 1989)
(- ) In 1972 M 1 and M3 breakdown published, in 1989 was discontinued
(-) In 1990 M5 was introduced but very soon was discontinued
(-) From 1991 only M2 and M4 are used as monetary indicators
(-) From 1992, an analysis of M4 components was published
Source, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin
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Tables (T)
(T -3.6) UK assets and liabilities (1975-1992)
( in milion pounds)
Year Cd's Sight Time Advances
1975 1763 11090 19681 17523
1976 1900 12370 20922 19466
1977 2530 15177 22022 21439
1978 2256 17747 24448 25496
1979 2272 20936 29968 30981
1980 2754 19989 37835 37294
1981 2827 22630 45045 46014
1981 3355 24935 47303 48891
1982 5443 29990 60830 61816
1983 6204 34477 63905 70152
1984 6692 40200 67174 77679
1985 7400 51722 75394 90933
1986 9386 68162 89788 109585
1987 13489 79495 103025 132977
1988 14502 90206 127621 168771
1989 13398 107863 149993 200712
1990 18003 115820 169175 221594
1991 21177 141199 184341 263521
1992 22186 148169 184226 270172
(+ ) The figures are end December
(*) In 1981 the monetary aggregates were redefined
Source, Abstract of banking and financial statistics
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Tables (T)
(T -3.7) Interest rates in the UK (1970-1994)
Base 7 day Sterling Treasury Minimum
Rate deposit certificates bil Lending
rate of deposit tender Rate
Dec 3 months 91 day bils
1970 7.00 5.00 7.25 6.82 7.00
1971 4.50 2.50 4.69 4.36 5.00
1972 7.30 5.75 8.74 7.76 9.00
1973 13.00 9.50 16.00 12.46 11.50
1974 12.00 9.50 13.15 10.99 11.50
1975 11.00 7.00 11.06 10.82 11.25
1976 14.00 11.00 14.26 13.78 14.50
1977 7.05 4.00 6.77 6.37 7.00
1978 12.50 10.00 12.27 11.57 12.50
1979 17.00 15.50 16.75 15.90 17.00
1980 14.00 11.71 14.64 13.07 14.00
1981 14.57 12.52 15.28 14.51 14.38
1982 10.06 6.81 10.49 9.96 10.00
1983 9.00 5.50 9.05 8.87 9.00
1984 9.69 6.63 9.92 9.10 9.50
1985 11.50 9.12 11.85 11.15 11.37
1986 11.00 8.15 11.24 10.66 10.87
1987 8.57 5.36 8.65 8.19 8.37
1988 13.00 8.29 12.38 12.54 12.87
1989 15.00 11.51 15.08 14.50 14.87
1990 14.00 10.74 13.69 12.96 13.87
1991 10.50 7.54 10.67 10.10 10.37
1992 7.00 3.55 7.02 6.39 6.87
1993 5.50 3.04 5.23 4.87 5.37
1994 6.15 3.14 6.25 5.87 6.12
(*) In 1972 the Bank rate became MLR, in 1982 it changed to Min. Band 1 Dealing rate
Source, Bank of England
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Tables (T)
(T -3.8) UK financial institutions balance sheets (1971-1994)
( in milion pounds)
Years BS Top five All Concentration Percent (all)
1971 N/A 24892 25849 0.963 N/A
1972 15246 31363 32509 0.965 0.469
1973 17545 42361 43878 0.965 0.400
1974 20094 49683 52009 0.955 0.386
1975 24204 54553 57425 0.950 0.421
1976 28202 63626 78039 0.815 0.361
1977 34288 71985 88166 0.816 0.389
1978 39538 80567 99685 0.808 0.397
1979 45789 101994 126314 0.807 0.363
1980 53793 122994 151127 0.814 0.356
1981 61815 163872 199510 0.821 0.310
1982 73033 199574 241605 0.826 0.302
1983 85869 219978 268993 0.818 0.319
1984 102689 257273 308414 0.834 0.333
1985 120763 254624 309325 0.823 0.390
1986 140603 279922 341466 0.820 0.412
1987 160097 287361 352766 0.815 0.454
1988 188844 332522 400574 0.830 0.471
1989 187012 391402 469242 0.834 0.399
1990 216848 405550 488305 0.831 0.444
1991 243980 415862 502154 0.828 0.486
1992 262515 488414 590803 0.827 0.444
1993 281152 512582 622561 0.823 0.452
B/S : Building Societes
Top Five: Barclays, Lloyds,Midland,Natwest and the RBS
All : All clearing banks
Concentration: Top five banks / All banks
Percent (all) : Building Societies / All, banks
Source, Abstract of banking financial statistics
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Tables (T)
(T -3.9) Profits of the UK banks during the period 1971-1992
Year Milion Change Banks behavior
1971 301
1972 411 36.54% Tandem
1973 623 51.58% Tandem
1974 523 -16.05% Tandem
1975 468 -10.52% Tandem
1976 756 61.54% Tandem
1977 977 29.23% Tandem
1978 1167 19.45% Tandem
1979 1668 42.93% Tandem
1980 1577 -5.46% Tandem ex.L/R
1981 1751 11.03% Tandem
1982 1560 -10.91% Tandemex.M
1983 1758 12.69% Tandemex.M
1984 2010 14.33% Tandemex.M
1985 2829 40.75% Tandem
1986 3283 16.05% Tandem
1987 517 -84.25% Tandemex.R
1988 4752 819.15% Tandem
1989 313 -93.41 % Tandem
1990 2679 755.91 % Tandem
1991 1421 -46.96% Tandemex.M
1992 1134 -20.20% Tandem ex.LIMN
L: Lloyds
R: Royal Bank of Scotland
M: Midland
N: Natwest
B: Barclays
Source, Abstract of banking financial statistics
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Tables (T)
(T-4.1) Exchange - traded and Over the Counter Derivatives
(in $ trilion)
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
Over the Counter 0.8 2.6 5.0 8.0 15.1
instruments
-Currency 0.1 0.45 0.6 1.2 1.4
- Interest rates 0.7 1.8 4 5.8 13.8
* 
swaps 0.4 1 2.25 3.8 9
*FRA'S 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.8 3.8
*swaptions - 0.3 0.55 0.6 1.3
-Equity - 0.05 0.2 0.4 0.5
Exchange traded 0.7 1.2 2.1 2.5 4.1
instruments
Total 1.5 3.8 7.1 10.5 19.2
*(International Swap dealer association)
Source, FRBNY Quarterly Review Winter 1992-1993 and updated by the author from
FRBS, internet address
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Tables (T)
(T -5.1) Securitized assets in the US (1987-1994)
( in $ bilion)
Year Consumer Business loans Trade Total
credit receivables
1987 - - 5.1 5.1
1988 - - 6.8 6.8
1989 48.7 2.0 8.0 60.2
1990 78.5 5.8 9.2 93.7
1991 103.3 8.8 11.3 123.7
1992 121.4 11.6 13.8 155.5
1993 130.7 21.3 15.2 155.6
1994 139.4 23.3 18.0 180.7
Source, OEeD (1995)
(T -5.2) Securitized assets in the US (1989 - 1998)
( in $ milion and not seasonally adjusted)
Year Automobile Revolvine Other Total
(Jan)
1989 14,903 10,773 3,456 29,132
1990 17,294 22,850 6,944 47,088
1991 24,785 45,221 8,009 78,015
1992 31,452 63,426 10,023 104,901
1993 33,485 73,802 10,836 118,123
1994 38,020 79,321 10,771 128,112
1995 35,033 97,548 13,533 146,114
1996 42,585 151,640 19,639 213,864
1997 48,659 194,549 25,303 268,511
1998 63,066 221,805 26,275 311,146
Source, Federal Reserve Statistical Release
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Tables (T)
(T -5.3) Mortgages providers in the US (1980-1994)
Resint Comm S&L Pools & Comm Comm S&L Life
Year Total Banks Trusts Total Banks Insur.
($ bil) (%) (%) (%) ($ bil) (%) (%) (%)
1980 965 16.6 50.5 12.6 256 31.6 24.1 31.6
1981 1040 16.4 48.2 13.6 276 32.6 22.9 31.8
1982 1082 16.1 42.3 17.8 302 33.9 22.0 31.0
1983 1200 15.2 40.2 21.6 355 33.9 23.5 29.3
1984 1335 14.7 39.6 22.7 421 36.3 24.9 26.4
1985 1505 14.2 36.8 25.4 487 37.2 23.8 26.2
1986 1707 13.8 32.7 30.4 561 39.7 21.6 26.6
1987 1936 14.2 31.1 33.8 663 40.6 22.8 25.1
1988 2169 15.4 31.0 33.4 703 41.3 20.1 26.7
1989 2409 16.2 27.8 35.0 754 42.7 17.8 27.2
1990 2615 17.4 22.9 37.9 758 44.1 14.4 28.4
1991 2778 17.4 19.4 40.7 759 44.4 11.4 28.2
1992 2954 17.2 16.6 42.3 714 46.1 9.6 27.8
1993 3146 17.7 15.0 42.1 700 46.4 8.9 26.8
1994 3339 18.3 14.2 42.7 696 47.9 7.8 24.6
Resint : Residential
Comm : Commercial
Source, DEeD (1995)
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Tables (T)
(T-5.4) Net Mortgage lending in the UK (1972-1992)
( in milion pounds)
Year Banks Building Societies Total Banks (%)
(Dec)
1972 345 2215 2560 13.48
1973 310 1999 2309 13.43
1974 90 1490 1580 5.70
1975 60 2768 2828 2.12
1976 80 3618 3698 2.16
1977 120 4100 4220 2.84
1978 276 5112 5388 5.12
1979 597 5269 5866 10.18
1980 593 5715 6308 9.40
1981 2448 6323 8771 27.91
1982 5078 8133 13211 38.44
1983 3531 10904 14435 24.46
1984 2043 14530 16573 12.33
1985 4223 14627 18850 22.40
1986 5200 19427 24627 21.12
1987 10104 14917 25021 40.38
1988 10879 23720 34599 31.44
1989 7034 24002 31036 22.66
1990 6400 24140 30540 20.96
1991 4790 20927 25717 18.63
1992 6485 13612 20097 32.27
Source, Abstract of Banking and Financial Statistics
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Tables (T)
(T -5.5) MBS and ABS issues in the UK (1987-1994)
( in milion pounds)
Year Residential Lease Auto Total
Mortgages Receivables Receivables
1987 1000 - - 1000
1988 3301 - - 3301
1989 2427 - - 2427
1990 2246 - 328 2574
1991 2759 - 450 3209
1992 298 563 200 1293
1993 913 165 294 2266
1994 2563 88 - 3375
Source, OEeD (1995)
(T -5.6) Originators of ABS in the UK (1987-1994)
( in milion pounds)
Year Centralized Banks Leasing Total
lenders Companies
1987 900 100 - 1000
1988 2106 735 - 3301
1989 1777 475 - 2427
1990 1771 803 - 2580
1991 2219 - 450 3209
1992 360 370 563 1293
1993 463 1637 165 2266
1994 562 2538 88 3375
Source, OECD (1995)
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Tables (T)
(T -6.1) Card fraud in the UK (1990-95)
El Based on ABS
IIBased on FS
E 35
Q)
a.
~ 30
'0
§ 25
o
~20
o
': 15Q)
a.
in 10
Q)
o
æ 5
o
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Year Fraud only in Fraud Outstanding* Lending** Lending * Outstanding
bank (cc)** (total) * * (%)
1990 76 125.6 9012 27742 (A) . ------
1991 81.2 165.6 9786 29350 (A) ------
1992 76.7 165 9888 31272 (A) ------
1993 57.6 129.8 10461 33508 41039 25%
1994 43.5 96.8 11914 37330 41387 29%
1995 40 88 13836 39450 47697 29%
(in million pounds)
*: Figures from Financial Statistics and Quarterly Report of Bank of England
(A): Figures before 1993 were not available from the QRBE or the Bank of England
**: Figures from Abstract of Banking Statistics
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Tables (T)
(T -6.2) Branches and ATM networks in the UK
Year Branches ATMs
Banks Building Banks Building
Societies Societies
1974 14543 3099 1390 -----
1975 14483 3375 1768 -----
1976 14477 3696 1876 -----
1977 14460 4130 2156 -----
1978 14271 4595 2140 -----
1979 14735 5147 2141 -----
1980 14702 5684 2422 -----
1981 14718 6162 3065 -----
1982 14671 6480 3869 6
1983 14492 6643 5347 112
1984 14361 6816 6172 291
1985 14289 6926 7702 652
1986 14008 6954 8625 1286
1987 13813 6962 9885 2072
1988 13702 6912 11003 2654
1989 13467 6236 12390 2578
1990 12994 6051 13283 2921
1991 12306 5921 13572 3344
1992 11751 5765 13863 3531
1993 11445 5654 14094 3677
1994 11078 ----- 14606 ------
Annual Abstract of Banking statistics (1996)
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Tables (T)
(T -6.3) Consumer Revolving Credit in the US (1968-96)
( in $ milion and not seasonally adjusted)
(Jan) Commercial Finance Credit Unions S&L No-Finance
1968 1,401 - - - -
1969 2,271 - - - -
1970 3,907 - - - -
1971 5,142 - - - 2,402
1972 5,915 - - - 2,552
1973 7,260 - - - 2,512
1974 9,274 - - - 2,517
1975 11,204 - - - 2,642
1976 12,382 - - - 2,731
1977 14,328 - - - 17,883
1978 18,644 - - - 20,151
1979 24,746 - - - 23,054
1980 29,801 - - - 26,363
1981 29,705 - - 25 27,991
1982 32,542 - - 341 30,541
1983 36,313 - - 877 31,744
1984 43,118 - 67 1,713 36,616
1985 61,445 295 1,021 3,640 39,306
1986 79,308 2,875 1,704 6,185 40,275
1987 87,800 5,455 3,704 7,788 39,735
1988 103,981 8,035 4,423 8,848 43,047
1989 114,143 10,615 4,706 8,666 40,707
1990 128,481 13,195 5,050 7,037 41,288
1991 127,083 15,775 5,268 7,861 42,162
1992 133,939 18,355 7,504 8,266 38,930
1993 130,079 20,935 9,547 9,838 41,961
1994 146,196 23,515 11,111 10,058 47,879
1995 178,655 26,095 13,071 9,191 53,840
1996 200,080 28,675 15,223 8,532 50,520
Source, Federal Reserve System
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Tables (T)
(T -6.4) Employment in the UK banking sector during the period
1974 -1994
Year Members of BBA Part time Building Societies
1974 265900 ----- 32685
1975 273800 ----- 34949
1976 274500 ----- 37377
1977 279300 ----- 41089
1978 292100 ----- 44932
1979 297600 ----- 49170
1980 315800 ----- 52727
1981 322200 ----- 55377
1982 347500 ----- 58149
1983 342600 ----- 61192
1984 346100 ----- 63114
1985 350800 ----- 65691
1986 372200 36600 69266
1987 391200 38700 74294
1988 417100 41100 80117
1989 427400 46700 74604
1990 444800 49300 76382
1991 430300 49300 79180
1992 406200 48200 79403
1993 382800 48700 106907
1994 371100 50500 -----
Annual Abstract of Banking statistics (1996)
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